Australian Safeguards Assistance Program

Analytical
Services for Environmental Sampling Environmental sampling is an important safeguards strengthening
measure that will enhance the IAEAs capability to detect undeclared nuclear
activities. ANSTOhas demonstrated that mass
spectrometry using a tandem accelerator can be used to analyse environmental
samples with very high sensitivity. It
has participated in an international exercise for the measurement of I-129 (a
long-lived fission product) in test samples prepared in the US, with good
results. ASNO has supplemented the
funding of this work to allow ANSTO to construct a new beam-line facility for
uranium and plutonium and complete the R&D needed to perfect its analytical
techniques.

Application
of the State-level Integration Concept on Fuel Cycles Under Safeguards This program of
work has assisted the IAEA to determine exactlyhow the current safeguards system can be strengthened and made
more cost-effective by integrating safeguards measures (INFCIRC/153) with those
implemented under the Additional Protocol (INFCIRC/540). Under this task, six IAEA non-nuclear-weapon
States, including Australia, each developed integrated safeguards approaches
for their own particular fuel cycles.
The intention is to derive generic guidance on how integrated safeguards
schemes should be designed from a study of specific real cases.

Re-Examination
of Basic Safeguards Implementation Parameters
The IAEA has acknowledged the need, in
parallel with the development of strengthened and integrated safeguards
concepts, to re-examine certain basic parameters used in safeguards, such as
timeliness goals, significant quantities, and the classification of nuclear
material for safeguards purposes. ASNO
has prepared papers on timeliness goals and the categorisation of nuclear
material, which have been used by the IAEA and formed an important input to
SAGSI's deliberations on these subjects.
Additional papers relating to other verification parameters have been
drafted and will be submitted to the IAEA in the next reporting period. The results of these studies are used by the
IAEA to directly support efforts to develop and implement integrated
safeguards.

Expansion
of the Physical Model The document known as the Physical Model was developed for the
IAEA by a panel of international experts (including ASNO staff) in support of the
Agency's improved analysis of information in the context of strengthened
safeguards. It was an attempt to
identify, describe and characterise every known technology and process for
carrying out each step necessary for the acquisition of weapons-useable fissile
material. As developed, the Physical
Model is a living document subject to periodic review and update. ASNO has agreed to contribute to the project
by providing support in the area of hot cells and R&D activities. The task results will be incorporated into
the Physical Model as integral parts of the document and be used by safeguards
analysts and inspectors as technical tools in the enhanced information analysis
in the context of strengthened and integrated safeguards.

Support for Information Review and Evaluation Since 1997,
ASNO has undertaken for the IAEA a number of consultancy subtasks in support of
the implementation of strengthened safeguards.
Activity for the reporting period is set out below.

• To evaluate information on
  mining and milling of uranium for safeguards purposes. This task seeks to:
  determine the circumstances under which the IAEA might undertake complementary
  access to a uranium mining/milling site; what verification activities would be
  applicable; and how declared information about mining/milling activities would
  contribute to an assessment on undeclared activities.
• To develop logic trees
  designed to evaluate proliferation pathways. This task requires the application of
  techniques used in safety and reliability analysis to the acquisition of
  nuclear material for weapons purposes.
  The technique generates a complete set of proliferation strategies,
  including those that require diversion of safeguarded nuclear material and
  those that make use only of activities outside safeguards. It allows the analyst to see easily where
  classical safeguards measures and safeguards-strengthening measures are
  complementary and where they are redundant.
  This task is a completed sub-task of a larger task.
• To evaluate the ways in
  which technology transfers (both within and outside the internationally
  established export control regimes) contribute to clandestine weapon programs.
  Under
  this subtask, the routes for transfer of technology needed to establish an
  undeclared capability for nuclear weapon production are being studied.
• Provide assistance in the
  use of the scientific literature. The IAEA has established a small
  international group of experts (including an ASNO officer) to provide
  assistance and guidance in the effective use of scientific literature for
  safeguards purposes.
• Provide
  assistance in the collection and handling of open source information. Under this subtask, ASNO
  assisted the IAEA in the establishment of logical mechanisms (search trees) for
  searching the Agencys databases of open-source literature for potentially
  proliferation-relevant items. This task
  is complete. IAEA analysts are using
  the search trees routinely.

Installation
and Demonstration of Reactor Power Monitors at the HIFAR Reactor This task
requires the installation and demonstration of two categories of power monitor
at ANSTOs HIFAR research reactor, the purpose of which is to detect operation
of the reactor at a power higher than declared and to detect undeclared
shutdowns. Both these activities could be
linked to the production of plutonium for potential use in a nuclear weapons
program or associated R&D. This
work has been progressed in collaboration with the IAEA, but will not be
completed until 2001.

Criteria
for Evaluating Information Technology Security for Safeguards Equipment
Systems Unattended
safeguards equipment in the field requires data authentication to provide a
high level of assurance that the generated safeguards data are secure from
unauthorised access and tampering.
Under various support programs, the IAEA has organised assessments of
the vulnerability of new authentication systems, normally in countries other
than those where the authentication system was developed or is intended to be
used. The Defence Signals Directorate
(DSD), as Australia's expert in this area, is contributing to the development
of the new standardised criteria for the IAEA.

Tasks Completed During 1999-2000

Consultantto
coordinate the implementation of digital image surveillance The IAEA is
deploying about 400 digital surveillance camera systems to replace the
relatively unreliable analog systems currently in use. The consultant coordinated activities such
as acceptance testing, site surveys, commissioning systems in the field, and
maintenance. An Australian expert in
digital surveillance systems was seconded to the Agency in Vienna for this
purpose.

Collaboration with other countries

ASNO has an active and growing safeguards
R&D collaboration program with US research laboratories, under an ASNO/DOE
agreement first concluded in 1992 and renewed in September 1998. Several projects have been proposed during
the year and work on formalising these projects is continuing.

In collaboration with the DOE, SNL and the
IAEA, ASNO is designing a remote monitoring system for the materials balance
area of the HIFAR research reactor. The
purpose of this is to save IAEA inspection resources by reducing the number of
routine inspections at HIFAR each year from four to one, with an additional
unannounced inspection once per year.
The equipment will be provided by SNL and it is planned that the system
will go into routine safeguards use in 2001/2002. This remote monitoring system will also be an important feature
of the new integrated safeguards approach proposed for Australia.

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