Attachment

Report of Discussion by Committee of Imperial Defence

LONDON, 4 March 1938

SECRET

MALAYA-PERIOD BEFORE RELIEF

The Committee had under consideration the following papers on the
subject of the 'period before relief' for Malaya:-

(i) A Memorandum by the Chiefs of the Staff [sic] Sub-committee
(C.I.D. Paper No. 444-C) [1]

(ii) A Memorandum by the Oversea Defence Committee (C.I.D. Paper
No. 463-C) [2]

Sir Cosmo Parkinson [3], introducing the Memorandum of the Oversea
Defence Committee, explained that it had been submitted in
accordance with the Conclusions of the Committee of Imperial
Defence at their 292nd Meeting, when the Memorandum by the Chiefs
of Staff (C.I.D. Paper No. 444-C) had been discussed. The Chiefs
of Staff had recommended, on purely technical considerations, a
'period before relief' for Malaya of 70 days, but they had asked
the Committee of Imperial Defence to consider whether this period
should not be increased in order to allow for possible delays in
the issue of orders to the Main Fleet to sail to the Far East. The
Oversea Defence Committee had then been asked to report on the
financial and other implications which would be involved in fixing
the 'period before relief' for Malaya at 50, 70 and go days
respectively. They had found themselves unable to comply literally
with these instructions, since they did not know what assumptions
they should take as lying behind a 'period before relief' of 50
days or 90 days. The underlying assumptions on which a 'period
before relief' of 70 days was based were, however, set out in the
Memorandum by the Chiefs of Staff. In these circumstances the
Oversea Defence Committee in the first part of their Memorandum
were reporting the implications of maintaining the reserves
required for 50, 70 and go days' consumption. It must be realised,
however, that these figures did not exactly correspond to the
reserves which are required to cover a 'period before relief' of
50, 70 and go days respectively. In the second part of their
Memorandum the Oversea Defence Committee dealt with the reserves
required to cover a 'period before relief' of 70 days, based on
the assumptions taken by the Chiefs of Staff in C.I.D. Paper No.

444-C. It would be seen that on these assumptions it was necessary
to make allowance for go days' reserves of most commodities, the
most important exception being the food supplies of the civil
population. As soon as the British Fleet on its arrival drove off
the enemy on the 70th day, local imports of food for the civil
population would be resumed. But in the case of other commodities,
which had to be drawn from this country, it would be necessary to
maintain 90 days' reserves, since supply ships would not arrive
until 20 days after the Main Fleet. The estimated cost of reserves
on the scale recommended by the Oversea Defence Committee for a
'period before relief' of 70 days amounted to nearly 3 millions,
but of this some 1 1/4 millions was in respect of the reserves
required for the civil population, and this expenditure would have
to be borne by the Colony.

Mr Bruce said that the security of Singapore was of vital interest
to the Commonwealth of Australia, and he asked for information as
to the reserves which now existed in Singapore and as to the time
which Singapore might be expected to last out if invested now.

Mr Hore-Belisha [4] pointed out that it was stated in paragraph 11
of the Memorandum by the Oversea Defence Committee that 60 days'
rations were now maintained in Malaya for the military and air
forces, and the same amount of reserves of Army stores.

Lord Chatfield [5] said that the Chiefs of Staff in their
Memorandum had stated that, allowing for delays, the Fleet could
be expected to arrive at latest in 70 days. Corresponding reserves
of stores would therefore have to be built up. If, however, there
was any delay in the initial despatch of the Main Fleet, these
reserves of stores might be inadequate. It was in order to gauge
whether any further allowance should be made on top of the 70 days
recommended by the Chiefs of Staff, that the Committee of Imperial
Defence had asked to be informed as to the cost of reserves for
periods other than 70 days. The Oversea, Defence Committee, on
reasoning which he felt sure his colleagues on the Chiefs of Staff
Sub-committee would accept as sound, recommended certain reserves
for a 70-day 'period before relief', at an estimated cost of
2,941,000. If the 'period before relief' were fixed at go days,
the cost of the corresponding reserves would probably be some
figure rather more than 3,179,000, which was only the cost of
reserves sufficient for 90 days' consumption. There seemed to be
two alternatives, either to decide now that nothing must be
allowed to stand in the way of the despatch of the Main Fleet on
the outbreak of war, in which case a 'period before relief' of 70
days would be correct; alternatively, if it were thought
impossible to guarantee in advance the immediate despatch of the
Fleet, to decide that Singapore should be stocked up with six
months' supplies of all natures. The latter alternative would
leave the date of sailing of the Fleet quite open, since there
would be an ample margin of reserves in the Colony.

Mr Bruce stressed the importance of ensuring that the full
reserves necessary were, in fact, available at Singapore without
delay. If the decision were taken now to fix the 'period before
relief' at 70 days, it would be realised if war came, that the
immediate despatch of the fleet was essential, since, as the
Chiefs of Staff had pointed out, any delay in its arrival at
Singapore after the end of the 'period before relief' might
jeopardise the whole security of the Empire by the loss of the
port. Ms Government would, he felt sure, like to have as large
reserves as possible in Singapore, but they were hardly in a
position to press too hard in this matter, since it was not they
who had to face the expense. If the Committee now accepted a
'period before relief' of 70 days, his Government would be keenly
interested to know when action would be taken to implement this
decision by the actual building up of the reserves in Singapore.

