Canberra, 13 March 1964

Secret

Deployment of Units of Australian Forces

I refer to our discussion yesterday concerning the possibility of the deployment of some units of the armed forces to an area which would convince Indonesia that we were serious in our intentions to support Malaysia.

2. As I see it, the following are important considerations affecting such a proposal:–

(a) The last Cabinet decision on the deployment of Australian units was that of 19 December, 1963, when the Foreign Affairs and Defence Committee, noting the view of the Defence Committee that there was no pressing need at that time for Australian military assistance in eastern Malaysia, decided that Australia should not at that stage offer new military contributions to the defence of eastern Malaysia.¹ The latest threat estimate is that Indonesia will step up the scale and size of covert operations against the Borneo territories but it does not appear that this will be so dramatic or rapid as to call for immediate Australian assistance.

(b) Under the Barwick/Kennedy understanding of October, 1963, Australia undertook to consult with the United States before it made further military commitments in the Treaty area or before it stationed armed forces in Sarawak or Sabah.² This reflected the United States nervousness that Australia might take military actions which would attract the ANZUS Treaty and so involve the United States.

(c) If any moves of Australian units were contemplated, they should take place in the Malaysian area. It would be unwise, militarily, to move Australian units in Australia or New Guinea in a way which is not required by the present military situation, which could be construed as provocative and which would direct attention to Australia's own territory and possibly provoke an Indonesian response in our own area. Even should we ultimately deploy forces in Borneo it seems that our objective would be to keep the conflict limited and not have it spread to the eastern end of the Indonesian archipelago.

(d) In my view, any moves of Australian forces should serve a clear military purpose, either by way of an actual contribution to operations or by releasing Malaysian or British forces which could be used in operations, or by being a military precautionary move which was clearly justified by the actual threat. Such moves, of course, may also serve important political purposes but I think it would be a wrong use of our forces to employ them for political purposes which were not sound militarily.

3. As you know, there has been no formal Malaysian request as yet for the use of Australian forces. Critchley received on 6th March a letter from the Deputy Secretary of the Malaysian Ministry of Defence, listing nine requests for the use of Australian forces.³ However, it is our view, which is shared by External Affairs, that this does not amount to a formal Malaysian request which we would expect to be transmitted at Government level. The summary of the Malaysian requests is in the attached cablegram.⁴ We have just received through External Affairs a copy of the letter from the Malaysian Ministry of Defence.⁵

4. On the basis of the summary in the attached cablegram, we and the Services have already been examining the practicability of meeting the Malaysian requests. This examination could rapidly be brought to finality if necessary. Normally it would have been considered by the Defence Committee next week and be available for Ministers at the end of next week. Should it be desired to advance this timetable, your urgent direction would be appreciated. We would also wish to warn External Affairs so that they could prepare a parallel examination of the political aspects. You might wish to discuss the whole question with the Minister for External Affairs.

5. You will see that the Malaysian requests envisage the possibility either of direct Australian assistance in Borneo or of Australian deployments in Malaya, which would enable Malaysian and British forces to be released to Borneo. Also, the requests vary in the impact they would be likely to make on Indonesian opinion and international opinion generally. For example, use of Dakota aircraft to drop supplies at the Thai border would attract little attention while use of coastal minesweepers for off-shore service in Borneo waters could well bring Australian forces into direct conflict with Indonesian forces attempting to infiltrate by sea into Borneo. The list therefore offers a range of possibilities should we wish to accede to any such requests. Of course, the Australian deployment which would have the most useful effect in the actual operations and the greatest political impact would be our battalion from the Strategic Reserve in Borneo.⁶

6. I will be submitting to you this afternoon a draft Cabinet Submission on Australian defence aid to Malaysia, following study of the report of the Australian mission.⁷ If this is taken by Cabinet next Tuesday and the decisions announced, it will, of course, in itself be a very substantial earnest of Australia's intentions in the Malaysian dispute.⁸

[NAA: A1945, 245/3/9]

1 See footnote 15, Document 139.

2 See footnote 6, Document 136.

3 This was a separate list of requirements for Australian forces from those drawn up earlier at a special meeting of Malaysian Defence Ministry with High Commissioners of Australia, New Zealand and the UK in Kuala Lumpur and considered by Cabinet in December and early February. The letter was dated 28 February, but Critchley only received it from Ramli bin Abdul Hamid (Deputy Secretary of Defence inistry) on 7 March. The first of the nine requests listed–an infantry battalion for perations on the Thai border–had already been met (see Document 150), and the other eight in summary were: an engineer construction unit for Borneo; two LAA batteries at Butterworth; a Field Ambulance for Borneo; four coastal minesweepers for patrol work off Borneo; from six to fourteen helicopters for Singapore and the Thai border; short range transport aircraft for supply drops up to 100,000 lbs per month on the Thai border; medium range troop and freight flights to Borneo; and five light reconnaissance aircraft for Borneo or the Thai border.

4 Not published.

5 Critchley had forwarded the letter by diplomatic bag on 8 March.

6 Menzies, Harold Holt (Treasurer), Hasluck and Barwick met on 19 March 'to give preliminary consideration' to the Defence Committee's response of that date to the requests. They decided that the US and UK should be advised of the nature of the requests, and that consideration be given to meeting them as far as practicable, before further consideration by the FAD committee following the receipt of US and UK reactions.

7 That is, the report of the Defence mission agreed to in Cabinet Decision No. 39,28 January (see Document 151).

8 Cabinet met on 17 March and approved the mission's recommendations on the allocation of the special funds of �3 million for defence assistance to Malaysia–Decision No. 108. On the difficulty of seconding Army and Navy personnel due to shortages in the required ranks, Cabinet requested that possible provision of CMF personnel be investigated, and that Malaysian authorities be informed that the question of additional personnel was still being examined.