Canberra, 9 February 1971

Secret

Australia's Policy Towards China

[matter omitted]

III Australian Policy to Date

42. Australia extends de jure recognition to the Government of the Republic of China, resident in Taipei, as the government of China. It does not recognise the Government of the People's Republic of China, although it has indirect dealings with it, mainly in respect of trade. Australia has had consular or diplomatic representation in the Republic of China since the early 1930's, with an Australian diplomatic mission in the capital from 1941 to 1949, and again from 1966, when Australia established an Embassy in Taiwan, to the present day. There was no Australian mission in the ROC between 1949 and 1966. There has been a ROC consular or diplomatic mission continuously in Australia since 1935. Australia has consistently supported the right of the Republic of China to represent China in all the organs of the United Nations and has opposed the seating of the People's Republic of China since 1949.

43. Annex D¹ sets out in more detail the Australian Government's attitude towards the PRC during the period 1949 to 1970, and summarises the reasons behind that policy as well as some of the arguments by Government Ministers, both in favour of and opposed to a change of policy.

IV The Need for Review

44. There is now an urgent need to review our policy towards China, for four reasons:

(a) A major reason is the growing international acceptability of the PRC. Trends that have developed recently in the international community can be expected to lead to an increasing number of countries recognising Peking, at the expense of Taiwan. This will serve to isolate our present position.

(b) The last Australian review took place in 1958, when Cabinet decided that our diplomatic policy should not deviate from that of the United States.² The latter has begun to modify its policies in South East Asia so as to reduce its military presence in the region and, at the same time, to impart greater flexibility and subtlety to American policies. This has involved a gradual search for a détente with Peking, and President Nixon has now called for a paper reviewing United States policy towards the PRC. We will not be prepared to face foreseeable new situations unless we too review our policy.

(c) Present international trade trends–the increasing difficulty in finding adequate outlets for our primary products, the tightening protectionism in the United States attitude, the implications for Australia of Britain's likely entry into the EEC–threaten a breakdown of our traditional trading patterns. This makes it imperative that we should seek to expand our trade with other potential markets, one of the biggest of which is the PRC.

(d) Within Australia, public support for the established policy of non-recognition of Communist China has weakened considerably. Few academics favour it, the press seems largely opposed, and public opinion generally has shifted. A Gallup Poll in the Melbourne Herald on 6 October 1970, showed that since 1969 more people ( 49%) were in favour of recognising Communist China than were opposed (35% ). Thirteen per cent were in favour of removing Taiwan from the United Nations in favour of Peking, 40% were opposed and 47% were undecided.

[matter omitted]

VI China's Representation in the United Nations

120. The question before the United Nations is not one of the admission of a new member. China is a member of the United Nations. Its seat is at present occupied by the Government of the Republic of China. The problem of China's representation is basically an issue over which Government is the rightful representative of China and therefore entitled to its seat in the General Assembly as well as in the Security Council.

121. Through the following discussion it is important to bear this in mind and not to confuse the issue with essentially irrelevant discussion of whether Peking is a peace-loving state and whether it observes the Declaration of Human Rights. These secondary aspects have in the past been used by supporters of the ROC and by those opposed to the seating of Peking as justification for their particular political stands on China's representation. They are relevant only insofar as the United Nations Charter concerns itself with requirements for United Nations' membership and to the extent that such requirements have been used in practice as legal weapons either to keep Peking out and Taipei in, or the reverse.

122. Both supporters and opponents of Peking's seating and of Taiwan's expulsion have used Charter arguments to achieve their political objectives on this issue. The most widely used argument in favour of Peking being seated at the United Nations has been based on the so-called 'principle of universality'–that the PRC along with every other nation has the right to. be represented in the United Nations.

123. No such general unqualified principle exists under Article 4(1).³ It is hedged about by requirements that joining members must be 'peace-loving', 'accept obligations contained in the Charter' and be 'able and willing' to carry these out; the question whether they meet these requirements is a matter for 'the judgement of the Organisation', by decision of the General Assembly upon the recommendation of the Security Council.

124. Opponents of Peking's admission have played Peking's supporters at their own game on this point by pointing to China's international behavior as being incompatible with the Charter qualifications imposed on the 'principle of universality'.

