NAA: A1945, 248/10/20

Canberra, 18 October 1965

Top Secret

British Presence in South East Asia

Introduction

Since the Quadripartite Meeting was held in London on the 3rd¹ and 7th September 1965, it has become clear that the United Kingdom does not intend to initiate any negotiations toward ending confrontation but has left open the possibility of such negotiations if given a favourable opportunity. The United Kingdom has also indicated that there would be no reduction in the level of British forces and activity in the Malaysia/Singapore area so long as confrontation continues.

2. The longer term however remains obscure. There are two main strands in British thinking, firstly the Defence Review which is directed towards the containment of defence expenditure within £2,000m. (in 1965 values) by 1969/70, requiring substantial cuts in defence commitments, and secondly their assessment of the durability of their tenure in the Singapore base. In the Australian and U.S. view this latter assessment tends to be unduly pessimistic and we suspect their reasoning is being unduly influenced by financial pressures.

3. The British have emphasised that even when confrontation has ended Britain will continue to make a military contribution to defence in South East Asia, but they are clearly contemplating redeployment of forces at a substantially reduced level, on a co-operative basis with their allies, away from the Singapore base. Should the Defence Review lead to decisions contrary to Australia's interests it would be well nigh impossible to have them reversed. It is considered therefore that it would be to Australia's advantage to attempt to influence United Kingdom consideration of the problems before the Defence Review is completed.

4. This paper draws attention to possible directions in which Australia could influence United Kingdom views on the long term problem of the United Kingdom retaining a military presence in South East Asia.

British Position in South East Asia

5. Australia's defence policy for a number of years has been based on a forward defence strategy to hold South East Asia thus providing depth for the defence of the Australian mainland and its island territories. The viability of this policy depends primarily on the maintenance of the U.S. commitment to South East Asia and the powerful contribution of forces by that country, but the continued presence of British forces and particularly the availability of bases in Singapore/Malaysia for use by forces of the ANZAM countries are most important elements of the policy. It should therefore be a primary objective of Australian defence policy that Britain continue to play a major part in the defence of South East Asia by maintaining commitments and an appropriate physical presence there, based on Singapore/Malaysia as long as possible and in the longer term by negotiating for base retention rights with appropriate maintenance and security elements.

6. In our opinion the centre of possible general war has now moved from Europe to Asia and the emergence of China will probably present the main political and military problems for the world in the next few decades. In South East Asia China seeks to extend her influence and ultimately dominate the area. She realises that this objective can be more surely and economically achieved through the manipulation of governments than by military conquest. She has apparently appreciated that any attempt at military conquest would involve her in war with the United States, and as a counter has developed a sophisticated method of applying military power for political purposes. The detonation of China's first two nuclear devices has contributed to China's prestige and authority and has had some political and psychological impact on government and public opinion in Asia. In partnership with the United States, Britain should bring her political and military influence to bear to help in solving the problems arising from the emergence of China. We believe that the maintenance by Britain of an adequate presence in Asia, if necessary at the cost of reducing her commitments in Europe, would constitute the most effective use of her forces in allied global strategy.

7. Although the United Kingdom's relative position as a world power has declined, she is nevertheless the only country in the western world which shares with the United States world wide responsibilities, and she has continued to play an important role in partnership with the United States in maintaining world order and security. The British contribution is particularly valuable in the area east of Suez because of the traditional and historical British position there; her success against communist insurgency waged over many years; the established base facilities especially in Singapore/Malaysia; and the considerable British forces deployed there.

8. The British role in South East Asia is complementary to that of the United States in that the British contribution assists in the containment of Communist China and also helps to balance the developing military strength of Indonesia. Because of her many world wide commitments the United States would find it very difficult to fill a gap created by the withdrawal of the United Kingdom from the South East Asian area and in any case would probably be unwilling to do so. A premature British withdrawal could indeed unsettle the United States at a time when that country is showing firm resolution in the defence of South East Asia. It could also encourage Indonesian expansionist policies and insurgency and subversion throughout the area. For both United States internal and for international reasons it is important that the American efforts be buttressed by those of other nations.

