NAA: A5882, CO1191

Canberra, 24 May 1971

Secret

The Strategic Basis of Australian Defence Policy, 1971

The Department of Foreign Affairs had a substantial part in the preparation of the Report attached to the Submission, both in its drafting stages and in its consideration and re-drafting by the Defence Committee.

2. Not everything is expressed in the way I should have preferred, but the report has been agreed by the whole Defence Committee–which is itself important.

3. I think the more important points brought out in the report include these:

(a) The decade ahead will see major changes–some already afoot–in our area of strategic interest, caused by developments both within the area and in the policies and capabilities of the major powers.

(b) These changes will complicate the strategic situation in our part of the world, and will require both a more flexible and a more independent Australian foreign/defence policy, with less reliance than in the past on our major allies and alliances.

(c) Some of the implications of this requirement are already evident but others cannot be foreseen clearly enough at this stage to enable them to be formulated precisely. Largely for this reason, and because military equipment has such a long lead-time and lifetime, the shaping of our military capabilities will not be easy.

(d) Moreover, we can discern no definite military threats to the security of Australian territory and we judge that there is a reduced likelihood of Australian combat involvement beyond our shores.

(e) But the conclusion to be drawn from the foregoing is not that our defence capability can be run down: future uncertainties and the need to have a credible independent military capability in support of Australian foreign policy rules out that easy course. (see paragraph 174). Rather does it mean that we should direct our defence expenditure less to short term defence capability and more to enhancing defence potential in the longer term and to inhibiting (e.g. by military aid programmes) the emergence of a threat.

4. Three particular points arising from the Report could I think be emphasised.

(a) The emergence of China as a true nuclear power with a credible deterrent will complicate affairs for the U.S.A. and U.S.S.R., must have its effect on the policies and planning of China's neighbours (including Australia), and could well lead India and Japan in particular to examine most carefully whether they should themselves seek to become nuclear powers. See also the final paragraph of the Report.

(b) One of the best ways in which we can help maintain security and stability in our region–a way, moreover, which emphasises that the primary responsibility for their defence rests with the regional countries themselves–is by training assistance. The Report accordingly calls (paragraph 190) for provision to be made for up-grading substantially our capacity to train overseas military and para-military personnel either in Australia or their own countries. This will require, for example, deliberate expansion of our training facilities beyond our own forces' immediate and prospective requirements.

(c) Defence cooperation with Indonesia needs to be stepped up. The importance of Indonesia to Australia, the generally favourable prospects for stability in Indonesia, the lack of a foreseeable threat from there, their pressing needs, and comparisons with what we do for Malaysia and Singapore, all point to the conclusion in paragraph 167 (m). We and Defence are about to embark on an intensive study of this matter with a view to putting a submission to Ministers quite soon.

1 In a covering note to Bunting, Eastman commented: 'Although we understand that the Prime Minister has not yet given directions as to the circulation of Mr. Gorton's submission on this subject [see Document 107] or as to the level of Ministerial handling of it, we assume that the Minister for Foreign Affairs will be involved in its consideration. We have therefore provided the Minister with the attached briefing note which we are copying to you for your information.' Leslie Bury was Foreign Minister, March–August 1971.