Volume 22: Australia and Recognition of the People’s Republic of China, 1949–1972
Canberra, 29 September .1955
Top Secret
Australian Policy on Formosa and the Off-Shore Islands
Differences of policy between the United Kingdom and the United States have made it difficult to define publicly Australia's policy on Formosa and the off-shore islands.
2. However, at all times, and with Cabinet approval (*1), Australia has drawn a distinction between Formosa and the Pescadores on the one hand and the offshore islands on the other.
3. The Prime Minister has described the juridical position of Formosa as very obscure (*2). Because of this obscurity, and for strategic and political reasons, we have wanted to keep Formosa and the Pescadores out of Communist hands (*1)(*2).
4. In order to deny Formosa to the Communists, Australia has sought to strengthen the international position of Formosa as much as possible. We wish to see Formosa given the military and political strength to ensure that its future will be decided peacefully and not as a result of Communist policies of force. To this end we are concerned about morale on Formosa (*3).
5. Australia does not aim, however, at propping up Chiang Kai–shek and his regime (*3). We have been careful to avoid referring to Chiang in our statements supporting Formosa.
6. On the other hand, we have suggested that a way should be left open for an eventual settlement on the status of Formosa on the basis of the freely expressed wishes of the inhabitants (*3).
7. The off–shore islands, which have never been part of the Japanese Empire, are in a different category. We have recognised that the situation in these islands has affected our efforts to build up and support the international position of Formosa (*4).
8. The off–shore islands (Quemoy and Matsu) are not regarded as important in themselves. The objective has been to enable the Nationalist Chinese to withdraw and the Americans to disentangle themselves without seriously affecting anti–communist morale in Formosa and the rest of Asia (*5). We regard American disengagement as a means of reducing the present serious risk of war and as a first step to strengthening the Western position of Formosa generally (*3). Cabinet has agreed unanimously that we must urge restraint on the United States (*1).
9. Australia has supported the United Kingdom view that it is important to get a sheet of water between the Communists and the Nationalists (*2). Nevertheless, we have not encouraged a simple withdrawal by the Nationalists from the off–shore islands. We consider that, given the present uncertainty of the free world towards Formosa, the effects of such a withdrawal on Nationalist morale could be serious. We do not consider that a withdrawal would be a farreaching contribution to peace unless accompanied by something else which would stiffen morale on Formosa and indicate to the rest of the world, particularly South East Asia, that this withdrawal did not foreshadow further withdrawals elsewhere (*6).
10. In the same way, although the Prime Minister has said it would be 'monstrous if the off–shore islands precipitated war' (*2) and 'Australia would not think the destiny of the off–shore islands worth a great war' (*7), he has also said that if the Communists attacked the islands we could only view with concern a military defeat to the Nationalists which might weaken their will or ability to hold Formosa itself (*8).
11. It follows that Australia believes that force should not be used by either the Communists or the Nationalists. We cannot support military efforts by the� Republic of China to re–establish itself on the mainland (*4) and we believe thatFormosa should not be used for attacks on the Chinese mainland or the off–shore islands (*3).
12. On the other hand, the possibilities of obtaining any understanding between the Nationalist Chinese and Peking on the future of the off–shore islands have been limited while Peking has consistently threatened to use force not merely against the islands but against Formosa itself (*5). If the Communists showed signs of accepting the position that force should not be used to take Formosa, we believe the settlement of the off–shore islands would be easier to achieve (*8).
13. Since last year we have suggested an examination of the problem by like–minded Governments with a view to subsequent diplomatic approaches to Peking and Moscow to reduce tension and the possibilities of Communist attacks (*9).
14. Australia has hoped for a lessening of tension between the Communists and the Nationalists so as to reduce the dangers of war that could grow into a world war (*4). In the context of the Great Power talks at Geneva this year we asked our representatives in London, Washington and Wellington to convey to the Governments the view that, as far as the Far East was concerned, we would welcome any development at Geneva which would tend to confirm the situation where neither side would undertake military operations (*8).