125. The other main argument which has been put forward is that Chinese representation in the United Nations is merely a matter of credentials, that Article 4 (1) in effect does not apply. It has been said that recognition of the credentials of the ROC should be withdrawn and transferred to the PRC. This would mean that the ROC would be unseated.

126. We and our other allies have opposed the unseating of the ROC on the grounds of Article 18(2), which lists among those matters which must be treated as an important question requiring a two-thirds majority, 'the expulsion of members'. It should be noted that this too has been used as a legal justification for a political issue of enormous importance in a situation where there is no precedent.

127. In recent years the General Assembly has had before it the question of Chinese representation in the United Nations in the form of two resolutions:

(a) a procedural resolution declaring that, in accordance with Article 18 of the Charter of the United Nations, any proposal to change the representation of China is an 'important question', requiring the assent of two-thirds of the members present and voting;

(b) a substantive resolution, usually introduced by Albania and others and known as the 'Albanian' resolution, calling for the seating of Communist China and the simultaneous expulsion of the Nationalist Chinese.

128. Other approaches have been tried from time to time, including in 1967 and 1968, a draft resolution submitted by Italy, Belgium and others, which sought to establish a committee of member states to explore and study the question, in order later to recommend to the General Assembly an 'equitable and practical' solution; and, in 1970, a draft Belgian resolution which called for a 'two-Chinas' solution on lines similar to a Canadian proposal of 1966. These approaches all failed for a variety of reasons that do not immediately concern us here.

129. CURRENT POSITION AFTER THE 25TH SESSION

The position has changed. Until this year the procedural (Important Question) resolution on China's representation had been held with comfortable majorities, and the substantive (Albanian) resolution had been defeated by small but solid majorities. In this year's vote the Albanian resolution for the first time obtained a simple majority of votes cast: 51 in favour to 49 against (Australia) with 25 abstentions (48–56–21 in 1969).

130. The result had no practical effect, however, because the earlier adoption of the procedural resolution, even if with a diminished majority (66 (Australia)–52–7 as against 71–48–4 in 1969), had established that two-thirds majority would be required for the passage of any substantive resolution.

131. The procedural resolution, justified on the ground of Article 18(2) of the Charter (which was designed to protect the Organisation against decisions on important matters by small majorities and as such constitutes a most important protection for small and medium countries), was introduced in 1961 essentially as a tactic to hold the line against Peking.

132. In more recent years, however, with the growing power and status of the PRC the emphasis has changed to protection of the ROC's position in the United Nations.

133. It has been acknowledged that once a simple majority has been gained for the Albanian resolution, it will become much more difficult in subsequent years to deny admission to Peking in the face of the wishes of a plurality of United Nations members. This has now happened and we are faced with the likelihood that within a few years, perhaps as early as the next General Assembly Session, in nine months time, the Important Question resolution will be defeated or the Albanian resolution achieve a two-thirds majority, resulting in the expulsion of the ROC and the seating of the PRC. This would be a major political victory for the PRC, and a diplomatic defeat for the United States.

134. Australian policy has been based on the view that an acceptable relationship between the PRC and the rest of the world cannot be achieved simply by admission to the United Nations or recognition of the regime of Mao Tse-tung and the expulsion of Taiwan. This policy had meaning so long as keeping the PRC out of the United Nations, or stemming the tide of recognition of the PRC, were practical possibilities. Now that these objectives are achievable, if at all, for only a very short time to come, we are forced to examine the utility of other formulae with a view to averting an outcome on China's representation which, with the expulsion of Taiwan, would constitute the worst possible result for the United States, Japan, perhaps some South East Asian governments and ourselves.

135. In examining alternative approaches to the problem of Chinese representation in the United Nations it is essential that we bear in mind that any further long-term attempt to keep the PRC out of the United Nations is bound to fail, with potentially grave implications for our interests going beyond the damage that such a political defeat would inflict on our prestige.

136. The Albanian/Important Question resolution combination may work again this year–it is too early to seek to apply the arithmetic involved–but it is most unlikely to work again after that.

137. Unless we are prepared to stand by and witness the expulsion of the ROC, our aim should clearly be to see whether a potentially more successful device than the Important Question/ Albanian resolution combination can be found. If our assessment is correct, that present tactics will lead to the entry of Peking on the worst possible terms for the Western allies, then the time to adopt new tactics is now rather than next year. We need, as a matter of urgency, to engage with our friends and allies in a search for a formula which might preserve Taiwan's right to representation in the United Nations, in the full knowledge that any formula which provides in effect for the representation of both Chinas will certainly be rejected by Peking, and failing a change of attitude, by Taipei also. But this need not concern us unduly: on the one hand, it is in the general Western interest, our own included, to put the onus on Peking to take its seat: on the other, if we are seriously concerned with principle, Taiwan's right to representation is a sound moral position and it is this that we would be defending rather than Taiwan's physical presence in the United Nations.

