Kuala Lumpur, 17 June 1966

1530. Secret

Indonesia-Malaysia

Our 1514.¹

Ghazali gave briefing today to Wade, Bottomley and myself.

2. Ghazali said he went to Djakarta on personal invitation of Suharto and kept visit as secret as possible to avoid interrogation by Press.² At their first meeting Suharto said that he personally was still perfectly satisfied with Bangkok Agreement but was having difficulty with Sukarno who described it as a treacherous sell out: Sukarno argued that it was contrary to the Manila Agreement under which Malaysia was not to be recognised until after 'ascertainment'. This put Suharto in a difficult position. There were several opportunists, including some senior Army officers with forces under their command, who might side with Sukarno in a show-down on the Bangkok Agreement and this could carry some risk of civil war: Suharto had no doubt as to who would win the war but he would much prefer to avoid such a situation. Suharto therefore proposed that Bangkok Agreement be ratified without alteration but that it should be accompanied by secret understanding in writing that recognition of Malaysia would be deferred until after the Borneo elections. Ghazali replied that this was the old Subandrio line which Malaysia had firmly rejected a long time ago: the proposed secret letter would not work anyway because the public ratification of the Bangkok Agreement would itself carry recognition with it. At the end of this meeting, Ghazali left Suharto with 'certain thoughts' to chew over.

3. At Suharto's request, Ghazali then had separate meetings with officers of the strategic command, the alert theatre command, the security police and the military police. In all he met about 60 officers. The details of the Settlement Agreement were not referred to but the discussions ranged over a number of subjects involved in the situation in South-East Asia as a whole. The military police in particular were interested in Ghazali's views on the most effective method of handling Communists. Ghazali told them that he knew they had killed off Aidit³ and a large number of the mass leaders of the Communist movement but what had they done about the cadres? They were silent on this. Ghazali then referred to the inefficiency of a system of competing intelligence organisations, such as Indonesia had had in the past, and the need to establish a central co-ordinated intelligence organisation such as Malaysia had developed. In his talks to the various groups of officers, Ghazali appealed to them to give their full support to Suharto who had sound views on the real threats to South-East Asia and the necessity for international co-operation in order to counter them.

4. The only civilians whom Ghazali met were Malik and Ruslan Abdul Gani.⁴ Ghazali said that once again he found that he and Malik were completely of one mind: Malik's difficulty was to persuade Suharto to face up to Sukarno and for this purpose to enable Suharto to show to the President that all the Generals were fully behind him. Ghazali then had a second meeting with Suharto in Malik's presence. At this Suharto put forward the following definite proposals:

(a) The Bangkok Agreement to be ratified without alteration.

(b) A secret written understanding that the exchange of diplomatic representatives would be deferred until after 're-affirmation' in the Borneo elections.

(c) Immediately on ratification, confrontation would cease, full working relations would be established and liaison teams would be set up in both capitals for the conduct of all normal business.⁵ (Indonesian team is already here.)

4. ⁶Ghazali explained to us that the secret understanding would be in no way inconsistent with the public Agreement: its effect would be that the phrase 'as soon as possible' would be interpreted as meaning not before the Borneo elections. Suharto had given him a firm promise not to publish the secret understanding: its purpose would be the immediate one of enabling him to carry all the Generals solidly with him in forcing Sukarno to accept the Agreement. Suharto went on to say that, after the Agreement was ratified, if the situation developed sufficiently favourably in the next month or two, he would be prepared to ignore the secret understanding and proceed to the exchange of diplomatic missions without waiting for the elections.

5. Ghazali was obviously highly pleased with this formula and revealed at the end of our briefing that it was in fact his own invention. He had put it to Suharto at the end of the first meeting but thought its chances of acceptance in Kuala Lumpur would be better if he could report it as a proposal put to him by Suharto. Ghazali said Suharto envisaged that the Agreement should be concluded immediately after the MPRS meeting on 5th July. Ghazali said that the Tunku was quite happy with the formula but Razak still had reservations. Ghazali was still working on him and had hopes of bringing him round in the course of the weekend.

6. In reply to questions Ghazali said that:–

(a) in none of his discussions in Djakarta had there been any mention of British forces or British bases;

(b) there had been no specific discussion on Malaysian/Indonesian co-operation against the C.C.O., but the 'spirit' of co-operation to counter Communist threat was apparent throughout;

(c) Suharto would prefer Malaysia to continue to detain Indonesian prisoners for the time being so that the Indonesian authorities could arrange for their screening here before they were repatriated;

(d) the question of whether military disengagement and the withdrawal of Commonwealth forces from Borneo should commence immediately after ratification of the Agreement or should be deferred pending the formal establishment of diplomatic relations was a matter for the defence authorities and not for the foreign office: Ghazali had made his contribution by providing the defence authorities with a good excuse for maintaining Commonwealth forces in Borneo for a longer period for this was in fact desired;

(e) Ghazali would rather not give us the precise text of the Bangkok Agreement until it was ratified and published as he had promised the Indonesians not to do so: he assured us, however, that he had already given us a faithful account of its substance.

7. With regard to the Bau incident,⁷ Ghazali said he now knew that the enemy group were not Chinese, as Razak's addition to yesterday's press release suggested they were: on the other hand the senior military officer in the Indonesian liaison mission in Kuala Lumpur had assured him that they were not regular Indonesian forces operating under orders from Djakarta. I saw no point in pursuing this discussion as activities by remote Indonesian forces in advance of a formal settlement are capable of a number of interpretations of possible innocence. I agreed with Ghazali that it would be more relevant to consider Indonesian performance after a settlement: on this, Ghazali declared his complete belief in Suharto's good faith.

8. In conclusion Ghazali said that he believed that if the Suharto–Malik–Buwano⁸ group could maintain and consolidate their domestic power, co-operation with them could provide security for the whole of South-East Asia.

[NAA: A1838, 3006/4/7]

1 16 June. Eastman advised that the Malaysians remained convinced that the Indonesians wanted to end confrontation and resume relations, but that there were differing views on accepting Indonesia's proposal to cease hostilities immediately while postponing the formal exchange of diplomatic relations until after the elections in Sabah and Sarawak.

2 Ghazali had returned to Kuala Lumpur on 14 June.

3 Aidit had been captured south of Jogjakarta on 20 November and executed on 22 November.

4 That is, Roeslan Abdulgani.

5 See Document 365.

6 Paragraphs numbered as in original document.

7 On 15 June, Australian forces had engaged infiltrators near their base at Bau, south of Kuching. A number of Indonesians were killed and wounded. Two Australians were also wounded, one of whom later died. Although infiltrations continued throughout June, the Bau incident was the last significant incursion before the formal end of confrontation.

8 Sultan Hamengkubuwono IX.