UKNA: FO 371/1811529, IM 1193/154

London, 3 September 1965

Top Secret

The Repercussions in South East Asia of the Separation of Singapore

1. Sir Neil Pritchard (U.K.) after welcoming the other Delegates, said that the British Government considered that the separation of Singapore created a need for urgent and highly secret consultations. The present talks, which were only a first stage, were regarded as ad referendum to Governments, with a view to preparing the way for decisions at Ministerial level, and therefore exploratory in character.

2. He referred to the paper QT(65) i which had been circulated to the other delegations and suggested that he should expand on the considerations in part V of their paper.

3. On this being agreed to, Sir Neil Pritchard spoke on the lines of the attached notes (Annex)-²

4. Mr. Peck (U.K.) said that the paper QT(65)1 gave no details of the modalities of a negotiation with the Indonesians designed to end confrontation. The British view was that the changed position in Singapore meant that it was not practicable in the longer run to continue to soldier on, but the problem was one of finding ways and means of starting negotiations without giving the impression either to the Indonesians or to the Kuala Lumpur or Singapore authorities that we were on the run. He recognised that these were distasteful possibilities but wondered whether it might not be possible as a first step to find some intermediary, the Japanese for example, to explore Indonesian reactions to a possible settlement based on the calling off of confrontation in return for reascertainment of opinion in Borneo and perhaps some reduction of British forces in Borneo. If these were encouraging, we might then try to get the Tunku and Lee to agree to the principle of negotiation, mentioning that we would be prepared to reduce forces in Singapore if this would help in that direction, and if they reacted suitably we could go on to discuss how best to set up a negotiating conference. It seemed that there were four possible types of conference. One was a large scale conference of all interested parties, including Britain, Australia, New Zealand, and the Philippines as well as the Indonesians and the Kuala Lumpur and Singapore authorities, perhaps under an independent convener such as Japan or U Thant.³ A second possible form was a conference attended by MAPHILINDO partners, with Japan in the chair. A third form was an Afro-Asian Commission on the lines agreed in Tokyo in 1964, with representatives of Indonesia, Malaysia and the Philippines, plus an Afro-Asian country nominated by each, and an independent chairman. A fourth was an AfroAsian sub-committee set up if the Algiers Afro-Asian Conference reconvened. Of these, the first two forms looked the most attractive. At such a meeting, we might work for a settlement based on general pacification in the area; the eventual establishment of MAPHILINDO in some form, the reascertainment of opinion in Borneo; some international guarantee for Sabah and Sarawak; and the thinning out of British forces in Borneo and Singapore over a suitable period. It was fully recognised that any such negotiations raised great difficulties regarding timing, approach and substance.

5. Sir Neil Pritchard (U.K.) said that the main reasons why a stand-pat position was no longer thought practicable was that our position both in Singapore and vis-a-vis confrontation depended on factors beyond our control, for example relations between Malaysia and Singapore, developments in Sabah and Sarawak, and the internal politics of Singapore, where pressures on Lee to make hostile-seeming public statements could become greater.

6. Sir Edwin Hicks (Australia) wished to make only preliminary comments on the British paper and the preceding statements. It was implicit in the paper that confrontation must end by some means or other. Before this was achieved, it was essential to ensure some unity of purpose between the Tunku and Lee. As regards ending confrontation he believed that the Indonesians would only accept a settlement on their own terms involving the complete withdrawal of bases. In the defence context there was, in Australian opinion, no substitute for Singapore. They were concerned about the reference in the British paper to reducing forces there, as they believed that confrontation could not be ended before the bases were reduced to complete defencelessness.

He welcomed the reference to a continuing British part in the defence of South East Asia established in view of past and current British burdens, but before this question or any relocation of bases was discussed it was necessary to consider the general strategy of the area.

7. Mr. Craw (New Zealand) shared Australia's concern about the outcome of a negotiated settlement and wondered whether the inherent dangers did not in fact out-weigh those involved in standing-pat. He thought that the immediate object should not so much be that of ending confrontation–though this could well be explored–as much as moves designed to get Malaysia and Singapore back into some looser form of federation. As alternatives in Australia to the Singapore base were no adequate substitute, and as negotiations about confrontation were likely to lead to the total loss of the Singapore base, he considered that it was essential to hang on to Singapore as long as possible.

8. Ambassador Berger (U.S.A.) said that two questions required careful examination: first, the British assumption that the Singapore position would become increasingly untenable; and secondly the question of where Malaysia and Singapore would go without external support, and, in that connection, whether there were not forces tending to drive both to require a continued British presence. He saw no prospect of an end to confrontation, whatever political changes in Indonesia took place. He felt that the course suggested in the British paper was dangerous. Singapore was certainly the best base in the area. If the position there became untenable the situation would be different, but the first question for discussion was whether this really was so.

