Canberra, 14 August 1953

Secret

Some Current Matters of International Affairs

MEMORANDUM BY MINISTER FOR EXTERNAL AFFAIRS

[matter omitted]

Communist China

There are two separate but closely a1lied questions, the diplomatic recognition of the Communists as the Government of China; and the admission of Communist China to the U.N.

This is a question on which it would not be wise to commit oneself too far ahead. The chief argument in favour of recognising Communist China is that it has effective control over the mainland of China. It is not a question of whether we like the Peking Government or not. It is very difficult to have any negotiations or reach any understandings with China unless we are prepared to talk to the Peking Government and regard it as a Government able to enter into commitments. Moreover if China has diplomatic and other relations with no one except the Soviet Union and other Communist countries, it is cut off from the rest of the world, and there is no opportunity to influence them. This throws Peking closer into the arms of Moscow.

One of the reasons for not recognising Communist China was that it had committed an act of aggression by invading the Republic of Korea and it was engaged in active hostilities against Australian and other troops. Now that the fighting has ended¹ we will have an opportunity of re–examining Chinese intentions and policies in the light of their behaviour at the Korean Political Conference and perhaps in Indo–China. The Americans in particular object to an early recognition of Peking (and her entry into the U.N.)–on the argument that a country should not be allowed to 'shoot its way into respectability'.

The attitude of the United States is an admitted factor deterring us from deciding too quickly to recognise Communist China. The United States Government is at present strongly committed not to recognise Peking. This is partly an emotional reaction against Communism and partly a feeling that the policies of the Roosevelt and Truman administrations were responsible .for the collapse of Chiang Kai–shek. It is not necessarily true that Australia should not take any action that was inconsistent with American views but it seems to me common sense that we should not be too much out of step with a country whose cooperation is essential to Australian security.

The question of recognition of Communist China and its admission to the United Nations has a number of other complexities. In the first place there is not much point in our recognising Peking if Peking in its turn does not follow suit by agreeing to the re–establishment of normal diplomatic relations with us. Though the U.K. recognised the Communist Government in 1949, the Communists have still not agreed to receive a British Ambassador nor have they sent an Ambassador to London. In the second place, even though we might eventually be prepared to recognise Peking as the Government of the mainland of China, we would not be prepared to hand Formosa over to the Communists for strategic and other reasons. The possibility exists of recognising two Chinese Governments, one of the Chinese mainland and the other of Formosa. The latter might possibly be under trusteeship. This however would not at this stage be acceptable to the Chinese Communists, though it might form a matter for negotiations.

Yet another complexity about recognising Chiang Kai–shek as the Government of Formosa, is that the Chinese are only a minority of the Island's population, the Formosans being a different people.

Admission of Communist China to the United Nations would mean they would take the place now occupied by Nationalist China, thus giving them membership of the Security Council with the right of veto. The Nationalist Chinese, if they were also to be kept in the United Nations by virtue of their control over Formosa, would have to be admitted as a new and additional member, presumably with a new name such as 'Taiwan' (or Formosa); and in any case they would not retain their permanent membership of the Security Council with its right of veto.

For all the reasons stated above, our best policy for the time being seems to be to wait and see and not to commit ourselves firmly to any course of action as regards recognition or non–recognition.

I believe that if countries like ourselves were to show at this juncture signs that we wished to hasten recognition of Communist China and her representation in the United Nations, we might force the United States into firm positions in opposition to such a move which they (United States) might later find it difficult to move from.

In the long run, recognition, short of some extraordinary circumstances, may well be inevitable. I think that general recognition of Communist China is likely to be hastened rather than retarded by a policy at this juncture of not pushing the United States too hard.

[matter omitted]

R.G. Casey
Minister for External Affairs²

[NAA: A1838, 3107/3311, i]

1 An Armistice Agreement was signed in Korea on 27 July 1953.

2 On 18 August, Cabinet 'noted' the contents of the submission.