Canberra, 30 May 1968¹

Top Secret

Defence Committee agendum no. 19/68 size and role of the Pacific Islands Regiment²

The Defence Committee spent most of the morning of 30th May discussing this submission.

2. Mr George Warwick Smith (Secretary of the Department of External Territories) was present and was the first to speak. He made general comments emphasising particularly the financial burden on the Territory after independence of any defence forces, and querying the size of the forces proposed in the paper.³ (He made a more substantial intervention later in the meeting.)

3. The Chiefs of Staff then spoke.

4. Lt. Gen. Sir John Wilton⁴ said:

(a) Defence of Papua New Guinea was vital to Australia. Therefore there was a case for Australia contributing to finance the Papuan forces even after independence.

(b) Very little was said in the paper about the Army and Navy. He did not agree that a further review should be undertaken not later than mid-1970; he did not think another review was necessary.

5. Lt. Gen. Sir Thomas Daly (CGS) spoke as follows:

(a) He referred to the time it takes to raise and train a force. This could not be done quickly.

(b) He appreciated Mr Warwick Smith's concern about finance and the economic burdens. But if Australia did not provide adequately for New Guinea forces, there were plenty of others who were willing to try.

(c) He queried whether there was much risk of the armed forces in New Guinea intervening in politics. Where this had occurred in other countries, it had been where the armed forces had taken over corrupt independent governments, not where there had been good governments.

6. Vice Admiral V.A.T. Smith⁵ expressed general agreement with the report of the Joint Planning Committee. He disagreed with Sir John Wilton on one point: Admiral Smith thought that another review would be necessary by 1970.

7. Air Marshal Sir Alister Murdoch (CAS)⁶ expressed general agreement with the report of the Joint Planning Committee. He also said he did not believe that the New Guinea economy could sustain a defence force without outside assistance.

8. I spoke as follows:

(a) I expressed disagreement with Sir John Wilton who had said that a review would not be necessary by 1970. I said I thought things were changing so rapidly and unpredictably in New Guinea, that mid-1970 would probably be too far off. I said my own feeling was that independence would come sooner than many persons thought and we would have more to go on by 1970 in forming a judgment on that point. The review might have to be sooner. I thought that the recommendation in 86(e)⁷ should be re-worded in the first sentence as follows: 'A review to be undertaken not later than mid-1970, to decide the possible overall composition of the defence forces of Papua and New Guinea and the relationship between these forces and the Australian defence structure'.

(b) Paragraph 85(h)⁸ was in my opinion too definite, as was paragraph 68.⁹ It would be better to say that certain things could be done which could reduce the risk of instability and insurrection, rather than to say that the risk would be slight.

(c) In paragraph 85(j)¹⁰ a sentence should be added as follows: 'Even so, some financial assistance for defence will probably still be needed from Australia after independence.' I thought that assistance from Australia would be necessary for a number of reasons. Most newly independent countries, in for example Africa, had received financial and other assistance for their armed forces in the early days of independence from the former colonial power. I added that the defence of New Guinea should be seen as part
of the defence of Australia, and in those circumstances it would not be unreasonable for Australia to make some financial contribution to it. The role of the limited New Guinea forces could be seen in relation to Australian defence: some patrolling, coping with any small incidents, and being a general stabilizing factor in New Guinea.

9. Sir John Bunting expressed agreement with what I had said about the need for a review not later than 1970.

10. Mr R.N. Townsend (Acting Secretary, Prime Minister's Department) also agreed with what I had said about the need for a review. He also said that he was inclined to think that we should be consolidating the expansion of the forces that had already occurred rather than expand as rapidly as the paper seemed to contemplate.¹¹

11. Mr M.W. O'Donnell (Deputy Secretary of the Treasury) said:

(a) The JPC report mixed the issues. It made political judgments which influenced its conclusions. The report should have concentrated on military aspects, namely defence against external aggression. The PIR should not be regarded as a reserve police force: it was a defence force.

(b) In regard to finance, the primary responsibility after independence would rest on the government of the new country. We could not ignore the cost side and the burden this would impose on an independent country. The CGS had already indicated the physical limits as regards time on building up a new force. The most sensible course in the next few years was to concentrate on the basic establishment as a basis for future expansion.

12. Sir John Wilton intervened to say that he thought we could not compartmentalize military and political aspects. War now was a politico-military question as was being daily demonstrated in South East Asia. The primary role of the P.I.R. would be border defence
and surveillance, and any possible internal role would be quite secondary. Sir John Wilton also said he was convinced from the studies made by the Services that the three battalion concept was the best answer, but the rate at which it was reached could be adjusted.