138. This is not to say that we should do less than our best to persuade the ROC to face the facts of life and accept a lesser and separate status in the United Nations.

139. A number of formulae have been proposed, all aimed at preserving Taiwan's position. The simplest is a modified Albanian resolution which would provide for the admission of the PRC without mentioning Taiwan. While this formula–often referred to as a 'Zambian-type' resolution–has the attraction of simplicity, it is dangerously ambiguous, Taiwan's position resting entirely on an unspoken and easily overturned understanding that Taiwan remains a member.

140. It could, however, attract some support from a significant number of countries anxious for Peking's admission but reluctant to support the expulsion of Taiwan.

141. These countries might see an easy way out with such a formula, despite the fact that it in no way provides for the enduring membership of Taiwan. The inherent danger in this formula is that Peking might indeed be tempted to assume China's seat; from the Security Council she could then be expected to work energetically for the total expulsion of the ROC's representatives.

142. The issue could well bring the United Nations to a complete halt, possibly for much longer than a single session. In terms of tactics a simple Zambian-type resolution contains almost as many pitfalls as the present Albanian/Important Question approach.

143. A second formula that has sometimes been discussed is along overtly 'One China–One Taiwan' lines. Under this the PRC would occupy the Chinese seat in the General Assembly and the Security Council and the ROC would continue, or be admitted to, membership as Taiwan. This formula is no better than the previous one on a number of grounds: it establishes the General Assembly, by precedent, as an arbiter of the existence and definition of states, a role not provided for it in the Charter and which few members would wish to see it assume, however anxious they might be for a settlement of the China question; secondly, and of immediate importance, it is a formula that seems totally unacceptable to both Peking and Taipei, and the open espousal of which by Australia or any other country would inevitably expose that country to the bitter hostility of both.

144. The formula's acceptability is not improved by linking it–as is often done–with the concept of self-determination for the people of Taiwan. Whatever the moral soundness of the concept and its appropriateness to the situation in which the Taiwanese find themselves, it does not seem legally feasible for the United Nations to attempt to impose upon a sovereign state, the ROC, a demand to carry out a self-determination process.

145. Not only would this be completely offensive to both Taipei and Peking (which claims to be the sovereign state involved) but the international ramifications set by such a precedent would be enormous, exposing any or all states to similar demands at the whim of the shifting majorities of the General Assembly.

146. One formula that probably does bear exploring with our allies and friends is provided by a proposed 'dual succession' resolution. This is a declaratory resolution in which the General Assembly would state that control over the territory in respect of which the Republic of China was an original member of the United Nations was now effectively exercised by two governments, the Government of the People's Republic of China and the Government of the Republic of China; that each was a member of the United Nations in respect of the territory (undefined) over which it exercised control; and that the People's Republic of China was the member of the Security Council referred to in paragraph 1 of Article 23 of the Charter;⁴ and would invite the PRC to take its seat.

147. This formula has a number of advantages, principally that it would preserve a place for Taiwan, that it would put the onus on Peking to take its seat, and that in the event of Peking's doing so, its action would constitute formal endorsement of Taiwan's right to representation. It has been argued against the 'dual succession' formula that having taken its seat, or even before, Peking could demand the expulsion of Taiwan, but this is an argument against any formula designed to preserve Taiwan's place. The argument is weakened by the clear Charter provision for a two-thirds majority for the expulsion of a member, and by the great difficulty Peking and its supporters would face in attracting sufficient votes to reverse a General Assembly decision clearly confirming Taiwan's membership.

148. Arising out of the 'dual succession' formula is an idea which has found some favour and which seeks to encompass all the divided nations–China, Germany, Korea and Vietnam.

149. In this approach the ROC's supporters would seek to negotiate a package deal with the USSR, involving a Security Council recommendation that the General Assembly admit to the United Nations all four divided states simultaneously. Such a package deal offers a simple solution based on the widely-respected 'principle of universality', and could be expected to have considerable appeal, reinforced by the possible additional advantage that it would assist a solution of the problems of Germany and Korea and open up possibilities for a United Nations role in Vietnam.

