UKNA: FCO 46/56

Australia House, London, 18 July 1967

Secret

In the message from my Prime Minister to you which I transmitted earlier this afternoon,¹ Mr. Holt mentioned that he would be making a statement on the terms of your Defence White Paper, and would send it to you.

This is the statement. Mr. Holt wishes me to say that it is being made available to you on a personal basis until such time as it is actually released. This is set down for 0930 hours Canberra time, Wednesday 19th July.

(begins)

'British White Paper on Defence.

Comment by the Prime Minister, The Right Honourable Harold Holt, C.H., M.P. 19th July, 1967.

The principal decisions relating to the British Defence policy East of Suez now announced in the British Government's White Paper on Defence have been the subject of consideration by the Australian Cabinet.

My visit to London in June this year was, of course, primarily to discuss these important issues with Mr. Wilson and other senior members of his Cabinet.

Mr. Wilson and Ministers also held talks with the Prime Ministers of Malaysia and Singapore and also with the New Zealand Deputy Prime Minister, who was representing Mr. Holyoake.

Consultations also took place with the United States administration.

These discussions were clearly desirable since it is not only British interests that are affected by the decisions taken.

The White Paper sets forward a number of decisions and states plans or planning intentions.

It is important that it should be seen in full perspective.

The decisions and plans will be phased over a considerable period of years running into the mid-70s.

There will first be a reduction of British forces deployed in Singapore and Malaysia between now and 1970/71 to about half current levels.

We have for some time assumed that some reduction would occur.

British Forces in Malaysia and Singapore were increased at the time of confrontation and we have recognised throughout that this increase would, as occasion permitted, be reversed and the level of Forces reduced.

There are, however, reductions proposed over the next few years going considerably beyond our earlier expectations.

Beyond 1970/71, the United Kingdom Government plans would, as they stand, lead to total withdrawal of British Forces from their bases in Malaysia and Singapore some time in the mid-1970s.

By then Britain proposes to have reorganized its Armed Forces about a highly mobile strategic reserve.

But it has clearly stated that it cannot plan beyond 1970/71 in the same detail as for the period up until that time, and the precise timing of the withdrawal from the mainland will depend on progress made in achieving a new basis of stability in South-East Asia and in resolving other problems in the Far East.

This is an important element in British Government intentions.

It indicates that Britain will play a continuing military role in the area.

This intention is again illustrated by the plan announced in the White Paper to maintain a military capability for use in the area if required, even after withdrawal from mainland bases.

Further, Britain undertakes in the White Paper to continue to honour obligations under SEATO and obligations under the Anglo-Malaysian Defence Agreement.

The Australian Government welcomes these particular policy decisions.

The British people have made a notable and indeed historic contribution to the establishment of stability and security in the Malaysia/Singapore region since the Second World War, and, in our view Britain can still play a role no other country is so well qualified to play.

Some aspects of the British Government's announcement, of course, are disappointing to us.

We do not overlook the economic problems with which Britain is at present contending, and the substantial savings in Defence expenditure, including expenditure overseas, which its Government believes to be necessary.

Neither do we overlook the British view that the requirement to station large forces in bases in Malaysia and Singapore will lessen as those countries, over the next decade, increase their own military capacities.

But even so, we very much regret that the British Government should feel itself impelled to plan now for final withdrawal from Malaysia and Singapore at a date so far ahead and when it is so difficult to predict how the situation in South-East Asia will move.

One of the principal aspects of my discussions with Mr. Wilson was to urge that his Government retain as much flexibility in its forward planning as was possible.

His Government has felt it necessary to set out a plan for withdrawal.

It has explained its reasons for this.

It has given recognition to the need to have the precise timing of the further moves beyond 1970/71 towards withdrawal from the bases depend upon progress made towards stability in South-East Asia and on other factors in the Far East.

We attach considerable importance to this.

The British announcement carries implications which obviously must form part of the continuing review we make of our Defence policy and planning.

The White Paper mentions the possible use by Britain of facilities in Australia.