13. Mr O'Donnell said that no Australian Ministers could support a paper that contemplated the taking over of the government by the army; that was contrary to all the traditions of Australia.

14. I commented that the paper was not arguing that the army in New Guinea should be able to take over the Government. The paper in fact was concerned to safe-guard against that. But the paper did contemplate that the armed forces would be at the call of the Government to maintain law and order in certain circumstances.

15. Sir Henry Bland supported what I had said and drew Mr O'Donnell's attention to page 11¹². Sir Henry pointed out that in Australia the Defence Act, in section 51, said that, where the Governor of a State proclaimed that domestic violence existed, the Governor-General might call out the armed forces to be used for the protection of that State against domestic violence.

16. Mr Warwick Smith spoke again and made some points of detail. He said that paragraph 72¹³ was inaccurate. In paragraph 85 he disagreed with (f)¹⁴ and (h), ¹⁵ on the latter point expressing agreement with what I had said. Mr Warwick Smith made two principal points:

(a) Who was the army going to defend the Territory against? Was it going to make any difference to the defence of New Guinea whether it had 2,000 or 4,000 troops? He favoured expansion being not too great or too rapid.

(b) His experience had been that Australians could only see New Guinea through Australian eyes. If Australian architects were asked to design a building and to do so as cheaply as possible, they always seemed to design it to accord with the highest standards in Australia, and, if asked to reduce, they would do it by cutting bits off instead of re-designing. Mr Warwick Smith asked whether the army organisation in New Guinea (headquarters structure etc.) was simply a straight transplantation of the Australian Army. For example, did the three units have to be battalions? And if so did they have to have the Australian establishment?

17. Sir Henry Bland made the following points:

(a) Account had to be taken of past Cabinet decisions, as set out in paragraph 2 of the paper.¹⁶

(b) The paper had given slight attention to the strategic aspect of Papua–New Guinea.¹⁷ Perhaps Papua–New Guinea did not have the importance for Australian defence that it had when West New Guinea was not in Indonesian hands. If it had little strategic importance to Australia, did it matter if Papua–New Guinea was in hostile hands? Sir Henry Bland said he was not asserting that but raising it as a question.

(c) But even so, an obligation rested on the Australian Government to provide a defence force for a country on the way to independence, just as it had an obligation to build up the police, education, etc. If independence came without our having provided a basis for defence, we would have failed in our obligations. The figures of 2,000 or 4,000 men or of three battalions had little meaning in a defence sense against a significant threat but was the minimum that we could set a new country out with.

(d) There was little in the paper about forces other than the army.

(e) The Minister for Defence had directed in April 1965 that work be done on the development of one defence force. Sir Henry implied (without specifically saying so) that thought should be given to the unification of the forces in New Guinea since they were starting off afresh instead of having an existing structure to modify.

(f) There should be a review in 1970 which should concern itself with the overall composition of defence forces, and also in relations between the Papua–New Guinea Force and the Australian forces.

(g) Instead of passing this long and detailed paper to Cabinet, especially as the Defence Committee had not considered it word by word, the Defence Committee should produce a short paper, directed at a few Ministers only.

18. Sir John Wilton intervened to say that he disagreed completely with any suggestion by Sir Henry Bland that Papua New Guinea was not very important to the defence of Australia.

19. Mr Warwick Smith intervened again to ask why, in paragraph 86(c) the aim was 2,800 men rather than 2,300 men.¹⁸

20. I said that thought might be given to some aspects that might be useful in the civil development of New Guinea. For example, in Thailand the SEATO workshops set up with Australian aid had been directed towards training {mechanics} for service initially in the armed forces, but with the deliberate intention that later on they should move into civil life with the skills they had acquired. Again, the ordinary soldier, if he did not get promoted, should after a few years be discharged and with proper handling could be an important element for stability and progress in his native village.

21. Lt. Gen. Sir Thomas Daly said that at present some privates were being held in the army past the point of usefulness, particularly as the men who had been recruited some time ago were not all of as high a standing as those being recruited today. But the Army was hung up at present about a pension scheme.

22. Sir Thomas Daly said he wanted to refer to a basic problem, namely the relations between the army and the civil administration in New Guinea. The army was responsible to the Commonwealth Government and not to the Administration, and was therefore looked at as something different. It did not appear in much of the publicity issued by the Administration, such as supplements {in} newspapers or exhibitions at the Royal Show. In a booklet issued by the Department of Territories on civics for use in schools, the only reference to the army was to the danger of it taking over the government.¹⁹

23. Mr Warwick Smith said he admitted that General Daly had made a good point. It was true also of the DCA²⁰ and ITU,²¹ who operated directly to the Commonwealth Government. Mr Warwick Smith went on to urge that if possible the army should be brought closer to the people by engaging in work like road building, bridge building etc. He concluded by asking once again why the figure of 2,800 had been fixed. Why could it not be less?