150. It is, however, manifestly more complex than the simple 'dual succession' resolution applied to China alone. Not only could we expect opposition from Peking and possibly Taipei (again on the grounds that it would perpetuate a clear division of China), but the package approach would clearly throw up major difficulties, inter alia:

(a) the problem of Berlin and four power responsibilities;

(b) the problem of which Government was to represent South Vietnam; and

(c) South Korea's position vis-a-vis United Nations peace-keeping forces stationed there.

151. The divided nations package deal is an imaginative approach to a series of seemingly intractable political problems, but, with the possible exception of East Germany, it is difficult to see that it would hold much appeal at this stage to the countries principally involved, to say nothing of their supporters.

152. Nor would it be profitable to link this approach, as has sometimes been done, with amendment of the United Nations Charter, aimed at enlarging the permanent membership of the Security Council. Any Charter amendment would need to be effected with a view to long-term reform of the United Nations. To attach it to the China question as a means of solving the latter, is likely to result in the opening of a Pandora's box that would do no more than confuse the China issue, and might itself prove incapable of solution.

153. We would need to have clear views on who we would like to see added to the Security Council, each with the power of the veto–certainly the PRC and Japan, but would we want Germany to be given a Security Council seat? Brazil would probably claim a seat, which would probably stimulate an Argentinian bid; the Africans would almost certainly seek at least one seat; India, too, would want one, with strenuous opposition and possibly a claim from Pakistan.

154. The PRC would demand and probably should be given a voice in the choice of its permanent associates. We would, in short, be confronted with a large number of very delicate and difficult questions on which we would have to make choices, instead of the more immediate one of the admission to the United Nations of all four divided states.

155. A fifth approach has been suggested, which combines elements of the Zambian-type and 'dual succession' formulae, with a protective Important Question resolution, in an amended form. The amended Important Question resolution would declare that in accordance with Article 18 of the Charter, any proposal to expel a member was an important question, and that the provisions of the resolution related to all members of the United Nations, 'including the Republic of China, whose government is resident in Taipei'.

156. Though essentially insurance against an Albanian resolution, the proposed resolution would have three substantive advantages: first, it would ensure that the ROC was recognised as a full member in its own right and that no question of credentials was involved; second, that any attempt to have the ROC expelled would require a two-thirds majority; and third, that if the ROC walked out on the admission of the PRC, it would not be treated as applying for new membership (requiring a Security Council recommendation, over which the PRC would have a veto) if it sought to rejoin later.

157. The substantive resolution would invite the PRC, as a member of the United Nations, to take its seat, and declare that the PRC is the permanent member of the Security Council referred to in paragraph 1 of Article 23 of the Charter. Such a formulation avoids the contentious issue of rival territorial claims as well as any overt references to two Chinas, and places the onus squarely on the PRC to accept or reject the invitation to take its seat, leaving the invitation open if the PRC does reject it. Taken together with the preceding Important Question resolution, it provides for membership of both Chinas, and offers to all countries not totally opposed to Taiwan's membership under any circumstances (a small minority) an even-handed solution to a complex and frustrating problem.

158. It is difficult to see any acceptable solution to the China issue in the United Nations which is not along the broad lines of one or other or a combination of the last three formulae outlined above – a 'dual-succession' formula, the divided nations approach, or a Zambian-type resolution combined with an amended Important Question resolution.

159. These and any other formulae which might be proposed are of course susceptible to severe and quite valid criticism on legal and procedural grounds. However, although legal and procedural justifications might need to be found–both for purposes of vote-catching in the United Nations and for domestic policy presentation–it should be kept in mind that the question is overwhelmingly a political one for which a political solution will have to be found, and that the General Assembly has in the past shown itself more than ready to disregard legal and procedural considerations.

160. The essential criteria by which any formula is to be judged should be its utility for our purposes and its political acceptability and we should be unrealistic if we rejected a formula which, though meeting those criteria, was of doubtful legality. We are likely to find that the outcome of the China issue will be a precedent-creating one for the United Nations Organisation and one which will have been conceived in political rather than strictly legal terms.

161. It is not possible at this time to assess the prospects of the various formulae outlined above, nor will it be until we have completed detailed consultations with the United States, Japan and New Zealand, and–and this is of crucial importance–ascertained the likelihood of any modification of ROC policy.

