Skip to main content

Annual Report 2000-2001

Australian Safeguards and Non-Proliferation Office 2000

Minister

Administration of the legislation under which ASNO operates,
the Nuclear Non-Proliferation
(Safeguards) Act
1987 (the
Safeguards Act), the Chemical Weapons (Prohibition) Act 1994and the Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Act
1998
, is the responsibility of the Minister for Foreign Affairs, the Hon.
Alexander Downer MP.

Director General, ASNO

The position of Director General, ASNO, incorporates the
functions of Director of Safeguards, Director, Chemical Weapons Convention
Office, and Director, Australian Comprehensive Test-Ban Office. Background to the formation of
ASNO,
established in 1998, is given in the ASNO Annual Report 1999-2000
(page 106).

Outline of Safeguards Role

ASNOs predecessor, the Australian Safeguards Office, was
established in 1974. The position of
Director of Safeguards was created in 1987 as a statutory office, appointed by the
Governor-General, in order to ensure the independence and integrity of
Australias domestic and bilateral safeguards functions. The Director of Safeguards reports directly
to the responsible Minister, who since 1994 has been the Minister for Foreign
Affairs. The Safeguards Act requires
the Director of Safeguards to prepare an Annual Report for presentation to
Parliament.

Mr John Carlson was initially appointed as Director of
Safeguards in 1989, and was appointed as Director General, ASNO, on 31 August
1998 when ASNO was established. Mr Carlson was re-appointed on 7 June 2000 for a further term of
three years.

Outline of CWC Role

The Chemical Weapons
(Prohibition) Act 1994

provides that the Minister may designate a particular office within a
Department or agency for which the Minister is responsible, or a statutory
office under legislationfor which the Minister is responsible, as the office whose
occupant is the Director, CWCO. On 11
March 1995 the Minister for Foreign Affairs designated the office of Director
of Safeguards for this purpose.

The Director, CWCO, is required to prepare an Annual Report
for presentation to Parliament, and to date this has been incorporated with the
Annual Report of the Director of Safeguards.

Outline of CTBT Role

The Director, ACTBO, is likewise to be designated
by the Minister under the Comprehensive
Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty Act 1998
. This Act will have effect when the CTBTenters into force.
Since
the CTBT is only in provisional operation, the Director, ACTBO cannot be
formally designated. However, ASNO is
already carrying out many of the tasks required of Australias CTBT national
authority and a report on these activities is included in this Report.

Functions

The functions of the Director General, ASNO, include:

  • ensuring the effective operation of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation (Safeguards) Act
    1987

    and the Chemical Weapons (Prohibition)
    Act 1994
    , and fulfilment of Australias obligations under the treaties
    these Acts implement;
  • ensuring fulfilment of Australias obligations under
    nuclear safeguards agreements, including the agreement with the International
    Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) for the application of safeguards pursuant to
    the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT);
  • monitoring compliance with the provisions of bilateral
    nuclear safeguards agreements by Australias treaty partners;
  • undertaking, coordinating and facilitating research and
    development (R&D) in relation to nuclear safeguards;
  • ensuring the timely and effective establishment of CTBT
    International Monitoring System (IMS) facilities in Australia, and
    undertaking preparations to meet the full range of Australias obligations
    under the CTBTwhen it
    enters into force; and
  • advising the Minister on nuclear non-proliferation and
    safeguards matters, and on issues related to CWC implementation and CTBT
    verification.

Overview
of Safeguards Role

On safeguards,
ASNO has four main areas of responsibility:

  • the application of safeguards within Australia;
  • the physical protection and security of nuclear items
    in Australia;
  • the operation of Australias bilateral safeguards agreements; and
  • contribution
    to the operation and development of international (IAEA) safeguards and the
    strengthening of the international nuclear non-proliferation regime.

IAEA safeguards are a key element in international action
against the spread of nuclear weapons. Effective IAEA safeguards are of vital interest to Australia because of
their contribution to global and regional peace and security. They are also important because they
underpin Australias stringent uranium export policies.

