NAA:A1209, 1962/1970

Canberra, 23 November 1962

Top Secret

Study of Possible Future Requirement for Commonwealth Bases in Australia

The members of the Defence Committee will recall that the above question was raised in a personal message from Mr. Macmillan to the Prime Minister dated 5th February, 1962¹ (copies circulated under Secretariat minute of 12th February), and was discussed at the meeting between the Defence Committee and the First Sea Lord on 15th February. Copies of an Australian record of that discussion were distributed personally to members of the Committee on 12th March. Paragraph 22 of the record stated:–

'The Chairman concluded the discussion on this subject by stating that the Australian Defence Committee fully agreed with the British Chiefs of Staff view that the longer term problems in a possible future strategic situation in which the Singapore bases were no longer available to Commonwealth forces should be examined. A certain amount of preliminary study at planning level had been given in Australia to this matter but it had not developed to any great extent. The Australian Defence Committee now understood that the British Chiefs of Staff were seeking Australian views on these questions, and, subject to Ministerial approval, would put them to serious study so that an exchange of views and joint examination could proceed.'

2. Following consultation between Defence, External Affairs and Prime Minister's Departments, the Prime Minister approved a reply to Mr. Macmillan's message in the following terms, which was sent on 31st August:–

'In February you gave me an outline of the very important defence considerations raised by the Greater Malaysia developments which we have been following with close interest. I am grateful to you and your colleagues for continuing to keep us fully in the picture.

2. You will recall that, after we received your February message, the First Sea Lord paid us a visit when he gave us a useful account of the views of the British Chiefs of Staff on the future strategy in the Far East. He also outlined the military aims which British forces in the Far East are designed to achieve and the practical effects of your deployment plans.

3. Moreover we have now had the opportunity to study the Defence White Paper with its emphasis on mobility of forces by sea and air, something which we have very much in mind in determining the future shape of our own Services. The meeting between Mr. Townley and Mr. Watkinson in Singapore last March was also of considerable value to us.

4. Against this background, and particularly in the light of the Malaysian talks in London last November and again in July, it is our present intention to maintain our existing forces in South East Asia and our planned contributions to possible operations in the area.

5. We agreed that there should be further study in both our countries of the defence problems in a possible situation in which the facilities of Malaysia might no longer be available to us. Our Service advisers have already done some thinking on these problems and this will be carried forward in the next few months to allow an exchange of views and joint study of them by the United Kingdom, Australia and New Zealand. At some later stage we might wish to consider also some way of associating the United States with this examination, because of the primary importance of that nation to the whole of our defence position in the Far East.

6. I am in complete agreement with the thought in the final paragraph of your message that we should do nothing which might suggest we were contemplating giving up the defence facilities in Malaya and Singapore. Present Australian defence policy is based on the concept of a forward defence in South East Asia and we believe that, in the present circumstances, this is the most effective strategy for our security. The studies we are now initiating are necessary contingency planning. Not only must they be conducted with the utmost discretion, but it is most important that we should guard against the development of a state of mind that in talking about the possible loss of the Malaysian bases we might come to accept their loss as inevitable.

7. I would like to emphasise that I would propose to await the outcome of these fuller discussions by our advisers before I come back to the considerations raised in paragraphs 5, 6 and 7 of your message.'

3. The British defence authorities were advised verbally and informally earlier in the year that it would not be practicable for the Australian defence authorities to undertake their examination of this question until certain important and high priority tasks, including the formulation of the new three-year defence programme, had been completed.

4. The study contemplated in the above correspondence should now be commenced, and the Joint Planning Committee, in association with an External Affairs representative, and consulting as necessary with the Joint Administrative Planning Committee, should undertake the initial examination.

5. Attention is invited to the special secrecy and delicacy of this subject, for the reasons indicated in paragraph 6 of the Prime Minister's message quoted above. Distribution of copies of this minute should accordingly be restricted to the individual members of the Defence Committee and the Joint Planning Committee.

1 See Document 13.