Taipei, 23 October 1970

Secret

The China/Taiwan Problem

Canada's recognition of Peking and the likelihood that the U.N. vote on Chinese representation this year will be more adverse to Taiwan than ever before have prompted the following observations. They may be relevant for the analysis of Australian policies towards mainland China and Taiwan which the Department will no doubt undertake with the 1971 U.N. session in mind, if for no other purpose. The observations are, as far as possible, in the form of propositions. They could be elaborated upon if necessary, but many seem axiomatic.

2. Two earlier memoranda from here are relevant. One (memorandum No. 79 of 12th February 1970)¹ discussed Australian political, economic and strategic interests in Taiwan. The second (memorandum No. 176 of 3rd April, 1970) recalled some Departmental thinking on the subject of Chinese representation in the U.N. in the early 1960's.²

3. A copy of this memorandum is being sent to Tokyo because of the importance of Japan's policies to this question, and because the Secretary might wish to see it if China is among the subjects to be discussed there.

4. Leaving aside such very important questions as individual countries' specific national interests in Taiwan or the mainland (trade, investment and so on), and the effect of Peking's entry on the U.N. organization, the following are among the major elements in the China problem which will have to be considered:

(a) Peking's claim to sovereignty over Taiwan;

(b) Taiwan's claim to be the Government of China and thus to sovereignty over the mainland;

(c) Both parties' claims that their dispute is an internal Chinese affair in which other countries, or international bodies, have no right to interfere;

(d) The U.S. defence commitment to Taiwan (which could be significant for ANZUS);

(e) The risk of subjecting the people on Taiwan and the mainland to war or political instability or reprisal.

5. In considering what approach to the problem might best protect our own interests, the following considerations seem important:

(a) If Taiwan is expelled or leaves the U.N., no guarantees of readmission could be relied upon.

(b) With Taiwan outside the U.N., the effectiveness and credibility of the U.S. defence commitment to the island could be greatly affected. Commitments to South Korea and West Germany are not parallels–the rival governments are not in the U.N. Peking could be on the Security Council with its claim to sovereignty over Taiwan at least tacitly accepted by a majority of U.N. members.

(c) With Taiwan outside the U.N., the pressures on other countries to break diplomatic relations with it would be greatly increased. There could be major strains between regional countries. A.S.P.A.C. could be seriously affected.

(d) Countries friendly to Taiwan should work to avoid U.N. decisions which would provoke a walk-out by the R.O.C. Extensive and persuasive discussions with the R.O.C. would be needed to establish clearly some reasonable limits within which the R.O.C. would not walk out. (To our knowledge no decisions have yet been made here on such questions.) Support for the R.O.C. in many countries could best be maintained if the idea that the future of Taiwan should be decided peacefully and in a. way which took account of the views of the Chinese people concerned is heavily stressed. Actual and potential support could easily be dissipated or negated if Taipei pitched too high its conditions for remaining in the U.N. The task of influencing the R.O.C. on this point would be onerous.

(e) Final policy decisions here rest solely with President Chiang; other personages (including Chiang Ching-kuo)³ might counsel moderation for particular tactical reasons (whether political or economic) but in the last resort they carry little weight. Any attempts to influence R.O.C. thinking would have to take account of this fact.

(f) The only influential diplomatic missions here are the Americans and Japanese. Even so, the R.O.C. Government is suspicious of the long-term intentions of both countries (despite such indications of near-permanency of stay as heavy investment, and construction of or plans for new Chanceries and official Residences which make oral assurances quite concrete). There is a considerable stock of good-will for Australia as a consistent friend but it could be very quickly dissipated in discussions on the question of Chinese representation or on other matters on which there were wide differences of views on questions of national policy.

(g) American and Japanese interests here appear largely to coincide with ours.

(h) Even if there were a simple majority in the U.N. for the Albanian resolution, there would still be something like the same number of countries which would be reluctant to see Taiwan expelled from the U.N. However, explicit two-Chinas moves, obviously unacceptable to Peking, could smack of trickery in Taiwan's favour. Attempts to develop proposals to the effect that there are now two states successor to the China which joined the U.N. would run into this difficulty, except in the unlikely event that Peking and, to a lesser degree Taiwan, suspended their claims to sovereignty.