162. The United States, we know, will certainly work to retain a place for Taiwan, exactly how we do not yet know. The State Department is not convinced that the time has come to abandon the Important Question/ Albanian Resolution combination, but has sufficiently strong doubts to be casting about for alternative tactics.

163. The trend of Japanese thinking appears to be away from sponsorship and even support of the Important Question resolution, and towards some form of dual representation formula. Japan, like Australia, has impressed on Chiang Kai-shek the need for flexibility; as with our Ambassador's urging, Chiang merely listened without commenting. It is becoming clear, however, that whatever Japan's final policy decision, the Japanese Government's judgement of Japan's best interests in its particularly complex relationship with the two Chinas will prevent it from taking a leading part in promoting any formula.

164. New Zealand sees little, if any, value in present tactics, and is particularly attracted to the dual succession formula on grounds of both utility and numbers.

165. A new report from Washington indicates that the British have led the United States to believe that they have virtually decided to vote against the Important Question resolution this year. They have said that they would not support any further 'holding' operation, nor would they support a 'two Chinas' proposal. The United States has asked Britain not to take any final decisions pending the outcome of the United States review, but the British have stressed the urgency of the matter and have said that they might not be able to postpone their final decision.

166. ROC policy is crucial, but is not yet formed. At first it appeared that the ROC was determined to adhere to the Important Question tactic and seek to ensure its success by harder work. But more recently there have been indications that sections of the administration in Taipei are thinking in terms of dual representation, convinced that Peking would not accept a seat on those terms. The essential question is whether Chiang Kai-shek, with whom the final decision unalterably rests, would accept such a formula. The New Zealand Prime Minister⁵ thinks he might, but we cannot know.

167. Since we do not know with any clarity the minds of even our closest friends, we clearly cannot even begin to formulate our own policy. The only conclusion to be drawn in this very fluid situation is that we must commence without delay detailed consultations with them, with a view to establishing as firmly as possible the continued viability or otherwise of present tactics, and, in the almost certain event that they are judged likely to fail, to seek agreement on an alternative procedure.

168. The prospect of PRC participation in the organs of the United Nations and its specialised agencies is not a pleasant one. United Nations membership will not immediately 'tame' Peking, although it could bring to bear on it many influences which could be expected, in the long term, to have a moderating effect, at least to the extent of bringing Peking to play the game according to established international rules.

169. In the short term, however, Peking can be expected to assume leadership of and give fresh life to the lunatic fringe in the Afro-Asian group and to encourage radical tendencies outside it.

170. Its membership will make future agreements and accommodations more difficult to reach and probably strain some of those already achieved. It will, in fact, broaden rather than reduce the areas of potential disagreement between the PRC and the West, including Australia, and probably hinder the development of improved bilateral relations between them.

171. But we will have to accept and learn to live with all these disagreeable facts and probabilities, because it is inevitable that the way will shortly be opened to PRC participation and, even if the invitation is in terms not to the PRC's liking, it is unlikely that the PRC will fail to take advantage of it for more than a few years.

172. Indeed, it is in the interests of the United Nations, and of Australia and the West in general, that the PRC should participate in United Nations proceedings and be involved in United Nations discussions on vital issues such as disarmament and all major East and South-East Asian questions. There is a strong element of unreality in discussions and agreements on disarmament especially from which the PRC, a nuclear power, is excluded, and there are parallels in other fields. We cannot, therefore, allow our justifiable apprehensions concerning the adverse consequences of Peking's entry into United Nations bodies to influence the formulation of our policy on that question.

VII Implications for Australian Policy

173. It is clear from the foregoing discussion that the PRC's fortunes in the international community are waxing and those of the Republic of China are rapidly on the wane. It was inevitable that this should happen, given the differences in the relative importance and strengths of the two states.

174. We have now reached a stage where Peking will soon be admitted into the United Nations, irrespective of our own wishes in the matter, and the ROC possibly excluded. The policies of the United States and Japan are in a state of flux and it is clear that both these powers are preparing to move, although the timing and extent of their movement are not yet known. If we were to find these two major countries moving substantially ahead of us towards a modus vivendi with the PRC, our own position would be exposed and our interests probably prejudiced. We would then soon find ourselves singled out by Peking from our friends and neighbours, many of whom have difficulty now in understanding our apparently conflicting policy of economic ties combined with political hostility towards the PRC. This would affect our freedom of manoeuvre by further narrowing the options that are available to us and would not be to our advantage.

