UKNA: CAB 129/158

London, 2 August 1971

Secret

The European Economic Communities

1. The main issues in our negotiations for accession to the European Economic Communities have now been resolved. Parliament will be asked in October to approve our decision in principle to join the Communities on the terms which have been negotiated. We must now proceed on the assumption that this approval will be given and that we shall be going forward with the process of joining the Communities.

2. With the main issues in the negotiations resolved, we are now entering a new phase in our relationship with Europe. We must actively turn our minds to the changes in our attitudes and practices which this phase will require.

3. Between now and the date of accession we shall face a two-fold task. First, we have to complete the processes leading up to our accession. This means completing the outstanding negotiations in order to be in a position to sign a Treaty of Accession by the end of 1971 and steering through Parliament by the end of the 1971–72 Session the legislation which will be required in order to enable us to ratify the Treaty by 31 December 1972. Work on these matters is already in hand; and the issues for decision will come to us at the appropriate times.

4. The second part of the task will be no less difficult and even more fundamental. We have now to adapt ourselves to the prospect of entry into the Communities in terns of both our basic policies and our administrative practices. Hitherto, 'the approach to Europe' has meant, in effect, the negotiations with the Communities on the terms of entry. The processes of discussion and decision have been designed accordingly. From now on, however, we cannot afford to compartmentalise Europe in this way. In all major problems of policy, whether political, economic or strategic in character, we have to learn to 'think European'; to think and decide in terms of our interests as a member of the Communities and in terms of the inter-action of our policies with Community policies and developments. This is not just a matter of ensuring that between now and the date of accession the Communities do not take policy decisions which are unacceptable or unpalatable to us. Over the whole range of our business we shall have to develop a clear and hard-headed concept of the real scope and nature of our interests as a member of the Communities and a realistic understanding of the aims and policies of the Communities and, indeed, of the individual members. And we shall have to be ready to take decisions in the light of what we can do to promote our interests as a member of the Communities and to encourage the development of the Communities in directions which serve our own interests and requirements, those of the other members and those of Europe as a whole.

5. All this implies an effort of a kind which the British Governmental machine has never had to make before, at any rate on this scale, except perhaps in the field of defence. We cannot expect to achieve this radical change of attitude by creating a new 'Department of Europe' or even by relying upon the normal processes of inter-departmental discussion. What is required is that individual departments should themselves develop the habit of thinking and acting, over the whole range of their business, in the manner appropriate to a member of the Communities.

6. We must use the period between now and the date of our accession to make a reality of this change of attitude in order that we may be ready, when the time comes, to join the Communities with a clear purpose and a realistic strategy which permeate the whole of Whitehall.

7. All this will mean a great deal of work, which will have to be carried out simultaneously with the specific preparations for entry to which I have already referred. Ministers should now put in hand the arrangements for ensuring that their Departments are staffed and organised to deal with this task.

8. During this period I believe that it will be helpful to have a small and compact inter-departmental unit to compare experience and to co-ordinate thinking and action. The existing inter-departmental machinery on Europe has served us well so far; and I believe that, strengthened where appropriate, it will match up with equal efficiency to the greater tasks which lie ahead.

9. I have asked the Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster to take charge of the whole programme in addition to the completion of the negotiations with the Communities. The inter-departmental team will be responsible to him. As the remaining negotiating. issues are dealt with, the focus of activity will shift increasingly from the diplomatic to the domestic arena. At the beginning of September, the Chancellor of the Duchy will therefore move out of the Foreign and Commonwealth Office into a more central and non-departmental position in Whitehall, although he will remain the Ministerial head of the negotiating team until the negotiations are complete. I am asking the Solicitor-General to assist the Chancellor of the Duchy in the preparation and passage of legislation through Parliament; and Ministers from other Departments will, of course, be invited to co-operate in preparing those sections of the legislation which are concerned with matters for which they are responsible.

10. In this new task the Chancellor of the Duchy will need the greatest possible support from all Departments in Whitehall; and I ask my colleagues to give him all the help they can in meeting the great challenge of transforming the British administrative system into something which will think and behave in a truly European manner.

The introduction of restrictions on Commonwealth immigration to the United Kingdom

One of the most telling indicators of the shifting foundations of the Anglo-Australian relationship was the changing status of Australians seeking to settle and work in Britain. Until 1962, Australians had been entitled to free entry to settle in Britain as of right, by virtue of their British subject status. This was indicative of deeply ingrained assumptions about Britain as the 'home' or 'mother' country, and the underlying ethnic and cultural unity of the 'British peoples' of the world. These ideas went largely unchallenged for generations, and rarely if ever became the subject of public controversy. The right of entry into Britain was so taken for granted that the rules rarely needed to be spell out to would-be working holiday-makers.

This situation began to change in the early 1960s when the Macmillan Government introduced the first of a series of immigration reforms, known as the 'Commonwealth Immigrants Acts'. The idea of restricting Commonwealth immigration to the UK had been debated openly since the arrival of the Empire Windrush in 1948 from the West Indies, which first publicised the issue of non-white communities settling in Britain. But throughout the 1950s, successive British governments had concluded that any curtailment of the entry rights of Commonwealth subjects would be highly damaging to the standing and credibility of the post-war Commonwealth. By the early 1960s, however, the increase in migration from, primarily, South Asia and the Caribbean, brought the debate about race, migration and social cohesion to the fore once more. Fearing the emergence of a US–style 'colour problem', the Macmillan Cabinet agreed in July 1961 that 'it was more important to contain this danger ... than to avoid unfavourable reactions to control in coloured Commonwealth countries and elsewhere'. ¹

Significantly, it was also agreed that any new restrictions should be non-discriminatory between Commonwealth countries. At a time when the government was promoting a new vision for a multi-racial Commonwealth, and when civil rights issues had gained special prominence in the US and the UN, the imposition of an overt 'colour bar' on immigrants from South Asia and the West Indies would have been politically untenable. Thus, the 'old' Commonwealth of Australia, New Zealand and Canada would be subject to immigration controls in the same way as the rest of the Commonwealth. This gave cause for genuine concern to the Home Office, anticipating that any radical curtailment of the entry rights of white Commonwealth citizens could give rise to heated protest abroad and political controversy at home.