9. Mr. Wright (U.K.) suggested that the political question in Singapore was probably the crucial one, i.e. whether Lee's leadership could stand up to pressures, in the face of a rational assessment of the interests of Singapore. It was arguable that whatever Lee and his party might want, they would be forced by these pressures into attitudes and actions corresponding to those which they would adopt if they in fact wanted to push us out.

10. Sir Neil Pritchard (U.K.) said that it was difficult to be optimistic about the suggestion that we should try to patch up matters between Kuala Lumpur and Singapore. This had been tried earlier in the year in the context of a less radical solution, but the only result had been that the Tunku and Lee had later on produced something even more damaging behind our backs. There were serious causes of division in terms of trading, industrial and economic relations. Apart from the attitude of Singapore towards the bases, it was also a fact that there had always been pressures in Malaya itself directed toward limiting the uses to which the base could be put, and, as in Singapore, these pressures were likely to increase. Would it be acceptable to be heavily involved in the Singapore base, when limitations were set on its use?

11. Mr. Craw (New Zealand) said that over the past years the use of Malaysia as a location for a Commonwealth Strategic reserve had been unpopular locally, and it might be worth considering whether there was any prospect of these forces being used, say, for SEATO purposes; they could not be, as long as confrontation lasted, whereas the British paper pointed towards their sharp reduction once confrontation was ended.

12. Ambassador Berger (U.S.A.) said that he had noticed a statement in the British paper that once confrontation was ended, the justification for the continuance of British forces in Singapore would also end. It was pointed out in reply that this (paragraph 10 of the paper) referred to the attitude of Malaysian Ministers.

13. Mr. Wright (U.K.) said that all U.K. forces were now in Singapore for purposes of confrontation, but it was possible that a SEATO requirement of troops could emerge in addition to those at present employed in the confrontation context. This might well be unacceptable to Lee. Moreover the Indonesians could increase their activities against Malaysia (while letting it be known that they would not act against Singapore) in order to drive a wedge between the two. The Singapore base would have to be used in operations in a non-Singapore context.

14. Sir Laurence Mclntyre (Australia) stated that all the things mentioned in the memorandum could happen but it was not inevitable that they would. The memorandum stated the worst cases. It was early yet and we should make allowances for extravagant statements in Kuala Lumpur, Singapore, Jesselton and Kuching. Lee appeared unstable, but on best form would not remain so. Patience was required in the present situation and the use of our influence with the leaders in Singapore and Malaysia. He could not accept that the worst case was the inevitable case.

15. Sir Neil Pritchard (U.K.) explained that reference to the tenability of the base was not in immediate terms. We had to think forward to the 1970s. The point at which the base would be untenable had moved closer in time but we could not tell by how many years. Our influence was probably not adequate to prevent the present situation getting worse. It would be imprudent to continue in the hope that the worst case would not emerge and that our influence was adequate, and then be forced to withdraw against our will.

16. Mr. C. T Wright (U.K.) explained that the problems of law and order in Singapore were crucial to us. There were some physical aspects of running the base which could very well make it impossible to run the base in the face of even minor disorder in Singapore. It was not only disorder generated by the Singapore Government but the prospect of that Government's being unable to keep order for us in the face of pressures upon it. Before the separation of Singapore we depended on Malaysian units to reinforce the police in Singapore. Now local security was less certain even without ill will on the part of the Singapore Government.

17. Ambassador Berger (U.S.A.) enquired about the effects of strikes in Singapore in the past and whether it was not in the interest of the Singapore Government to maintain peace and order. He pointed out that there were very strong reasons why both the Singapore and Malaysian Governments would wish to retain an outside military presence in their countries.

18. Mr. E. H. Peck (U.K.) pointed out that this factor put us in a strong position if we wished to negotiate with the Indonesians. The desire of the Tunku and Lee to retain our military presence could be used to point out to the Indonesians that they were unlikely to achieve their first demand–removal of the base–therefore we could consider the next line of bargaining. This was not a slippery slope as the U.K. military presence had both local and regional backing.

19. Sir Laurence Mcintyre (Australia) considered that Indonesian undertakings or re-assurances could not be relied upon.

20. Sir Neil Pritchard (U.K.) pointed out that hitherto we had considered that we could handle the Indonesians militarily and could hope for an internal crack in Indonesia before the collapse of the Malaysian political scene. But it might be that this was the wrong way round.