9. The United Kingdom has advised that by 1970, quite apart from any financial considerations, she might no longer be able to count on the use of the Singapore base once confrontation has ended. It appears that this timing relates at least as much to the United Kingdom aim of containing defence expenditure within £2,000 m. by 1969/70 as to any assessment of the likely local political situation over the next five years. Any tendency by the United Kingdom to accept the view that 1970 is a date beyond which the United Kingdom forces are not likely to be in Singapore/Malaysia would be contrary to Australian interests and should be countered. An estimate of the period the United Kingdom could hope to retain forces in the area would only be arrived at by a continuing assessment of political and military factors affecting Singapore/Malaysia.

10. Mr. Harold Wilson in his message to Sir Robert Menzies dated 25th September, 1965, wrote 'naturally we have no intention of being forced out of Singapore in a humiliating manner'. This statement could be construed as indicating that, should an opportunity present itself, the United Kingdom would make an early withdrawal from Singapore/Malaysia to obviate any possibility of having to make a hasty withdrawal under adverse circumstances at a later date. If such a course were to be followed by the United Kingdom it must have a detrimental effect on the political and military stability of the whole area and would throw a grave burden on the other nations involved there. It would most certainly place Australia's forward defence policy as at present conceived in jeopardy. The United Kingdom should continue to be made aware of the serious implications for the Western position in the area of a withdrawal and also of the Australian (and U.S.) view that a United Kingdom presence should be maintained in the area for as long as possible even though this brings with it the inherent risk of having to make a withdrawal under less favourable conditions.

Possible Australian Action

11. Australian efforts to convince the United Kingdom that she should continue to maintain a presence in the South East Asian area as long as possible are unlikely to be successful unless the arguments are backed by some tangible indication that Australia is prepared to be forthcoming to assist the United Kingdom and to examine the possibility of entering into co-operative arrangements when the British proposals in this regard are finally made known to us.

12. Assistance which could be given to the United Kingdom to help her maintain her presence in the area covers a wide range of possibilities which would have to be examined in the light of likely circumstances at the time and other Australian commitments. What the United Kingdom is looking for is some relief of her financial burdens. Australian assistance could include the provision of additional Australian forces to enable a reduction of United Kingdom forces, or in other circumstances a contribution of finance towards the maintenance of the Singapore/ Malaysian bases. There would need to be an early examination of the form of assistance or arrangements required.

13. The United Kingdom would also be reassured of Australia's intention to make an adequate contribution of forces to Malaysia and Singapore if Australia continued to develop her facilities there. This has particular relevance at the moment to Butterworth, where new works have been proposed as part of the programme to replace the Sabre aircraft there with Mirage aircraft. As an earnest of our intentions we should preferably initiate action now to proceed with these new works but it would be imprudent to commit ourselves financially until the United Kingdom's own attitude to facilities in Malaysia/Singapore has been clarified.

14. As indicated earlier the United Kingdom believe that as a result of the separation of Singapore from Malaysia there is a need for the rapid development of contingency planning against the possibility of a forced withdrawal from the area. The requirement for such planning has been opposed by the United States on the grounds that if it became known that the United Kingdom was seriously considering alternatives to Singapore the western position there would be gravely weakened. Although the United States' view is readily understood Australia has on a number of previous occasions agreed to such planning with the United Kingdom because of our own assessment that while the British presence in Malaysia/Singapore should be maintained as long as possible, the security of tenure is uncertain. The risks pointed to by the United States are real but in our view the preparation of contingency plans would help to convince the United Kingdom that we understand their problems and are willing to assist them and would be part of the price of persuading the United Kingdom to hold on in Malaysia/ Singapore as long as possible.

15. Contingency planning should cover the kind of military presence which should be maintained in Singapore/Malaysia given the end of confrontation. This would include an assessment of the aims and tasks of the forces which might remain there, the levels of such forces, and the maintenance of facilities, perhaps as part of a co-operative arrangement with the local authorities, even if substantial overseas Commonwealth forces are not physically located in Singapore/Malaysia on full time deployment. There is also a need to examine the practicability of maintaining bases in Malaysia even if Singapore is no longer available.