175. In the PRC's eyes the continuation of our present policy beyond the point when Peking had been admitted to the United Nations would be seen–rightly or wrongly–as provocative, and the PRC could be expected to treat us and our interests accordingly.

176. Australian policy towards the PRC, especially in recent years, has rested on the need to extract a 'good behaviour bond' from Peking in return for recognition or admission to the United Nations. This stand is becoming increasingly unrealistic in a changing political situation in which international support is swinging Peking's way. It will need to be abandoned, in particular as far as Peking's admission to the United Nations is concerned, and possibly also in our approach to the problems of diplomatic recognition. This is not to say that we should not at the same time attempt to extract PRC concessions over Taiwan in any bilateral contracts that the Government may decide to take up with the PRC in the future.

177. The guiding consideration in our approach to this issue should be the prejudice we will suffer if we stand still rather than any advantages we might gain if we move. Seen from this point of time it seems most unlikely that we will gain any substantial advantage from recognising the PRC.

178. But beyond the diplomatic disadvantages that will flow from maintenance of our present position, there could well ensue damage to our valuable trade relations with that country. This will be particularly important if, as seems likely, Britain joins the EEC and if the trend towards protectionism continues in the United States. The failure to date by the PRC to express interest in further wheat purchases from Australia may reflect a decision by the PRC, in its internationally enhanced position, to adopt a harder line towards us as a reaction to our own policy towards it. We have no way of knowing whether this is in fact the case, but this view was recently put to the International Congress of Orientalists by Dr T.B. Millar,⁶ who said:

'There are of course always some political considerations to trade, and some political or even strategic effects. Until very recently, Australian trade with the Chinese People's Republic seemed to be unrelated to Australia's unwillingness to enter into diplomatic relations with Peking or to see her take the place of "China" at the United Nations. In recent months, as the bandwagon to seat Peking has begun to roll, the effect or potential effect of non-recognition on trade has seemed more significant ... At this time of international movement on this question with the final outcome still uncertain (especially as regards the position of Taiwan) it would be surprising if mainland China did not exploit any leverage that trade may give it' .

179. The Chinese market can be expected to assume even greater importance after Britain has entered the Common Market. If, as the Minister for Primary Industry has said, the market is of 'critical importance' to the Australian wheat industry, then preservation of it should be treated as a major policy objective.

180. It should be noted here, however, that there is no way of knowing whether the PRC would react favorably by purchasing more from Australia if we were to modify our policy towards it. Indeed there is reason to believe that the PRC aims eventually at self-reliance and strictly controlled trade and therefore we should not delude ourselves into believing that an unlimited market will be opened to us if we change our policy. Peking will no doubt buy our wheat and other commodities whenever she cannot get the same commodities elsewhere at a comparable price, but she can be expected to discriminate against us whenever possible on political grounds.

181. The most we can say is that by continuing with our present policy we will court disadvantages in trade as well as politically.

182. The strategic importance of China on a global scale, and the increasing need to bring her into disarmament negotiations and the resolution of conflicts, in particular in Asia, outweighs the insubstantial pretension of Chiang Kai-shek to represent that country in world forums.

183. We need now to begin to take into account the permanence and power of China and, in the formulation of new policies, to balance these factors against the unreality of Taiwan's position.

184. We should also remember in this respect that many of the PRC's attitudes derive from the geographical position of China, her history, the size of the country and the Chinese belief in their own unique character, and to this extent they are attitudes that would exist whatever the form of Government in China. China has seldom been an easy bedfellow for her smaller neighbours and can be expected to be a troublesome influence for a long time to come. But this should not deter us from facing the fact that Peking has arrived on the world stage and her acceptance into its community will bring about substantial political changes which will compel us to modify our present policy.

185. Australia's policy to date has stressed the interests of the people on Taiwan and upheld the principle that 14 million inhabitants should not be subjected to forceful integration into the great body politic of Communist China. This is a sound moral position; it is also very much in Australia's own national interest–we are a country of comparable population–and has a fair degree of international sympathy.