This flows out of the discussions which Mr. Healey, the British Minister of Defence, had in Canberra early last year with the Australian Cabinet.²

The examination of these possibilities, including feasibility studies, has been conducted at Service level.

This examination will be continued.

I would add that I have maintained personal contact with Mr. Holyoake, the Tunku Abdul Rahman and Mr. Lee Kuan Yew, and our frank and constructive exchanges with them and also with the British and American Governments in relation to these matters will also continue.'

(ends).

1Holt's message referred to Wilson's message of 13 July (see Document 80). It repeated his government's sense of disappointment, which he described as 'very real', and his belief that Britain's long-term intentions would weaken confidence in Southeast Asia. These considerations, however, did not override 'the long-standing friendship between our two countries'. 'We prize highly the ties which, from your message, will continue to be of much significance for the future of this part of the world.' In responding to the UK White Paper (see Document 80, note 1), Holt's statement would be in a 'lower key' than the strength of feeling in his Cabinet because his government did not want to add to Wilson's difficulties, or increase anxieties in Malaysia and Singapore. While conveying Australia's disappointment, the statement would welcome the UK's decision to retain an out-of-area capability and emphasise that withdrawal would be phased over a considerable period of time (UKNA: FCO 46/56).

On the same day he forwarded Holt's message about the White Paper to Wilson, Downer wrote privately to Sir R. Menzies on the same subject: 'My dear Sir Robert. I hope this reaches you in time before you leave. It is a depressing document, appropriately published in red. Today is surely a shameful and inglorious occasion in British history. Yours ever. Alick' (NLA: Menzies Papers, folder 84, box 10, Downer to Menzies, 18 July 1967).

Downer continued on this theme in a letter to Lord Casey early in 1968: 'I need not tell you of my own reaction to this episode of humiliation, deceit, shame, and national disgrace. I am so disgusted by the double talk of Ministers, of their unending brazen breaking of promises to me personally as High Commissioner, and to our Government in Canberra, that I wonder whether I can usefully continue here in my present position. What I have been trying to do, for some time–looking to the future–is to cultivate more and more members of the Conservative Party, and try to make them realise the crass folly of attenuating the Anglo-Australian relationship–not just out of sentiment, but in their own material self-interest in the decades to come. The response is encouraging, and in this–if you will forgive me saying so–I have been helped in the last 6 months by a breakthrough in the national and provincial press, and a really wide reportage of my speeches and articles. This, at least, is encouraging, because you and I both know how hard it is in England to get our story across. The response from all sections of the community, and from all parts of the kingdom, is most heartening.

'I do not believe this country is decadent, or that it has lost the spirit of 1939–1945. ... Never in my life have I known a Prime Minister so distrusted and discredited, or a Government which has lost–momentarily at least–the confidence of the public so dramatically. Nevertheless, it is hard to see such a clever strategist as Wilson being easily dispossessed, nor the rank and file of the Labour party forgetting the lessons of 1931 and 1951. And, as Alec Home said to me yesterday, it could well be that by the end of this year devaluation would result in a favourable trade outlook, followed up by a convincingly favourable balance in 1969. This could enhance the Government's prospects for an election at the end of 1970.'

In the same letter Downer commented at length on the quality of the British Civil Service. At the Commonwealth Office he detected 'a lack of fire, a tendency to compromise too much, a declining belief in the causes they ought to serve'. He was also 'disturbed' by some Foreign Office attitudes. Sir Paul Gore-Booth, the Permanent Secretary, was sociable and companionable, but Downer questioned whether he had 'any faith in Britain as a Power of world influence'. The Foreign Office was 'strongly pro-Common Market', and while its officials probably did not agree with the 'shameful abandonment' of Southeast Asia, the Indian Ocean, and the Persian Gulf, there was 'not the slightest suspicion of the spirit of Palmerston or even Salisbury, walking in the corridors'. Downer believed Australian civil servants compared favourably with their UK counterparts. 'As with most of us Australians, they have a more confident, dynamic outlook than our English brethren' (NAA: M1003, Downer to Lord Casey, 23 January 1968).

2 See Document 53.