As a solution to this dilemma, the 1962 Commonwealth Immigrants Act introduced a complex 'voucher' system that effectively discriminated in favour of the 'old' Commonwealth, without overtly discriminating on racial grounds. Would-be migrants were divided into two categories: those who had jobs waiting for them in Britain or who possessed 'qualifications useful to Britain', and those who did not. Vouchers for the former would be administered liberally, while the latter would be subject to strict quotas. In this way, virtually anyone from the old Commonwealth seeking a period of work in Britain would be granted entry. As the Home Secretary, Rab Butler, minuted in October 1961, 'although the scheme purports to relate solely to employment and to be non-discriminatory, its aim is primarily social and its restrictive effect is intended, and would in fact, operate on coloured people almost exclusively'. ²

For this reason, the Australian reaction to the 1962 Commonwealth Immigrants Act was initially somewhat muted. While recognising the significance in the fact that Australians could no longer enter the UK for employment as of right, and despite objections in certain quarters about the mere fact of having to 'apply' for a voucher to work in Britain, the Menzies Government nonetheless recognised that the British were going as far as could reasonably be expected to bestow favour on Australians at the entry gates. Moreover, the Australian Government's whole posture on the immigration question was determined by Australia's own discriminatory immigration practices. Australian governments had long preached the principle of non-interference in immigration policies between sovereign states, and were at pains to avoid international scrutiny or diplomatic controversy over the 'White Australia' policy. Any overt criticism of the new British legislation would therefore place the Australian Government in an ambiguous position. Thus, in contrast to the furore over restrictions on the entry of Australian trade goods that was the heart of the EEC problem, the Menzies Government was more sanguine when it came to restrictions on the entry of Australian people (Documents 304–06).

But while Australia raised no objections in principle, there was scope for argument over the details. Soon after the implementation of the new British entry rules in April 1962, difficulties began to emerge. As early as October 1962 Australia House felt bound to register misgivings about individual cases of Australians turned back at the ports–concerns that fell largely on deaf ears in the Home Office (Documents 307, 308). Two issues became prominent in this initial period–Australian requests that migration officers should be empowered with special discretion to admit Australians without entry vouchers, and Australian concerns about the system of passport queues at UK entry gates. The new system operated with three queues, for UK citizens, Commonwealth citizens and 'aliens' respectively, and Australia House complained that Australians were often directed to the 'Aliens' queue when the Commonwealth entry point was unmanned–an affront to their British subjecthood. Here, again, there was little the Home Office could do to meet Australian demands without causing delays and inconvenience to UK citizens.

Australian objections to the UK entry rules became more frequent and vocal during the tenure of Alexander Downer as High Commissioner from 1964. This was partly due to the personality and temperament of Mr Downer, who found the changes across the board in the Anglo-Australian relationship during these years profoundly at odds with his own 'British' outlook and instincts–something that he gave free voice to in his many speeches and public engagements around the country. But it was also due to an increasing number of Australians being stopped at the entry gates, which was partly because of the expiry of the entry vouchers of the first wave of arrivals admitted under the 1962 Act. Problems typically arose with the expired vouchers of Australians returning from short visits to the Continent.

Two aspects of this difficult phase in relations are worth noting. One is the role of the print media in generating the periodic 'crises' in Anglo-Australian relations on the migration question–far more so than direct government-to-government dealings. Both the UK and the Australian press became adept at publicising individual cases of hardship, and these reports themselves generated much of the diplomatic activity between the two countries. It is impossible to document every instance of this, but the most prominent case is included here–namely an item in the Times in November 1966 which reverberated widely and prompted the Commonwealth Relations Office to consider seriously the idea of discriminating openly in favour of the 'white' Commonwealth (Documents 314–16).

Secondly, there was the role of 'informal' diplomacy on the part of the Australian High Commissioner. Mr Downer's interventions on the migration issue were invariably prompted by individual cases of hardship, sometimes on behalf of people known to him personally. At no point does the High Commissioner seem to have been instructed by Canberra to seek changes in the UK entry rules to secure additional benefits for Australians, as this would have been in breach of the principle of non-intervention in matters of migration policy. Yet this was the clear impression that was conveyed in the High Commissioner's handling of individual problem cases. Moreover, Mr Downer's interventions were often made during informal or social encounters with British ministers and officials, and even some of his official discussions in Whitehall on this subject do not appear in the Australian record. As a result, there is a lopsidedness to the official record, and much of the documentary evidence of 'Australian objections' to the UK entry rules is to be found in London, not Canberra.

This first cluster of documents on the UK immigration issue covers the period from the inauguration of the Commonwealth Immigrants Act in 1962 to the problems generated by press reports of Australian hardship in the mid-1960s and the response of the Australian High Commissioner.

1 UKNA: CAB 134/1469, CCM(61), 3rd meeting, 31 July 1961.

2 UKNA: CAB 129/107, C(61)153, 6 October 1961.