186. We should clearly explore thoroughly all possibilities of safeguarding these principles and the means whereby they may continue to be given effect. However, we should be well aware that it may not, in the long run, be possible to do anything effective about Taiwan for a number of reasons which are speculative as far as the future is concerned but which are only too apparent at present:

(a) the obduracy of Peking;

(b) the intransigence of the ROC in accepting a diminished status; and

(c) the reluctance of Taiwan's 'well-wishers' to incur the wrath of Peking by supporting a position for Taiwan in the United Nations.

187. Against the background of that probability and against the priorities of our national interests, we will need in the future to open our minds to the possibility of recognising the PRC without any safeguards for Taiwan. We would, of course, wish to see our relationship with Taiwan continued for as long as possible. But if we are to approach a more flexible position aimed at a more constructive relationship with the PRC, we may, in the last resort, need to introduce changes of substance in our policy. This may involve a graduated reduction and possibly even a graduated withdrawal of our diplomatic support from the ROC, a low posture policy towards it and a parallel softening of our attitude towards the PRC.

188. Whatever concrete steps are adopted in this direction, in the near future they would clearly be limited by our desire, on the one hand, not to appear to be jettisoning the ROC, and, on the other, by maintenance of the principle that a PRC/ROC settlement should not be effected by force.

189. Our immediate concern is therefore basically twofold: to consider

(a) whether and at what pace we should introduce changes of substance in our policy towards the PRC, including the timing of recognition, and

(b) at the same time, whether and how to contribute to the continued existence of Taiwan as a separate entity, so long as it desires, and its right to remain a member of the United Nations.

190. Australian recognition of the PRC at this time would involve a complete reversal of our present policy towards the ROC:

(a) We would have dumped them overnight.

(b) It could weaken American bargaining power in their efforts to bring Hanoi (and possibly Peking) to a political settlement in Indo China and

(c) Would tend to bring our credibility into question among some South East Asian governments, e.g. South Viet-Nam, South Korea, Cambodia, Laos and Thailand in particular, although probably not among others e.g. Indonesia, Malaysia and Singapore.

191. We cannot, in short, go too far too quickly along the road to recognition. We need, first of all, in concert with our friends and allies, to consider carefully what concessions we should seek from the PRC, and, as distinct from that, what we could actually live with as the price for our recognition, and then to commence negotiations with the PRC to seek those concessions.

192. It is important that we take the first steps towards recognition, i.e. consultations with our friends followed by initial contacts with the PRC, before the latter is admitted to membership of the United Nations. It matters less that the initial contact with the PRC be unsuccessful than that it be made before the PRC is admitted to the United Nations.

193. The policies we are to adopt in our future approach towards the PRC and the ROC will be reflected most dramatically and immediately in the United Nations, where the problem of China's representation is an extremely complex one.

194. Our overall approach should clearly involve close consultations with the United States in particular, Japan, the ROC, New Zealand, Indonesia and perhaps other South East Asian governments who share our own main interests.

195. Without prejudging the results of these consultations, it is clear that if we wish to see Taiwan preserved as a member of the United Nations she will have to be brought to accept membership as Taiwan or some other entity, but not as China, unless under a 'dual succession' formula or a formula such as that suggested in paragraph 155 above.

196. A move towards such a change will inevitably involve a confrontation with President Chiang Kai-shek and his administration, but this is a necessity that must be faced sooner rather than later if any position for the Government of ROC in the United Nations is to be preserved. It would be imprudent of Australia to join in attempts to devise a procedure that would open the door for the entry of the PRC into the United Nations and to the China seat on the Security Council, while preserving separate membership for Taiwan, without ascertaining before the next United Nations Session precisely where the Nationalist Chinese stand. If they intend to quit the United Nations as soon as the PRC is admitted, the question would arise as to whether we should move or join in a move to retain a place for them.

197. We should also remember that the development of a procedure to safeguard Taiwan's right to membership in the United Nations may founder badly through lack of general support, even if the ROC could be persuaded to accept a diminished status. Without the ROC's co-operation, however, we may have no other option than to resign ourselves along with several others to the facts of life. We would be unwise to try to shore up the ROC, either alone or in concert with others, if it insists on retaining its inflexible and unrealistic position. Consultation with our allies, a demarche with President Chiang Kai-shek and timing are therefore key elements in our future approach.

198. The United States and Japan, as principally interested parties in the China question, are both seeking improved relations with the PRC.