16. It is also desirable that there should be an examination of the extension of base facilities in Australia. The development of such infrastructure is likely to be necessary in any event in the longer term. If the British are forced out of Singapore/Malaysia in the future but adhere to their stated intention to maintain a military presence in this part of the world they will require military facilities in Australia. If on the other hand the British withdraw completely from the South East Asian and Australasian area then additional facilities would be needed in Australia to house the forces which we have currently deployed in Malaysia and in support of any expansion of our own forces. The nature of such expanded facilities requires close examination. It could include extensions to existing Navy, Army and Air Force facilities to enable British Naval and Air units to be based in Australia if necessary or units of the three British Services to be deployed here periodically on exercises and moved here quickly in the event of a threat developing. Such combined operating and support facilities would normally be shared on a partnership basis with Australian forces. Willingness by Australia to accept commitments to expand support facilities in Australia which would be available for use by United Kingdom forces would help to convince the United Kingdom of our readiness to assist. Any extension of base facilities in Australia should be carried out as part of Australia's planned defence development of its forces and done in such a way that it cannot be related publicly to alternative deployment from bases in Singapore/Malaysia.

17. It is emphasised that the development of additional facilities in Australia which could be used by United Kingdom forces is not considered to provide a satisfactory alternative to the maintenance by the United Kingdom in association with Australian and New Zealand forces of a physical presence in Singapore/Malaysia for as long as possible.

18. It is pointed out that the deployment of United Kingdom forces to Australia in peacetime would give rise to the normal problems associated with the stationing of forces in an overseas country including command and control, jurisdiction and status of forces, and the use of such forces in delicate political circumstances, for example use of British forces for internal security duties in the British Pacific Islands territories. Moreover, the basing of British forces in Australia would raise the whole question of introducing to this country forces with a nuclear capability.

Consultations with the United States

19. It is essential that the United States should be kept fully informed and consulted as appropriate in any discussions affecting the future of the United Kingdom in the area and of any arrangements entered into with the United Kingdom. The awareness by the United States of Australia's efforts to influence the United Kingdom to maintain her commitments on the mainland of South East Asia could strengthen the United States' resolution to continue with her present policies in the area. Moreover, it is essential to take the United States fully into our confidence at all times in security arrangements affecting South East Asia in view of the paramount defence responsibilities of the United States for backing and support in situations which might develop.

Conclusions

20. The following are our main conclusions:–

(a) In our opinion the centre of possible general war has now moved from Europe to Asia and the emergence of China will probably present the main political and military problems for the world in the next few decades. We believe that the maintenance by the United Kingdom of an adequate presence in Asia, if necessary at the cost of reducing her commitments in Europe, would constitute the most effective use of her forces in allied global strategy;

(b) Decisions on the British Defence Review will be taken this year and will include the measures proposed for the future of the British military presence in Singapore/Malaysia. Once a decision adverse to Australia's interests is taken it will be well nigh impossible to have it reversed;

(c) It should be a primary objective of Australian policy that Britain continue to play a major part in the defence of South East Asia, by maintaining commitments there and an appropriate physical presence based in Singapore/Malaysia for as long as possible, and in the longer term by negotiating for base retention rights;

(d) Paras 6-10 outline some of the considerations which could be put to the British in support of the proposition that she should maintain a military presence in the South East Asian area as long as possible. These arguments are however unlikely to be successful unless they are backed by some tangible indication that Australia is prepared to be forthcoming to assist the United Kingdom and to examine the possibility of entering into co-operative arrangements when the British proposals in this regard are finally presented.

(e) Australia should take the initiative in indicating to the United Kingdom that she is understanding of the United Kingdom financial difficulties; is prepared to co-operate further in the maintenance of the British position in Singapore/Malaysia and to examine any proposals which might be advanced by the British for co-operative arrangements to secure this continued presence; and will participate in contingency planning against a forced withdrawal at some time in the future;

(f) There should be an early examination of the extension of base facilities which would be needed in Australia in the event of a forced withdrawal of United Kingdom and Australian forces from Singapore/Malaysia and which would be available for joint use by Australian and allied forces;

(g) The United States should be kept fully informed and consulted as appropriate in any discussions affecting the future of the United Kingdom in the area and any arrangements entered into with the United Kingdom.

