Singapore, 17 February 1965

151. Confidential

When Lendrum, New Zealand Deputy, saw Lee Kuan Yew yesterday to discuss his visit to New Zealand,¹ Lee said that he hoped to go to Kuala Lumpur today to talk with the Tunku about a possible modus vivendi between Singapore and Kuala Lumpur. He had played golf with the Tunku during the Tunku's visit to Singapore over the weekend to open the new UMNO building here and he thought that, possibly as a result of an intervention by Mountbatten,² the Tunku showed some readiness to consider a disengagement. Lee spoke of the PAP's agreeing to withdraw altogether from Malaya and to abstain from politics there in future for the restoration to Singapore of some authority over the police and a larger share of Singapore revenue; both parties would cease their attacks on each other. (Lendrum said Lee was rather vague about these details and reported the Tunku as being even vaguer.) Lee thought that if an arrangement along these lines could be brought about for the duration of Indonesian confrontation then Malaysia would have a much better chance of survival.

2. This seems to me a step in the wrong direction. It is important that a modus vivendi be found between Singapore and Kuala Lumpur (the alternative is to gamble that nothing serious will come of current clashes), but to base this on a loosening of the federal arrangement and on the enlargement of Singapore's independence at best postpones an attempt to grapple with a problem that meantime continues to grow and at worst creates forces favouring Singapore's withdrawal from the Federation.

3. Basically the conflict between Singapore and Kuala Lumpur is the familiar conflict between modernisers and traditionalists. Singapore, with its secular, pan-communal and socialist programme, represents a fundamental challenge to the regime in Kuala Lumpur and its supporters and to the Malay mass represented by such parties as the PMIP.³ The challenge takes on racial overtones because of Singapore's predominantly Chinese character and Malay anxieties about the future. This account much simplifies a complex situation and does not take into account the presence of modernising elements in the Kuala Lumpur regime and the impatience and political insensitivity of many Singapore politicians, particularly, at times, Lee Kuan Yew. But it does explain the intemperate attack on Singapore which, since the PAP's ill-judged entry into politics last April, has been carried on by UMNO politicians and their associates and organs such as 'Utusan Melayun',⁴ including in recent months Federal Cabinet Ministers and, several times, the Tunku himself. (In a statement this week Tan Siew Sin compared Lee's Singapore to Hitler's Germany.) This campaign has, in my view, been quite out of proportion to any 'misbehaviour' by the PAP, which by and large has shown restraint in reply. (However, Lee Kuan Yew's oft-expressed fears about Malay communalism clearly cause much irritation in Kuala Lumpur.)

4. I do not believe it realistic to try to insulate Singapore by giving it special status (and, anyway, I suspect Lee has an eye beyond mere temporary disengagement). Politically, Singapore will continue an affront to traditionalist and conservative forces in Malaya and one cannot see them ceasing their attack for long, nor a Federal Government finding it possible to withstand pressure from these influential quarters. Nor can I see Singapore refraining from comment on developments in Malaya and Malaysia at large, which must so closely affect interests here. And Singapore's governmental efficiency, acknowledged by Tan Siew Sin and other Federal Ministers, must of itself exercise a political influence in Malaya. In terms of the development of Malaysia too, it appears a fundamental error to loosen the federal arrangement: the requirement at all times is to develop a strong federal arrangement, drawing in regional and other interests and loyalties.

5. It has been unrealistic, in terms of the secure establishment of the new federation, to exclude Singapore, one of the main and most dynamic of the founding partners, from the federal effort (however necessary this might have seemed in terms of the politics of 1963).⁵ Singapore should be harnessed and brought into partnership. This means a substantive place (or places) in the Federal Government, in which the other three founding states are now represented.⁶ This might be held unrealistic in the politics of 1965 but I wonder if it could not be arranged as part of a deal to put a stop to the damaging conflict between Kuala Lumpur and Singapore and to close the pro-Malaysian ranks against foreign and domestic enemies. Presented against the background of Indonesian confrontation, of the further deterioration in recent weeks of relations between Singapore and Kuala Lumpur, of the recent arrests in Malaya of pro-Indonesian traitors⁷ and of an agreement by the PAP to withdraw completely from Malayan politics in the interests of national unity, such an arrangement might be politically practicable if there were a genuine desire to stop the rot and bring Singapore in.

6. An arrangement like this, limited, say, until the end of confrontation or general Malaysian elections, seems something that should be thoroughly explored before an illusory and retrogressive disengagement is resorted to, which in the end can hardly serve either party, or us. Admittedly it would not resolve the basic conflict, but it should give a better prospect of containing it for a time. It would offer opportunities to introduce into the Federal Government some of Singapore's creativeness and drive, to promote progress in federal matters and to educate Singaporeans in the problems of Malaysian politics and developments. It would also give Kuala Lumpur a much stronger hold over Lee Kuan Yew than they have now or are in prospect of getting.

7. Foregoing is as 'seen from Singapore'. I have repeated this message to Kuala Lumpur.

[NAA: A1945, 245/1/28]

1 Lee was due to begin a visit to New Zealand on 5 March. He was to then travel to Australia on 15 March and return to Singapore on 2 April.

2 Earl Mountbatten, the retiring Chief of the UK Defence Staff, visited Kuala Lumpur, Singapore, Hong Kong, Australia and New Zealand from late January to early March.

3 Pan Malayan Islamic Party.

4 Utusan Melayu, a Malay newspaper controlled by UMNO.

5 A reference to Malayan fears that the incorporation of Singapore would result in future Chinese domination of Malaysia (see paragraph 12, Document 1).

6 Under the Heads of Agreement for a Merger between the Federation of Malaya and Singapore, November 1961, as a trade-off for retaining control over labour and education, Singapore held only 15 seats of the 104 seats in the federal House of Representatives. This was less than an entitlement on a basis of population ratios and proportionately less than the number of seats held by other states in the federation.

7 A reference to the arrests at the end of January and in early February of leading members of a group of Malay nationalists who had developed close subversive links with the Indonesians through a movement known as the 'Melayu Raya'. The Malay political parties were involved, particularly the PMIP in Kelantan (northern Malaysia). The initial objective had been to set up a Malaysian govemment-in-exile in Cambodia with the ultimate goal of attaining a Greater Indonesia that would include Malaya, North Kalimantan and the Philippines.