He observed that a delay of some eleven months had already taken
place since the Chiefs of Staff had submitted their original
Memorandum, and he hoped that there would be no further long
delays in this matter.

Sir Thomas Inskip [6] said that it would be for the three Service
Departments to build up the necessary reserves. Although he fully
appreciated Mr Bruce's desire for early action in the matter,
provision of these reserves would have to take its turn among the
other commitments of the three Defence Services. There was only a
limited amount of money available, and the date when provision
would be made would have to depend on the priority accorded to it.

Sir Maurice Hankey [7] observed that Singapore had always received
a high priority in the past and would no doubt continue to do so
in the future.

Mr Bruce said that he felt in duty bound to press, on behalf of
his Government, for the very highest priority to be accorded to
the provision of these reserves. The whole basis of Empire defence
rested on the security of Singapore. Many millions of pounds had
been spent already on the base, and it would be appalling to
contemplate its loss through a failure to provide it with the
necessary reserves.

Mr Hore-Belisha said he was glad to hear from Mr Bruce of the very
keen interest which the Australian Government took in the security
of the Singapore base. As Mr Bruce no doubt knew, there was a
proposal to initiate conversations with the Australian Government,
with a view to exploring the possibility of the provision of
Australian troops to form part of the garrison of the port.

Mr Bruce said that the provision of Australian troops for
Singapore would raise political questions which might present
considerable difficulty. He wished to make the position of
Australia with regard to the defence of Singapore quite clear,
since in answer to his strong representations for ample reserves
to be provided at Singapore it was open to the United Kingdom
Government to say, with very good reason, that Australia was not
bearing the cost and should not therefore try to dictate what
should be done at Singapore. He recalled that when the question of
the construction of the base was first raised, in about 1923, some
parts of the Empire made actual contributions in cash towards its
cost. Australia had made no such contribution, but she had taken
on the responsibility for providing two first-class cruisers and
carrying out a five-year programme of naval expansion during the
years 1923-1928. She was now engaged in carrying out another
defence programme, but the Australian Government would be quite
prepared to discuss whether the contributions which they were now
making towards Imperial Defence as a whole were sufficient.

Sir Thomas Inskip said that he felt sure that the Committee fully
appreciated the point of view which had been put forward by Mr
Bruce. The United Kingdom Government realised that the naval
contributions of Australia were a contribution towards Imperial
Defence as a whole. He welcomed the suggestion of Mr Bruce for
discussions on the present scale of Australian defence programmes.

Mr Bruce said that three Ministers of his Government [8] would be
in the country in about a month's time, and that would provide a
very convenient opportunity for such discussions.

The Committee agreed-
(a) That the 'period before relief' for Malaya should be fixed at
70 days, the underlying assumptions on which this period is based
being those set out in paragraph 9 of the Memorandum by the Chiefs
of Staff Sub-committee (C.I.D. Paper No. 444-C).

(b) That Service Departments should be authorised to build up
reserves of stores to the levels recommended by the Oversea
Defence Committee in paragraph 20 of their Memorandum (C.I.D.

Paper No. 463-C), subject to the usual arrangements for obtaining
Treasury sanction to the expenditure involved.

(c) To recommend that the provision referred to in (b) above
should be accorded a very high priority in the programmes of the
three Defence Services.

(d) To ask the Secretary of State for the Colonies [9] to take the
necessary steps to ensure that the reserves recommended for the
civil population of Malaya by the Oversea Defence Committee in
paragraph 20 of C.I.D. Paper No. 463-C were provided as early as
possible.

(e) To take note of the anxiety of the Government of Australia
that the reserves referred to in Conclusions (b) and (d) above
should be built up at Singapore with the least possible delay, and
to welcome the suggestion put forward by the High Commissioner for
Australia that Australia's contribution towards Imperial Defence
as a whole should be the subject of discussion at the first
convenient opportunity between representatives of the United
Kingdom and Australian Governments.

[AA : A1608, C51/1/10]

1 Not printed.

2 Not printed. The Oversea Defence Committee, a standing sub-
committee of the Committee of Imperial Defence, was responsible
for advice on all matters concerning the defence of Britain's
colonies, protectorates and dependencies, other than technical
matters of coastal and Port defences. During the inter-war period,
it comprised representatives of the Admiralty, the War Office, the
Air Ministry, the India Office, the Burma Office, the Dominions
Office, the Foreign Office and the Treasury, with the Permanent
Under-Secretary of State for the Colonies as the chairman. Its
membership was entirely at the official rather than the
ministerial level.

3 U.K. Permanent Under-Secretary of State for the Colonies.

4 U.K. Secretary of State for War.

5 U.K. First Sea Lord and Chief of Naval Staff.

6 U.K. Minister for Co-ordination of Defence.

7 Secretary of Committee of Imperial Defence.

8 Sir Earle Page (Minister for Commerce), R. G. Menzies (Attorney-
General) and T. W. White (Minister for Trade and Customs) who were
to discuss revision of the Ottawa Agreement of 1932.

9 W. G. A. Ormsby-Gore.