Historical documents
25 October 1938
1. On 4th October, the Commonwealth Government was informed by the
British Government that the Italian Government had decided to
withdraw 10,000 troops from Spain on its own initiative and
without reference to the withdrawal of foreign volunteers by the
Barcelona Government, and that the Italian Government had in these
circumstances proposed to the British Government that the Anglo-
Italian Agreement should be brought into force at once. The
Commonwealth Government was informed in a subsequent cable [1]
that the Italian Government had stated that if its present
proposals were accepted no further Italian troops would be sent to
Spain and that it was quite probable that the remainder of the
Italian troops would soon be withdrawn. It also appears from this
telegram that the British Government has informed the Italian
Government that it could take no immediate action in regard to the
matter, but if the withdrawal of Italian troops now contemplated
could be effected, the Italian Government's proposal would be
brought before Cabinet at the first opportunity and, if Cabinet
agreed, would be laid before Parliament immediately on its
reassembly when the matter would become one of confidence in the
Government.
2. It will be recalled that the Anglo-Italian Agreement is to come
into force on a date to be determined by agreement between the two
Governments, and in this respect the British Government regards
the settlement of the Spanish question 'as a pre-requisite of the
entry into force of the agreement'.
During the past few months the Italian Government has repeatedly
urged that its acceptance of the British plan for the withdrawal
of foreign volunteers is, in effect, a settlement of the Spanish
situation, and that the Anglo-Italian Agreement should accordingly
be put into immediate effect. The British Government has, however,
maintained that the settlement of the Spanish question must be one
which would eliminate this matter as a source of international
friction, and that a settlement could only be achieved by:-
(a) carrying out the plan of the Non-Intervention Committee;
(b) a unilateral withdrawal of Italian troops from Spain;
(c) the conclusion of an armistice.
3. The non-intervention plan has not yet been put into effect. It
has been accepted by the Spanish Government, but General Franco
[2], after delaying for weeks in his reply, said that the plan
would only be acceptable if the Non-Intervention Committee were
first prepared to grant belligerent rights to his Government.
In the meantime, the Spanish Government raised the question of the
withdrawal of foreign volunteers from Spain at the League Assembly
meeting in September, and agreed to the supervision by a League
International Commission of the withdrawal of volunteers from
Republican Spain.
4. The intimation by the Italian Government to withdraw a large
part of its forces from Spain, and the reiteration of declaration
that it has no territorial or economic ambitions in Spain,
indicate that it genuinely desires the implementation of the
Anglo-Italian Agreement,
5. At the same time, it must not be overlooked that the continuous
drain on Italian resources of this unprofitable Spanish adventure,
frustrated hopes, growing opposition on the part of General
Franco's adherents, and the end of the war apparently as far off
as ever, may have considerably influenced Signor Mussolini in his
decision. A statement in the last Foreign Office despatch from
Burgos [3] is significant: 'Spanish and Italian relations have
steadily gone from bad to worse. No amount of propaganda or
mellifluous phrasing can hide the fact that the two allies are
heartily tired of one another and look forward to the day when
their partnership in arms will be dissolved.'
6. The real reason for the recent advance by Italy probably lies
in the strengthened position of Germany, and the correspondingly
weakened position of Italy. Italy now has a common frontier with
Germany, which increases and emphasises her vulnerability; she
fears the possibility of Germany endeavouring to obtain an outlet
to the Mediterranean for her Austrian territory; she looks askance
at the augmentation of German military and economic power by the
Anschluss, the acquisition of the Sudeten areas in Czechoslovakia
and the gravitation into the German camp of Hungary and Poland.
Reports from the British Embassy, Rome, during the recent crisis,
led to the belief that despite Signor Mussolini's public
declaration on the solidarity of the Berlin-Rome axis, Italy was
not prepared automatically to go to war on the side of Germany.
Various reports received by the Commonwealth Government indicate
that the economic and financial position of Italy, severely
strained by war, shows a continued deterioration.
The acquisition of Abyssinia has made her even more vulnerable
militarily than before. Like Great Britain and France she has a
strong incentive for the maintenance of a free Mediterranean, Suez
Canal and Red Sea by agreement, and it is this that, the Anglo-
Italian Agreement is designed mainly to effect.
7. The views of the Commonwealth Government on the question of
Anglo-Italian friendship were set out in two telegrams as
follows:-
(i) Telegram to the Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs-dated
2nd February, 1938-
'My colleagues and I have read with great interest your telegram
of 27th January, 1938, with regard to international affairs. We
agree that the present situation calls for action and we feel that
the re-opening of conversations with Italy is of the utmost
importance. I should be glad if you would continue to keep me
fully advised as to the situation.' [4]
(ii) Telegram to the Hon. Sir Earle Page, London: from the Hon. J.
A. Lyons-dated 6th July, 1938:
'Information recently received from despatches and cablegrams
indicates a deterioration in Anglo-Italian relations which is
causing grave concern to the Commonwealth Government. We feel that
implementation of Anglo-Italian Agreement is of paramount
importance in the present international situation, and we would
like you to urge the United Kingdom Government that everything
should be done to bring it into effect at earliest possible moment
especially as it appears to us that slow progress in negotiations
over Sudeten question may lead at any moment to a crisis. [5]
8. The Prime Minister on the 21St October received a personal
telegram from Mr Bruce stating that Mr Chamberlain and Lord
Halifax were in favour of the application of the Agreement, and
that he thought it desirable for the Commonwealth Government to
indicate as soon as possible that it would welcome an early
application of the Agreement (See Annex 'A'). [6]
The views of the British Ambassador at Rome, dated 4th October,
are also attached (See Annex C). [7]
Lord Perth states that if we fail to bring the Agreement into
force, 'consequently he (Mussolini) will conclude a definite
military alliance with Germany even though this is against his
innermost wish and would be unpopular in the country.'
9. It is a matter for decision whether the Commonwealth
Government, considers it advisable again to inform the British
Government of its views.
10. Should the Anglo-Italian Agreement be put into effect this
would involve the de jure recognition by Great Britain of the
Italian conquest of Abyssinia, and it would then presumably be
necessary for the Commonwealth Government to indicate its attitude
in regard to this question. A copy of a submission dated 18th May,
1938, dealing with this matter is attached (Annex 'B'). [8]