21. In reply to a question from Sir Laurence Mcintyre, Mr. Peck (U.K.) elucidated that British forces would stay in Singapore after confrontation was brought to an end but that, for example, they could withdraw from Borneo to Singapore, and perhaps reduce in scale, and still be ready to return to Borneo if confrontation erupted again. It would be possible, of course, to come to the aid of Borneo territories initially from Singapore or later from elsewhere. Sir Neil Pritchard (U.K.) recalled the arguments which were put at the time for the formation of Malaysia and pointed out that one of the reasons for this been our doubts about having a base which was at the mercy of an independent Singapore. This was the predicament we now faced and, in addition, Lee was more strongly entrenched there now than before Malaysia. Nonetheless there was now serious doubt as to whether Lee had adequate forces to control disorder in Singapore. While Malaysian troops might be sent, they might not arrive in time and it was now possible that U.K. troops might be called in to suppress internal disorder in an independent country. This might be a more likely situation after the departure of Lee rather than under his Government but Lee was likely to go on making enemies.

22. Ambassador Berger (U.S.A.) considered that the speculation on this subject, in the context of contingency planning, was acceptable and useful but that a year or two was required to see how the situation would develop. Mr. Wright (U.K.) pointed out that time would be required in contingency planning and that this meant action now in order to be prepared for contingencies which might occur in some years' time.

23. Sir Neil Pritchard (U.K.) asked two specific questions:–

1. If Lee or the Tunku or the Indonesians or anyone sought negotiations to end confrontation should we reject this? And
2. If Sabah and Sarawak wanted to be independent and yet defended by us (and this could happen quickly and without our having much chance to intervene) what should we do?

24. On negotiations, Sir Laurence Mclintyre (Australia) considered that anything which the Tunku approved could be accepted, although he personally was sceptical of any Japanese mediation. There was the possibility that Lee and the Tunku might differ over negotiations and that Lee might negotiate Singapore out of confrontation.

25. Mr. Morgan (U.K.) considered that the more dangerous and likely problem was summed up in Sir Neil Pritchard's second question. If Sabah and Sarawak voted themselves out of Malaysia and sought independence the Indonesians would have achieved two of their three aims in opposing Malaysia. They would have Singapore out of Malaysia, Sabah and Sarawak out of Malaysia and would only be left with their third aim of getting the U.K. bases out, too. Our position would be doubly untenable because there would be no Malaysia for us to protect and our military presence would be a liability to the separate states. He outlined the warnings which had been given to leaders in Sarawak and Sabah but emphasised that the inhabitants might well press for a referendum, and could ask for one of their options to be a reversion to some sort of colonial status perhaps similar to Fiji.

26. Sir Neil Pritchard (U.K.) summing up the views of other delegations asked if it was the general opinion that there was less disadvantage in waiting to see how the situation developed and that it was too early to make any major decisions of policy. Mr. Morgan (U.K.) pointed out that our position in Singapore itself was fairly secure up until, say, 1968, so long as Lee was in power and needed us, but there might well not be the same time before developments in Sarawak and Sabah.

27. Ambassador Berger (U.S.A.) pointed out that the situation would be affected by the U.K.'s will and determination to maintain the base and that any apparent weakening or planning to get out would affect the result and the time scale. Mr Peck (U.K.) said that alternative arrangements would have to be prepared as part of some entirely separate and apparently disconnected process. This would require early consideration.

28. The meeting agreed to adjourn until Tuesday when an attempt might be made to identify the issues to be considered by Governments.

29. There would need to be consideration of the relationship of the problem of Singapore/ Malaysia to the wider problems of Asia including the effect on South Vietnam and India. There might also be some consideration of the situation if Indonesia became Communist–dominated, and fully under the influence of China.⁴

1 Present: for the UK, Sir N. Pritchard (Deputy Under-Secretary of State, Commonwealth Relations Office, Chairman), E. H. Peck (Assistant Under-Secretary of State, Foreign Office), J.C. Morgan (Commonwealth Relations Office), C. W. Wright and H.S.H. Stanley (Foreign Office); for Australia, Sir E. Hicks, Sir L. Mcintyre, R. Osborn; for New Zealand, C. Craw, M.J.C. Templeton; for the US, Ambassador S. Berger, F.T. Underhill, G. Newman, C. B. Wood.

2 Not published.

3 UN Secretary-General.

4 The British Defence Liaison Staff at Canberra reported to the Ministry of Defence in London a discussion with Air Chief Marshal Scherger about the UK's assessment of the repercussions in Southeast Asia of Singapore's separation from Malaysia. Scherger was 'bitterly disappointed' about what he regarded as a 'fait accompli' by UK ministers. He regarded the UK's memorandum on the subject as 'a unilateral UK decision to "defect" in the Far East and one which contradicts all Australia had been led to believe from UK public and private statements in the past ten months'. He contrasted Australian help in the Middle East and Europe in two world wars with this 'apparent appeasement'. Challenged to respond with constructive counter-proposals, Scherger replied that if they were to be convincing, any Australian suggestions 'would only result in a UK request for Australia to do more and this they could not do without affecting development' (UKNA: FO 371/181529 .. IM 1193/135, telegram, British Defence Liaison Staff, Canberra, to Ministry of Defence, 7 September 1965).