Key safeguards functions are:

  • ensuring that nuclear material, associated material,
    equipment and technology in Australia is properly accounted for and controlled,
    and ensuring that requirements are met under Australias safeguards agreement
    with the IAEA and bilateral agreements applying to nuclear material and items
    in Australia;
  • pursuant to obligations under the Convention on the
    Physical Protectionof Nuclear Material (CPPNM), and following IAEA
    guidelines, ensuring that appropriate security measures are applied to nuclear
    items in Australia;
  • ensuring Australias bilateral safeguards agreements are implemented
    satisfactorily, that is, to guarantee Australias nuclear exports remain in
    exclusively peaceful use; ensuring that conditions which Australia places on
    the use of Australian Obligated Nuclear Material (AONM), additional to IAEA
    safeguards, are met (these conditions are outlined on page 69);
  • ensuring that all AONM is subject to IAEA safeguards,
    and verification of non-diversion is carried out by the IAEA;
  • ensuring that any nuclear items other than nuclear
    material (i.e. associated material, equipment and technology) transferred to
    other countries are properly accounted for, and that the relevant records of
    Australias partners are consistent with ASNO records;
  • contributing to the development and effective
    implementation of IAEA safeguards through activities such as participation in
    expert groups and international meetings on safeguards, field testing of new
    safeguards methods in Australia, and presentation of regional trainingcourses on safeguards techniques;
  • managing Australias Support Program for IAEA
    safeguards, which embraces R&D work and includes consultancy tasks for the
    IAEA;
  • evaluation of the effectiveness of IAEA safeguards, and
    evaluation of non-proliferation aspects of nuclear fuel cycle developments, as
    a basis for advising Government;
  • contributing to the development of Australias policies
    in the area of disarmament and non-proliferation by colleagues in the International
    Security Division (ISD) of DFAT; and
  • working closely on technical issues of common interest
    with agencies such as the Australian Nuclear Science and Technology
    Organisation (ANSTO), the Australian Radiation Protection and Nuclear
    Safety Agency (ARPANSA), the Defence Intelligence Organisation (DIO),
    and the Office of National Assessments (ONA).

Overview of CWC
Role

ASNO
is the focal point in Australia for liaison between stakeholders, such as
operators of declared facilities, the Organisation for the Prohibition of
Chemical Weapons (OPCW),
and the national authorities of other States Parties on issues relating to
implementation of the Convention. ASNOs
role here is primarily one of liaison and facilitation, to ensure that
Australias international obligations under the CWC are met while at the same
time making certain that the rights of facility operators are protected. ASNO seeks to promote effective
international implementation of the CWC, particularly in Australias immediate
region, by working with the OPCW and other States Parties in the resolution of
outstanding verification issues and providing practical implementation
assistance to regional countries, upon request.

ASNO
is responsible for ensuring that the requirements of the Chemical Weapons (Prohibition) Act 1994are met.
It has the right to conduct national compliance inspections of
relevant chemical facilities. While the
Act makes provision for national inspectors to obtain mandatory access to
sites, it is expected such powers will be exercised only in exceptional
circumstances. ASNO has an extensive
on-site consultation and outreach program aimed at raising awareness of
affected parties of CWC obligations, collecting information necessary for
declarations and preparing sites for routine compliance inspections by the OPCW.

ASNO
is responsible for ensuring that the requirements of section 5J of the Customs (Prohibited Imports) Regulations
are met by regulating the importation of CWC Scheduled chemicals through
operation of an import permitsystem.

ASNO
provides technical support to DFAT in multilateral efforts to strengthen the
Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BWC). If such measures are agreed, it is envisaged that ASNO would be expanded
to embrace BWC responsibilities similar to those it holds under the CWC.

Key CWC functions are:

  • identifying
    and gathering information on industrial chemical facilities and activities
    required to be declared to the OPCW;
  • working
    with declarable facilities to prepare for the possibility of OPCW inspection;
  • increasing
    awareness of the CWC
    and Australias obligations by disseminating information on the Convention and
    the Chemical Weapons (Prohibition) Act
    1994 to the chemical industry and
    other domestic entities likely to be affected, including through on-site
    consultations;
  • administering
    and developing regulatory, administrative and logistical mechanisms to enable
    Australia to fulfil its CWC obligations;
  • liaising
    with overseas counterpart organisations and with the Technical Secretariat of
    the OPCW in connection with technical and practical implementation issues;
  • conducting
    research directed towards improving the effectiveness of the CWCs verification
    regime;
  • assisting,
    upon request, other States Parties to implement the CWC, particularly in
    Australias immediate region; and
  • providing
    technical advice to support Australias delegation at the negotiations to
    strengthen the BWC.

Overview of CTBT Role

While the CTBTis not yet in force, the Treaty expressly provides (Article IV)
that its verification system (the International Monitoring SystemIMS) shall be capable of meeting
the requirements of the Treaty upon entry into force. The Preparatory Commission for the CTBT Organisation
(CTBTO), with the CTBTO Provisional
Technical Secretariat (PTS) and States Signatories, are therefore engaged in major
tasks even before the Treaty has come into force. This includes the establishment and/or upgrading of 337
monitoring facilities around the world, as well as the development of detailed
procedures for the operation of these facilities and for the conduct of other
verification activities such as On-Site Inspections.