(i) It may be too late to reconsider the pros and cons of seeking to have a U.N. study group on the question set up. Any such proposal made next year might well be seen as a delaying tactic in Taiwan's favour. Moreover, the outcome of study by a group of unpredictable composition might be unhelpful to our interests.

6. From the above some very generalized lines of thought emerge:

(a) It is a matter for decision whether Australian interests in the China/Taiwan question call for any early or sustained initiative. Deep involvement could affect established relations with Taiwan and possibly any dealings we have or might wish to have with the mainland. We might, however, wish to explore actively the thinking of other countries and thereafter drop into a less active role.

(b) In any event we should keep in particularly close touch with U.S. and Japanese thinking on the China question in the next year and as necessary subsequently. We might consider undertaking a series of bilateral consultations within a small 'study group' of friendly countries. Periodic meetings (preferably in Washington for security reasons), to exchange ideas on how to preserve a position for Taiwan in the U.N. (assuming this would be a defined common objective) or at least to assure it of an international status sufficient to justify external assistance with defence in particular, would be helpful.

(c) The role of missions in Taipei might be to sound out–possibly on a 'personal' basis–R.O.C. reaction to thinking that seemed promising as a result of such exchanges of views.

(d) The U.K. and Canada might from time to time be asked to attempt similar soundings in Peking. They would presumably not wish to be members of a 'friendly nations' study group; their position in Peking could be affected if the existence of a group of which they were members became known.

7. One line of thought which might be worth pursuing is that of preparing a draft declaratory resolution for use whenever the vote on Chinese representation is likely to go against us, or had already done so, and there was a real risk of the R.O.C. either being expelled or walking out. To win a majority, such a resolution would have to be in very general terms. It might however express international concern at the continuation of the dispute between the authorities in Taiwan and Peking, express the hope that this dispute would be settled peacefully, and declare that, until there is a peaceful settlement, both parties should observe Charter principles and are regarded by the U.N. as having the rights and obligations inherent in the Charter. (It would admittedly be hard to sustain a large majority for such a resolution which would favour the U.S. and to some extent Taiwan, and be in effect an exhortation to Peking. But it would presumably need only a simple majority.)

8. Studies might also examine (a) possible variations on the 'successor states' approach and on the study group approach, (b) the prospects of persuading both parties (and as a tactical matter the R.O.C. in particular) to declare publicly that they would abstain from the use of force in pursuit of their claims or leave them in abeyance in the interests of a peaceful settlement, and (c) whether the pattern of having three Russian seats (U.S.S.R., Ukraine, Byelorussia) could provide any possible future parallel for the case of China. At first glance none of these approaches appears likely to be very productive in the short term at least.

9. It might be worth recalling a remark by the U.S. Chargé⁴ here some weeks ago to the effect that the U.S. this year did not want any third proposals blurring the issue on the 'important question' and Albanian resolutions. (As you know, it has discouraged Belgian and other thinking on new approaches.) It does not seem fanciful to think that the U.S. has had it in mind that a sharp revelation of the precariousness of the R.O.C.'s position might be salutary in making the Government here more receptive to pressure for modifications in its stand. The U.S. might therefore be glad to exchange ideas with countries working towards similar goals.

10. Copies of this memorandum are being sent to Washington and Tokyo for information, and comment is desired.

[NAA: A1838, 3107/38118, i]

1 Document 135.

2 Dunn had pointed out that during Menzies' tenure as Minister for External Affairs, consideration was given to the idea of putting forward a resolution that would seat both Chinas, as successor states to the original ROC, with the Security Council seat passing to Peking. This had been seen as means of preserving a seat for Taiwan, and placing the onus on the PRC for rejection of the offer.

3 General Chiang Ching-kuo was at this time Defence Minister of the Republic of China.

4 O.V. Armstrong, US Deputy Chief of Mission in Taipei.