NAA:A1209, 1965/6595 PART4

Canberra, 19 January 1966

293. Secret

Would you please transmit the following personal message from me to Mr. Harold Wilson on the subject of the British defence review and Mr. Healey's coming visit.

'Message to Mr. Harold Wilson from Sir Robert Menzies dated 19th January

Thank you for your long message on 31st December giving me a full account of your talks in Washington. ¹ We are looking forward to our meeting with Denis Healey at the end of the month.

I will not attempt to write at length now about particular issues, but we have been giving further and urgent attention to the matter of your defence review and the issues which it raises, and there are one or two observations of general principle which I might make, so that you will know the trend of thinking on our part.

We see and appreciate the magnitude of your problems, deriving importantly from the economic side. But there are other grave considerations at issue, including effective Western military effort on the mainland of South-East Asia in support of the continued independence and stability of the countries of the region. We regard it as fundamental that Britain, in reviewing her global role, should not contemplate any significant withdrawal from the defence posture which, jointly with Australia and New Zealand, she has established in the Far East. Against the present background of expansionist policies of China and the grim task in Vietnam, where the Americans have taken the momentous step of committing large forces to the mainland of South-East Asia in order to contain China, there seem to us overwhelming strategic considerations why British defence bases in the Far East, to which we contribute, should be held where they are.

In this wide context, also, the British and Commonwealth presence in its current form is an essential sustaining and stabilizing force in Malaysia and Singapore. Britain's presence and military strength on mainland South-East Asia (and perhaps, consequently, Australia's and New Zealand's) is sanctioned by tradition and by arrangements with free popular government. This existing Commonwealth defence structure is a great asset. We believe it should be retained, and hopefully be developed, for example by bringing India into a closer relationship. In other words, we believe this is a time collectively to strengthen allied provisions for the security of this vital region and, if need be, to look to new arrangements under which this can be done. The stakes are large and of global importance.

You spoke of the need for an alternative posture in the Far East. For our part we cannot envisage an alternative posture which would have the same value and effectiveness as the present arrangements. I would not leave any doubt as to the depth of our conviction on this. A new development of bases and facilities in Australia would be no adequate substitute for the present British defence structure in the region. Our preparations for the talks with Mr. Healey would be aided if we could obtain from you in advance an indication of the strategic concept which you visualize for South-East Asia, and indeed an indication of the role you contemplate for your forces and of what it is you envisage when you refer to an alternative posture. But you will understand that the assessment which I have stated above must weigh heavily with us in our consideration of the approach you are putting to us, that it is urgent to start making preparations for substitute facilities in Australia. In any case, your expressed hope that your partners would carry the new capital expenditure which would be involved must, in itself, raise heavy considerations for us, which we would have to take time to examine.

It is basic to the position which we have taken that the security problems of the region should be tackled as a totality under an arrangement where Britain is joined with America, New Zealand and ourselves in the examination and solution of problems which we believe affect most vitally the interests of all of us, now and in the more distant future.

This leads me to express the view that the vital issues affecting the security of South-East Asia and our respective contributions cannot be satisfactorily resolved through a series of separate talks between Britain and the United States and between Britain, Australia and New Zealand, valuable as these are in opening up the issues and giving each of us the opportunity to study the implications. What we believe to be needed is high level quadripartite consultations and we therefore see the coming discussions in Canberra not as a means of arriving at finality on the matters in question, but as a prelude to quadripartite talks at which our common strategic interests can be identified and translated into agreed and concerted effort.'

1 See Document 46.