Annual Report 1999-2000
Operation of Australias national system of
accounting for, and control of, nuclear material and items subject to IAEA
safeguards, including promotion and regulation, within Australia, of effective
measures for the physical protection of nuclear facilities and material.
Milestone
A1
A1.1 The provisions of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation (Safeguards) Act
1987 administered effectively.
A1.2 The continued adequacy of the Acts provisions reviewed and evaluated.
A1.3 Under the Acts Permit
System, nuclear items in Australiaincluding those subject to bilateral
safeguards agreementscontrolled and accounted for effectively.
Activities
Permits and authorities
During the year two new permits or
authorities under the Safeguards Act were issued, none expired and none were
revoked. The conditions of three
permits were varied.
Permits and Authorities in Australia
Permit or
Authority to:
Granted
Expired
Number at End of Period
Total
2
3
0
91
Possess nuclear material
1
3
0
31
Possess associated items
0
0
0
21
Transport nuclear material
1
0
0
22
Transport associated items
0
0
0
0
Communicate
information contained in associated technology
0
0
0
17
Laser
enrichment R&D
An Australian company, Silex Systems
Limited, is
researching an innovative method of separating uranium isotopes using laser
techniques. In 1996 the company entered
into an agreement with the United States Enrichment Corporation (USEC) to
explore the commercial potential of this technology. In the first phase, Silex demonstrated the technology to USEC
specialists. If further development
work in successive phases is successful, the technology may be commercialised
in the United Statesthis aspect is discussed further under Milestone B2 (on page
29).
Development of Silex enrichment technology - photograph courtesy of Silex Systems Ltd.
ASNO is following the progress of this research closely, since
the Silex technology will have to be classified as associated technology and
associated equipment under the Safeguards Act if it proves practicable for
the enrichment of nuclear material, or if it is considered that details of the
technology could be useful for others working in the enrichment field. ASNOs objective here is to ensure that
nuclear technology remains in exclusively peaceful use and does not contribute
to any proliferation efforts. Classification
as associated technology will have the result of restricting access to the
technology to authorised persons. ASNO
is also concerned to ensure that all IAEA reporting requirements with respect
to nuclear-related R&D are met. In
anticipation that the Silex process may become associated technology, ASNO
has already put in place appropriate security measures to ensure against
unauthorised access.
Data reported pursuant to the Safeguards Act
As required by sub-section 51(2) of the
Safeguards Act, details of nuclear material and associated items of Australian
origin, and nuclear material and associated items within Australia, regardless
of origin, are set out in Annexes to this Report as follows:
Annex A: Nuclear
Material within Australia at 30 June 2000.
Annex B: Associated
Items within Australia at 30 June 2000.
Annex C: Australian
Obligated Nuclear Material Overseas:
(i) Locations and
Quantities of AONM at 31 December 1999.(ii) Transfers of
AONM during 1999.
As in previous years, no associated items of Australian origin are
located overseas.
ASNO also provides the Australian National
Audit Office with a statement each year of holdings of nuclear items by ANSTO.
Performance Assessment
Administration of the Permit System was
carried out in a timely manner, with all changes published in the Commonwealth
of Australia Gazette as required by the Safeguards Act. All nuclear material and nuclear items
within Australia were satisfactorily accounted for as at 30 June 2000.
Milestone
A2
IAEA safeguards implemented satisfactorily
in Australia.
Activities
Australias State System of Accounting for
and Control of Nuclear Material (SSAC)is operated by ASNO in
accordance with Australias safeguards agreement with the IAEA. ASNO reports to the IAEA on the disposition
of nuclear material in Australia and assists inspections carried out by the
IAEA at Australian facilities.
Reports on the disposition of nuclear material
Each month an ASNO officer carries out an
audit of the inventory of nuclear material at the ANSTO site at Lucas Heights
(near Sydney), which is the principal location of safeguardable nuclear
material in Australia. Changes during
the month in that inventory (as well as any changes elsewhere in Australia) are
reported by ASNO to IAEA headquarters in Vienna. Accounting reports are also given to the IAEA by ASNO following
the IAEA inspections described below.
Details of Australian Accounting Reports to
the IAEA during the year are at Annex D.
IAEA inspections in Australia
ASNO inspector assists IAEA in collection of environmental samplesphotograph
As in other countries covered by IAEA safeguards, the Agency carries
out routine inspections of Australian nuclear facilities. The aim of these inspections is to verify
that nuclear material inventories are as declared by the operator and the
SSAC. Each inspection deals with what
is described as a Material Balance Area (MBA), of which Australia has five, as
listed in Table 4.