15. We have suggested there should be friendly pressure, by those of the Commonwealth countries with appropriate lines of communication, on both Washington and Peking to behave sensibly (*2).
16. At the same time as we have sought to reduce tension, our objective has been to find an arrangement to cover both the off–shore islands and Formosa in one stroke (*6).
17. To meet this objective we have proposed a joint declaration to the effect that any attempt to decide the fate of Formosa and the Pescadores by force would be resisted. We suggested this declaration should be made by as many countries as possible, with the United States, United Kingdom, Canada, New Zealand and Australia as essential participants. We hoped this would enable us to solve the problem of the off–shore islands while avoiding the damage that would occur if the abandonment of the islands were unconditional (*6).
18. In considering departmentally the possibility of exploratory talks with Peking, we have been aware of the dangers of negotiations confined to Formosa and the Pescadores alone lest we tie ourselves to negotiations which would be bound to fail unless we were prepared to make concessions on Formosa. Our view has been that we might be prepared to make concessions elsewhere in return for Communist concessions on Formosa.
19. Australia considered the Bandung offer of Chou En–lai to negotiate with the Americans to ease tensions as an opportunity to explore a settlement much wider than that of the Formosa/off–shore islands problem. We suggested to the United States that Communist China might be invited to attend a Four Power Conference in respect of Asian matters, the Conference thus becoming to that extent a Five Power one. As the Conference would consider a vast variety of causes and places of tension, we suggested that the vexed question of the attendance of Nationalist China need not arise until a later stage when Formosa and the off–shore islands fell for consideration (*10).
20. In line with the policy of seeking a co–ordinated approach towards a general settlement with China, the Secretary suggested to the Minister on 10th September that recognition of Peking should be considered not only in the context of the independence ofFormosa and the status of the off–shore islands, but also in the context of a general settlement in which Peking would give adequate assurances about abstention from force, implementation of the Korean and Indo–China settlements etc.
Legend
*1. Cabinet decision of 28th January 1955. (Telegram from the Minister to the Prime Minister.)
*2. Statement by Prime Minister at Prime Ministers' Conference in London on 7th February 1955.1
*3. Letter from the Prime Minister to the Acting High Commissioner for the United Kingdom–16th April 1955.2
*4. Statement of the Secretary to the Chinese Minister on 1st September 1955.3
*5. Savingram Guidance–13th May 1955.4
*6. Letter from the Prime Minister to the Acting High Commissioner for the United Kingdom–25th April 1955.5
*7. Statement by the Prime Minister to the Press–London–9th February 1955.6
*8. Telegram to London, Washington and Wellington–13th July 1955.7
*9. Telegram from the Minister to Washington, London and Wellington–5th November 1954.8
*10. Telegram from the Prime Minister to Dulles–27th April 1955.9
1 Not published.
2 See editorial note–Australia's Proposal for a Commonwealth Guarantee of Formosa.
3 Not published.
4 Not published.
5 See editorial note–Australia's Proposal for a Commonwealth Guarantee of Formosa.
6 See note 2, Document 50.
7 It asked that the Governments of the United States, the United Kingdom and New Zealand be informed of the Australian Government's opinion that Far Eastern issues should be discussed at the four–power conference in Geneva. It added that: 'United States at present has ruled out any initiative by them on offshore islands and seems to be basing its hopes on a de facto ceasefire becoming so well established that it would be difficult for Communists to break it. Americans may be overestimating extent to which this de facto ceasefire actually exists at present. Chinese Communist wireless frequently broadcasts reports of Nationalist planes being shot down over mainland, minor sea clashes are occurring and in any case Communists are building airfields and military strength on mainland opposite Formosa. Consequently we would welcome any development at Geneva which would tend to confirm situation where neither side will undertake military operations'.
8 Not found.
9 Document 53.