ASNO is Australias designated National Authority for the CTBT. Overall, the role is one of
liaison and facilitation to ensure that the International Monitoring System is
established efficiently and relevant domestic arrangements are in place.

Key CTBT functions include:

  • being the national point of contact for liaison on CTBT
    implementation;
  • establishing and maintaining legal, administrative and
    financial mechanisms to give effect to the CTBT in Australia;
  • participating in development and implementation of
    Australian policy relevant to the CTBT;
  • promoting an understanding in Australia of CTBT
    verification, including by acting as an interface between technical and policy
    specialists; and
  • contributing to the development of treaty verification,
    through the CTBTO Preparatory Commission and its working groups.

Advice
to the Government

The staff of ASNO have substantial experience in
international and bilateral safeguards, nuclear technology, CWC and
BWC verification issues, and CTBT processes and procedures. Drawing on this expertise and an
international network of contacts in other governments and organisations, ASNO
provides technical and policy advice to the Government and non-government
bodies.

Legislation

Nuclear Non-Proliferation (Safeguards) Act 1987

The Nuclear
Non-Proliferation (Safeguards) Act 1987

took effect on 31 March 1987. This
Act establishes the statutory office of Director of Safeguards and forms the
legislative basis for ASNOs nuclear safeguards activities.

The Safeguards Act gives effect to Australias safeguards
obligations under:

  • the NPT;
  • Australias NPT safeguards agreement with the IAEA;
  • agreements between Australia and various countries (and
    Euratom) concerning transfers of nuclear items, and
    cooperation in peaceful uses of nuclear energy; and
  • the Convention on the Physical Protectionof Nuclear Material
    (CPPNM).

Control over nuclear material and associated items in
Australia is exercised under the Safeguards Act by a system of permitsfor their possession and transport.
Communication of information contained in sensitive nuclear
technology is controlled through the grant of authorities.

The Safeguards Act empowers the Minister to grant, vary or revoke
permitsor
authorities, to make declarations or orders in relation to material, equipment
or technology covered by the Act, and to appoint inspectors to assess
compliance with the Act and with Australias NPT safeguards agreement with the
IAEA. The
Ministerhas
delegated most of these powers (with certain exceptions such as granting of
permits to uranium mines and for nuclear activities) to the Director of
Safeguards.

Regulations and declarations under this Act are listed under
the Freedom of Information Act 1982 statements
on page 75
of this Report.

Nuclear Non-Proliferation (Safeguards) (Consequential
Amendments) Act 1988

The Nuclear
Non-Proliferation (Safeguards) (Consequential Amendments) Act 1988
took
effect on 24 May 1988. It amended the Patents Act 1952 to allow referral from
the Patent Office to the Director of Safeguards of patent applications which
might constitute associated technology under the Safeguards Act. The amendments give the Director of
Safeguards the power to direct that such a patent application lapse if the
applicant does not hold an appropriate authority under the Safeguards Act to
communicate sensitive information at the time of making the application for the
patent.

Nuclear Safeguards (Producers of Uranium Ore Concentrates)
Charge Act 1993

In conjunction with an amendment to the Safeguards Act, this
legislation imposes an annual charge on uranium producers corresponding to a
proportion of ASNOs operating costs. Further details are on page 23.

South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone Treaty Act 1986

The South Pacific
Nuclear Free Zone Treaty Act 1986
(the SPNFZ Act) prohibits the
manufacture, production, acquisition, stationing and testing of nuclear
explosive devices, and R&D relating to manufacture or production of nuclear
explosive devices.

The SPNFZ Act establishes the framework for inspections in
Australia by Treaty inspectors, and provides for appointment by the Minister for Foreign Affairs of
authorised officers to accompany and observe international inspectors while
they are in Australia. Inspectors
appointed for the purposes of the Safeguards Act are also inspectors under the
SPNFZ Act. These inspectors are to
assist Treaty inspectors and authorised officers in carrying out Treaty
inspections, and investigating possible breaches of the SPNFZ legislation in
Australia.

Chemical Weapons (Prohibition) Act 1994

The Chemical Weapons
(Prohibition) Act 1994
was enacted on 25 February 1994. Division 1 of Part 7 of the Act (establishing the CWCO and the position
of its Director), and sections 95, 96, 97, 99, 102, 103, and 104 were
proclaimed on 15 February 1995. Other
provisions of the Act which expressly relied on the CWC came into effect on 29
April 1997 when the CWC entered into force. The final parts of the Act, dealing with routine compliance inspections
of Other Chemical Production Facilities, came into effect on 17 August
2000.

