The
outlook for further progress in multilateral arms control, in the short term at
least, is not encouraging. The decision
by the US in late 2000 not to ratify the CTBTis unlikely to be
reversed in the near future. The
prospects for the negotiations on the BWCaimed at
strengthening that Convention are uncertain, and there is continuing stalemate
in the Conference on Disarmament on commencement of negotiations for a Fissile
Material Cut‑off Treaty (FMCT).

In the area of nuclear safeguards, further effort needs to
go into encouraging the conclusion of Additional Protocols, so as to achieve
universal acceptance of strengthened safeguardswithin a reasonable time frame.
ASNOs contribution to this effort will include outreach activities to
assist countries in our region to sign and ratify the Additional Protocol. ASNO will continue to work closely with the
IAEA and our counterpart organisations in the further development of
strengthened and integrated safeguards, particularly through the
Australian Safeguards Support Program, and through a substantial involvement in
SAGSI.^[1]
ASNO will follow closely worldwide developments in nuclear fuel cycle
technology, with regard to non-proliferation and safeguards implications.

In collaboration with the IAEA,
and with AusAID funding, ASNO will present a regional safeguards trainingcourse in
Australia, particularly to assist the DPRK. This training will support the IAEAs work in the DPRK as that country
moves towards full compliance with its safeguards agreement in accordance with
the Agreed Framework. Several other regional states have registered for this
course.^[2]

While the commencement of FMCT negotiations remains stalled,
a number of states are considering a series of workshops and other activities,
in order to progress development of technical verification aspects. It is hoped this will help raise awareness
of these issues among the members of the Conference on Disarmament, and
demonstrate that a substantial degree of agreement is possible on major
elements of the FMCT regime. This is
expected to continue as a major area of activity for ASNO.

The initial phase of the international review of the CPPNMis now complete.
ASNO
expects that follow-up work to draft a well-defined amendment will start in the
coming year and it will participate in the technical and legal experts drafting
group when that body is established.

ASNO will work closely with ANSTO on physical protectionaspects of the replacement research reactor project and with
ARPANSAin its
licensing processes.

As Australias national authority for the CWC, ASNO will
collect national information for, and make declarations to, the OPCW, while
facilitating OPCW inspections of relevant facilities in Australia. Similarly, it will strive to strengthen the
CWC verification regime, inter alia,
by helping to resolve outstanding technical implementation issues, particularly
those affecting industry.

Despite the setback to prospects for the early
entry-into-force of the CTBT, reinforcement of the norm against the testing of
nuclear weapons remains a very high priority for Australia. ASNO will be supporting the efforts of DFAT
in encouraging signature and ratificationof the CTBT. ASNO will work to ensure that
Australias CTBT commitments are met, primarily by coordinating the
establishment and operation of Australian stations in the Treatys
International Monitoring System. ASNO
will continue its significant contribution to development of procedures for the
conduct of On-site Inspections under the Treaty.

On the proposed protocol for strengthening the BWC, ASNO
will work closely with DFAT in developing options to achieve outcomes
favourable to Australias security interests.