199. While it is essential that we should consult closely with them on the question of United Nations tactics as well as on the general question of diplomatic recognition of the PRC, we cannot expect to be kept fully informed by them of any moves they might make to normalise their relations. Nor should we expect them to keep in step with us in their progress towards a settlement of their bilateral relations with Peking. Indeed, the Japanese have already told us that they for one will be out of step, that it will be their aim to keep one jump ahead of the United States, rather than remain completely in concert.

200. In my view this should be our aim too. We are a significant country in the Asia context and it does not always do our image good in Asia to be seen as constantly following America's lead or as progressing towards a new policy exactly in step with them. Indeed, it may well be advantageous to the United States to have us advancing towards normalisation of relations with the PRC one or two steps ahead of them, provided we keep them fully informed of our position as it develops.

201. We are not under the same constraints as the Japanese, with their need to balance their relations more finely than we do with both Chinas, or the Americans, with their Mutual Defence Treaty with the ROC, and because of this it might be possible for us to undertake meaningful discussions with the PRC. This could be of immense importance to the United States as well as to us, in giving them access to the thinking of the PRC and to the possibility of influencing that thinking.

202. However, this is a very different matter from being helpful in the United Nations context. While we could and should be as helpful as possible there, we should not seek to be helpful beyond the point where our own interests are harmed. This point could occur at various stages in United Nations consideration of the issue. It would almost certainly occur if we allowed ourselves to be persuaded by the United States and Japan to undertake an initiative that was doomed to failure, or one that would incur the hostility of either or both Peking and Taipei. We should firmly resist this approach.

VIII Recommendations

203. On the basis of the foregoing exposition, I recommend that:–

1. The Department of Foreign Affairs be authorised to commence urgent consultations with the United States, Japan, the ROC and New Zealand on the China question, such consultations to encompass assessment of likely developments in respect of both international acceptance of the PRC and the ROC generally, and, more specifically, likely developments in respect of the Chinese representation issue in the United Nations, leading to examination of the tactics to be adopted there;

2. The Department of Foreign Affairs be authorised to say in the course of such consultations that the Australian Government is convinced that the PRC will sooner or later be admitted to the United Nations and achieve general international acceptance; that it regards recognition of the PRC as in Australia's long term interest; that while we are anxious to concert policy with our friends and allies, the United States may wish to consider the desirability, if possible, of Australia moving somewhat ahead of the United States in exploratory contacts with the PRC.

3. The Department of Foreign Affairs be authorised, if the abovementioned consultations reveal the need, to join in efforts to persuade the ROC of the need for flexibility in its policies, especially with regard to United Nations representation.

4. An appropriate opportunity be taken to make known publicly the Government's interest in normalisation of bilateral relations with the PRC, without prejudice to a peaceful resolution of the problems between the two rival Governments, and to declare that we are prepared to deal with both the Government of the PRC and the Government on Taiwan in respect of matters affecting Australian interests in the territories under their respective control;

5. The Department of Foreign Affairs be authorised to make known privately to the PRC, after consultation with the United States, Japan, the ROC and New Zealand, but not later than the commencement of the next session of the United Nations General Assembly, the Government's interest in discussion of bilateral relations.

6. In public reference to the PRC, Australian Ministers and officials should:

(a) refer to it as 'the People's Republic of China';

(b) cease hostile references to the PRC, but in line with our policy towards the USSR, criticise frankly major actions which offend us. We should keep such criticism separate from statements about China's representation in the United Nations.

(c) Avoid excessively warm or laudatory references to the ROC;

(d) Stress Australia's readiness to welcome the PRC back into the international community in accordance with the terms of the United Nations Charter;

(e) Underline Taiwan's evident desire for a separate status and the responsible role it has played in the international community.

7. We should in the future give careful consideration to requests for major displays of Australian friendship with the ROC, such as Ministerial visits and visits by Parliamentary delegations;

8. Cabinet consider at an early date the implications for future policy of the outcome of recommendations 1,2, 3 and 5.

William McMahon

Minister for Foreign Affairs

[A1838, 625/10/6]

1 Not published.

2 See footnote 4, Document 143.

3 See footnote 2, Document 42.

4 Paragraph one of Article 23(1) identifies five permanent members of the Security Council,
including the 'Republic of China'.

5 K.J. Holyoake.

6 Director, Australian Institute of International Affairs; Professorial Fellow in International
Relations, Australian National University.