NOTE: A copy of the message from Mr. Harold Wilson to Sir Robert Menzies dated the 25th September, 1965 is attached.

MESSAGE FROM MR. HAROLD WILSON TO SIR ROBERT MENZIES DATED 25 SEPTEMBER 1965-QUADRIPARTITE TALKS

By now you will have had reports on the talks about the consequences of the separation of Singapore from Malaysia which have recently been held between official representatives of the Governments of Australia and New Zealand, the United States and Britain. We had earlier agreed that these talks were to be purely exploratory and would not commit any of us–naturally no vital decisions had been made by us in advance of these talks, which we found extremely useful.

2. As you know from our talk on 1 July² we have in the course of our current defence review taken into account that by 1970 we might no longer be able to count on the use of the Singapore base once confrontation had been ended, quite apart from any financial considerations which might also have to be taken into account in the review. It was the sudden separation of Singapore from Malaysia which made it necessary for us to start the processes of consultation with you and our other allies on our future military posture in the Far East earlier than we had expected and before the studies in our defence review had been completed. But it remains basic to our thinking that, even when confrontation has been ended Britain should continue to play a role in and make a military contribution to defence in the Far East, on the basis of allied co-operative arrangements.

3. I think it is clear from the talks and from the messages which have already been exchanged that while we all share the same aim, that is the defence of Western interests in the South East Asia region, there is some divergence of view about the means of attaining it. This divergence relates firstly to the expected durability of our tenure in the Singapore base, given the political and economic forces at play and the personalities involved–secondly, to the extent to which the separation of Singapore has affected both the fortitude of Malaysia and Singapore together in resisting Indonesian confrontation and our own ability to assist them–and the implications of this for pursuing possibilities of a negotiated settlement–and thirdly, as to the manner in which, dependent on the end of confrontation and the outcome of our defence review, our forces might be redeployed on a co-operative basis.

4. I do not think I need to spell out in detail the intricate considerations on the foregoing points which were fully discussed at the talks, but I feel bound to say that our own assessment of the situation is that time is not on our side, either as regards our tenure in Singapore or the continuation of confrontation. We want to play our part in defence arrangements in the Far East area, and we think it most important to ensure that we are in a position to do this if at any time or for any reason it is no longer possible to carry on the use of the Singapore base. Naturally we have no intention of being forced out of Singapore in a humiliating manner, nor of accepting as a condition of ending confrontation that any of the parts of the former Malaysia should, against their will, be left defenceless.

5. All the questions raised by the separation of Singapore from Malaysia are clearly of the greatest consequence for future Western policy in the area, and equally it is of the utmost importance that between us we should find the right solutions. I am certain that we cannot meet this situation except by way of a continuing process of full consultation, leading to the working out of effective future defence arrangements on a fully co-operative basis.

6. I have now been able to review matters with my colleagues. You and we are of course agreed that the end of Indonesia's confrontation is in itself a most desirable objective. We do not however have it in mind for the time being to initiate a move towards ending it and we shall need to consult together if and when we think that the time has come to make such a move or to take advantage of any move that might be made by a third party. It was at the recent talks the view of the representatives of the United States, Australia and New Zealand that the position created by separation of Singapore did not render the situation so immediately insecure as to justify at present a positive initiative by us designed to bring confrontation to an end. However the whole of the position in relation to confrontation seems to us to be highly uncertain, and while we have decided on a policy of 'wait and see' for the present, some change in the situation may at any time and at short notice demand the most urgent consultations between us as to the means of dealing with it.

7. As regards defence matters, it will be our aim to have further consultations as soon as possible with the Governments of Australia, New Zealand and the United States about the Singapore base and our future defence arrangements in the Far East. These consultations will have to be placed in the global context of our defence review and we will be making proposals to you about this as soon as that review is sufficiently advanced.

1 See Document 3 5.

2 See Document 30.