IAEA inspectors visited Australia on 5
occasions during 1999-2000 to carry out routine inspections (see Annex D for
details).
Australia
ANSTO
AS-A
HIFAR
reactor
ANSTO
AS-B
Moata
reactor[2]
ANSTO
AS-C
Research and Development
Laboratories
ANSTO
AS-D
Vault
Storage
Elsewhere
AS-E
Other
locations in Australia
[2] In February 1995 the
ANSTO Board decided to cease operation of Moata, and the reactor was defuelled
in May 1995.
ASNO, as the national safeguards authority,
acts as the intermediary between the IAEA and the facility operator on all
safeguards matters. An ASNO officer
accompanies IAEA inspectors during inspections in Australia. The officer ensures the inspectors are able
to carry out their duties, so that Australia meets its obligations, and
mediates on any issues arising between the IAEA and the facility operator. In particular, ASNO assists in the
resolution of any inconsistencies discovered during inspections, thus
simplifying the IAEA inspectors task.
A major focus of IAEA inspection activity
is the identification and evaluation of material unaccounted for (MUF), that is, the difference between the records maintained by the
operator (the ending book inventory) and the physical inventory verified by
the IAEA. Since MUF is the difference
between two measured quantities, it may be equal to zero, or it may be either a
positive or negative value. If MUF is
positive it does not necessarily indicate that material has been lost, nor does
a negative figure mean that material has somehow been created. In the normal course, some measurement
differences are expected. There was a
small MUF of enriched uranium declared for MBA AS-C (R&D Laboratories)
during the year. The Physical Inventory
for this MBA was less than the Book Inventory by 4.73 grams of uranium element
and 0.10 grams of U-235 isotope.
The IAEA reports all conclusions drawn from
its routine safeguards inspections in Australia, including comments on any MUF,
in the statements provided pursuant to Article 91(b) of Australias NPT
safeguards agreement. A summary of
Statements provided during the year for Material Balance Areas AS-A, B, C and D
and an explanatory note on MBA AS-E are at Annex E of this Report.
Declaration of Safeguards Inspectors
Under section 57 of the Safeguards Act, the
Minister may declare a person to be an Inspector for the purposes of the
Act. In practice, this applies only to
officers of ASNO. The role of an
Inspector is to ensure compliance with provisions of the Safeguards Act and to
assist IAEA inspectors in the conduct of Agency inspections in Australia. No new national inspectors were declared in
1999-2000.
The Minister may declare a person
designated by the IAEA as an Agency Inspector for the purpose of the
Safeguards Act. In practice, all IAEA
staff designated to Australia are declared under the Safeguards Actthere were
21 new designations during 1999-2000.
There are currently 181 IAEA staff declared as Agency Inspectors
pursuant to the Act.
Since 1990, inspector appointment and
declaration powers have been delegated by the Minister to the Director of
Safeguards.
Performance Assessment
All routine IAEA inspections were concluded
satisfactorily and all apparent discrepancies were resolved.
IAEA statements during 1999-2000 confirm
that all of Australias IAEA safeguards obligations were discharged
satisfactorily and, specifically, that Australias records had been maintained
in accordance with prescribed practice.
ASNOs reporting fully satisfies IAEA requirements.
The IAEA has never found cause to comment
adversely on Australias accounting for and control of nuclear materiala fact
reflected in Article 91(b) statements over the years.
Milestone
A3
A3.1 Appropriate physical
protection measures for nuclear material in Australia reviewed; sites holding
nuclear items audited to ensure that prescribed physical protection measures
have been implemented effectively.
A3.2 Sites holding nuclear
items audited to ensure that prescribed physical protection measures have been
implemented effectively.
Activities
Physical Protection within Australia
ASNO is responsible for prescribing the
levels of physical protection, or security, to be applied to nuclear items
subject to the Safeguards Act. During
the year, inspections were carried out of the physical protection measures
applied at ANSTO. Inspections were also
carried out of the physical protection measures applied at, and in connection
with, the uranium mining operations in South Australia and the Northern
Territory. In addition, regular
inspections were made of the arrangements put in place for the protection of
potentially sensitive information relating to the Silex laser enrichment
R&D project.
Performance Assessment
Physical protection requirements prescribed
by ASNO are consistent with the most recently agreed international standards.
All physical protection inspections undertaken
by ASNO had satisfactory outcomes: ANSTO, the uranium mines and associated
operations, and Silex were all confirmed to be applying appropriate levels of
physical protection.
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