Background

The IAEAsafeguards system is being strengthened through the introduction
of new safeguards measures, some of whiche.g. complementary accessare based
on conclusion by the state of an Additional Protocol, supplementing its basic
safeguards agreement. Australia was the
first state to sign an Additional Protocol, on 23 September 1997, and was also
the first to ratify the Protocol, which entered into force on 10 December
1997. Australias initial set of formal
Protocol Declarations was submitted to the IAEA on 26 March 1998
(Australia had previously prepared draft declarations as part of the assistance
given to the Agency in the development of strengthened safeguards
methodologies).

Following the introduction of strengthened safeguards in
Australia, in 1998, the IAEA undertook a comprehensive program of complementary
accessand environmental sampling at ANSTO's Lucas Heights facilities to
confirm the details of Australia's declarations and to establish a baseline for
reference in future environmental sampling activities. In fact, environmental sampling had been
commenced prior to the conclusion of the Protocol, as part of Australia's
cooperative effort in assisting the Agency in the development of strengthened
safeguards techniques, and pursuant to the IAEA Board of Governors decision in
1995 on the deployment of environmental sampling and other strengthened
safeguards measures to the extent possible under existing safeguards
agreements.

As at 30 June 2001 the IAEA had carried twelve complementary
accesses in Australia: nine times at Lucas Heights, once at a location
belonging to the Defence Science and Technology Organisation in South
Australia, and once at the Ranger uranium mine. One of the complementary accesses at Lucas Heights was carried
out on a managed access basis, the first time the Agency had used the managed
access provisions of the Additional Protocol anywhere.

The IAEA has determined that the
introduction of integrated safeguards (see preceding article) can be considered
if there are positive results from the implementation of both classical and
strengthened safeguards activities. Progress to integrated safeguards is thus a two-stage process, the first
stage being to meet the requirements of strengthened safeguards. Since Australias Additional Protocol was
the first to enter into effect, Australia had gone through three complete
annual cycles of strengthened safeguards verification and evaluation (i.e.
1998, 1999 and 2000). Thus Australia
was the first candidate for the introduction of integrated safeguards. Following a year of detailed discussion
between ASNO and the IAEA, integrated safeguards were introduced in Australia
at the beginning of 2001.

Implementation of integrated
safeguards

Under classical safeguards the IAEAs inspection activity
for Australia was determined primarily by Australias holdings of research
reactor fuel. Australia has large
holdings of spent HEU (high enriched uranium) fuelthough these holdings are
being steadily reduced through transfers to the US and France. The Agencys classical safeguards criteria
require this spent fuel to be inspected four times a year. Following the introduction of strengthened
safeguards, this pattern of four inspections a year was maintained, with the
addition of complementary accesses, which in most cases have been undertaken at
the Lucas Heights site.

Under the integrated safeguards
regime now being applied, the timeliness period for spent fuel has been changed
from three months to 12 months, eliminating quarterly inspections. The four inspections each year have been
replaced by an annual Physical Inventory Verification (PIV), and an average of one unannounced
inspection. The term average is
important-to maintain deterrence, once an unannounced inspection has
taken place, there will always be the possibility of a further unannounced
inspection in the same year.

The objectives of
unannounced inspections include, to verify the fresh and spent fuel inventory
and if possible the core fuel, and to confirm facility design information, the
declared operation of the reactor, and the absence of undeclared
activities. Where possible, fuel
transfers will be verified during the PIV or unannounced inspection(s), but the
IAEA has indicated that if necessary additional inspections may be undertaken
for this purpose.

In addition to the
inspections outlined above, there are five or six complementary accesses each
year, mainly at the Lucas Heights site, but also encompassing uranium mines and
locations other than facilities. In
most circumstances it is expected that complementary accesses would be carried
out when inspectors are in Australia for routine inspections.

The overall savings
in inspection effort are expected to be about 45%,
though this depends on whether additional inspections are required to
verify fuel transfers-an area where ASNO believes remote monitoring
techniques could be very useful.

A noteworthy
feature of the integrated safeguards regime is the use of unannounced
inspections-i.e. inspections whose timing is unpredictable to the State
or the facility operator. These are not
unique to either strengthened or integrated safeguards-standard
safeguards agreements provide for a proportion of routine inspections to be
unannounced. However, the value of
unannounced inspections has been particularly recognised in the context of
integrated safeguards.

Unannounced
inspections do not necessarily mean immediate
access. A distinction is made between
the initiation of the inspection-arrival of inspectors at the facility-and
the time in which the inspectors require access to the area to be
inspected. There should be a balance
between the objectives of the inspectiontaking account of the time required to
conceal the scenario the inspection is addressingand practical considerations.

In Australia's case, the IAEA has agreed to provide three
hours notice of required access pursuant to an unannounced inspection. Notice would normally be given at 7.00 am of
an inspection to commence at 10.00 am that day. This is consistent with the travelling time required for
national inspectors to reach Lucas Heights from ASNO's office in Canberra (a
distance of 275 km), and reflects the Agencys
judgment that any undeclared activity at the Lucas Heights site could not be
concealed within that time. If for any
reason ASNO inspectors are delayed in reaching the site, the inspection can
commence in any event after three hours.

Conclusions

The integrated safeguards regime combines increased
effectiveness and appreciable savings in inspection effort. However, strengthened and integrated safeguards
place new requirements on nuclear operators and national safeguards
authorities. In particular, for
unannounced inspections to work efficiently the operators accountancy records
must be maintained on a real-time or near-real-time basis (what is referred to
as NRTAnear-real-time accountancy). Effectively the IAEA has moved some of the verification workload to the
state system. Instead of the IAEA
verifying nuclear material holdings at regular intervals, the state system
needs to ensure that accurate NRTA records are maintained. The IAEA then carries out unpredictable
inspections at short notice to verify these accounts are accurate and
up-to-date. ASNO is working closely
with ANSTOto help
it reach the necessary standard.

Since Australias Additional Protocol was the first to enter
into effect, it has been in a pioneering role assisting the IAEA to develop the
procedures and methods for strengthened and integrated safeguards. Australia has hosted the IAEAs first
complementary accesses, the first exercise of managed access under the
Protocol, the first complementary access to a uranium mine and now the first
integrated safeguards regime.