In conjunction with other legislation (see under the
following heading), the Act gives effect to Australias obligations,
responsibilities and rights as a State Party to the CWC. In particular, the Act:

  • prohibits activities connected to the development,
    production or use of chemical weapons, including assisting anyone engaged in
    these activities, whether intentionally or recklessly-such offences are
    punishable by life imprisonment;
  • establishes permit and notification systems to provide
    a legal framework for the mandatory provision of data to CWCO (i.e. ASNO) by
    facilities which produce or use chemicals as specified by the Convention, so
    that ASNO can lodge declarations with the OPCW;
  • provides for routine inspections of declared facilities
    and challenge inspections of any facility or other place in Australia by OPCW
    inspectors to verify compliance with the CWC, and for inspections by CWCO to
    verify compliance with the Act; and
  • provides
    for procedures should another State Party seek clarification concerning
    compliance with the Convention by any facility or other person or place in
    Australia.

Regulations under the Act prescribe procedures and details
of other arrangements provided for in the Act. In particular, the Regulations define conditions that are to be met by
holders of permits issued under the Act, and for granting privileges and
immunities to OPCW inspectors when in Australia to carry out an on-site
inspection.

The text of the CWC is reproduced in the Schedule to the
Act. The manner in which any powers are
exercised under the Act must be consistent with the Convention, and have regard
to Australias obligations under it.

The Chemical Weapons
(Prohibition) Act 1994
was amended on 6 April 1998. The amendments refine administration of the
Act by simplifying compliance obligations for facilities requiring permits, clarifying the legislative
basis for Australia to implement some of its obligations under the Convention,
correcting drafting errors and improving certain procedures, including those
related to secrecy. For consistency,
concomitant Regulations were amended on 17 December 1998.

Other CWC related legislation

Other aspects of the CWC which
required legislation have been, or are being, dealt with under existing
legislation, in particular the:

  • Customs
    (Prohibited Exports) Regulations
    and Customs
    (Prohibited Imports) Regulations
    to enforce CWC obligations in relation to
    export and import controls on scheduled chemicals. The Customs(Prohibited Imports) Regulations were amended on 15 December
    1999 to extend import licensing arrangements to cover all CWC scheduled
    chemicals; and
  • International
    Organisations (Privileges and Immunities) Act 1963
    , to recognise the OPCW
    as an international organisation, and to grant appropriate privileges and
    immunities to its officers when in Australia for official purposes.

Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty Act 1998

The Act gives effect to Australias obligations as a Party
to the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT). It prohibits the causing of any nuclear explosion at any place
within Australian jurisdiction or control and establishes a penalty of up to
life imprisonment for an offence against the provision. The Act also prohibits Australian nationals
from causing a nuclear explosion in any other place.

The Act requires the Commonwealth Government to facilitate
verification of compliance with the Treaty provisions, including the obligation
to arrange for the establishment and operation of Australian monitoring
stations and the provision of data from these. It provides the Commonwealth with the authority to establish IMSstations and to make provision for access to them for CTBT
monitoring purposes. The Act also makes
provision for the Ministerfor Foreign Affairs to enter into arrangements with the CTBT
Organisation to facilitate cooperation in relation to monitoring stations under
Australian control.

Australia is under an obligation, pursuant to Article IV of
the Treaty, to allow CTBT inspectors to inspect any place in Australia or the
external Territories in an On-Site Inspection. The Act provides comprehensive powers for inspection arrangements,
including the right for inspectors to gather information, to collect and remove
samples, to undertake drilling. Access
to facilities by inspectors for challenge inspections is by consent of the
occupier or by warrant issued by a magistrate.

The Act establishes ACTBO(part of ASNO) as the Australian national authority for the
CTBT. The Act grants ACTBO necessary
legal capacity and provides for the power to make regulations with respect to
privileges and immunities for the CTBTOrganisation and its officials under Australian law in accordance
with the Treaty.

The Act was assented to on 2 July 1998 but, as provided for
in section 2 of the Act, will not come into effect until the CTBT enters into
force.

Proposed legislative amendments

It is envisaged that amendments to relevant legislation will
be introduced at a convenient time in order to formalise the amalgamation of
ASO, CWCO and ACTBO into ASNO and to formally
establish the position of Director General, ASNO.

Last Updated: 24 September 2014
Back to top