24. Sir Henry Bland said it seemed quite clear to him that two battalions were needed. In addition there were the past statements by the Government, contained in paragraph 2 of the paper.

25. The Committee left it to Sir Henry Bland to consider and draft a submission in the light of discussion at the meeting. Members of the Committee will look at his draft when he has completed it.

[NAA: A 1838, 689/2 part 3]

1 Plimsoll's notes, which were written on 31 May, appeared under cover of a short submission of the same date to Hasluck.

2 That is, JPC report no. 32/1968, 8 May 1968, NAA: A1209, 1968/8538 part 2. For context, see editorial note 'Pacific Island Regiment: ongoing debate over its size and role'.

3 See paragraph 19 below.

4 Chairman, Chiefs of Staff Committee.

5 Chief of the Naval Staff.

6 Chief of the Air Staff.

7 This read: 'a review be undertaken not later than mid 1970, to decide the best over-all composition of the defence forces of Papua and New Guinea' (JPC report no. 32/1968, 8 May 1968, NAA: A1209, 1968/8538 part 2).

8 'Subject to the conditions in paragraph 68 [see footnote 5], the proposed programme for expansion of the PIR should result in the development of a well disciplined loyal force and risk of instability or insurrection would be slight provided independence does not come too early' (loc. cit.).

9 'Under certain circumstances and if less desirable policies are adopted by the authorities in PNG, a disciplined force of any size can represent a threat. However, given enlightened policies, orderly advancement towards independence, the size and rate of development envisaged for the PIR and the continuation of appropriate training and educational measures for the PIR, the risks in this regard in PNG should be minimal' (loc. cit.).

10 'The financial situation, and the need to avoid saddling a future government of PNG with a defence force it could not afford, demand that defence costs be kept as low as possible consistent with defence requirements' (loc. cit.).

11 During preparation for the meeting, G.L.V. Hooton (senior advisor, External Relations and Defence Branch, PMD) had written to Townsend that, in his view, the Defence case for expansion of the PIR rested on internal factors. He believed that the JPC paper should have juxtaposed the PIR with the 'African experience', and he was 'unimpressed by the Army statements about civic education ... and can only recall that Sandhurst trainees have surprised their alma mater in most Afiican armies'. Hooton recommended that more study be given the question, during which a 'full paper' by the Administration could be considered alongside 'someone ... who has had experience in police/military relations in primitive areas' (minute, 27 May 1968,8 May 1968, NAA: A1209, 1968/8538 part 1).

12 This included the comment that the secondary purpose of the PIR was to 'provide for the future ... an efficient, well disciplined, stable and reliable army which is completely loyal to the Administration or established Government of the country; an Army that will if called upon, give willing assistance to the Administration or government in the exercise of lawful authority' (JPC report no. 3211968, 8 May 1968, NAA: A1209, I 968/8538 part 2).

13 'It is the Australian Government's view that an independent Papua and New Guinea should be able to support from its own resources the bulk of its recurring public expenditure on essential administrative, economic and social services. In 1967/68 total local receipts (revenue plus loans) are expected to cover only 32% of total Government expenditure (Administration plus other Commonwealth Authorities) and on present estimates the percent for 197I/72 would only be slightly higher. While over the next four years loans from the [IBRD] and/or [IDA] credits totalling $10 million may be available these coupled with possible aid from the [UNDP] would amount to less than 2% of present estimates of Administration expenditure over the period' (loc. cit.).

14 'It is practical to commence raising a third battalion in 1972 with a view to its manning being contemplated by 1974' (loc. cit.).

15 See footnote 4.

16 'On 22 May 63 the Prime Minister announced that the strength of the PIR was to be doubled and on 10 Nov 64 he announced an increase of the force to three battalions and supporting units with a total strength approaching 3500 by Jun 1968' (JPC Report no. 32/1968, 8 May 1968, NAA: A 1209, 1968/8538 part 2).

17 The report had judged: 'The strategic importance of PNG lies mainly in its potential as a base for the conduct of activities or operations prejudicial to our interests. In the interest of Australian defence we will wish to ensure that PNG is oriented towards us and to retain some defence link with PNG in order to deter an external threat to the area, to secure our lines of communication and to maintain access to PNG and its base facilities. This is particularly important while there is uncertainty regarding Australian/Indonesian relations' (loc. cit.).

18 The aim was to achieve this increase by June 1969.

19 See footnote 9, Document 145.

20 Department of Civil Aviation.

21 International Telecommunication Union.