Following is summary referred to in my immediately preceding
telegram [2]:-

First objective Brussels Conference must be to reach peace by
agreement. It is still uncertain whether Japan will attend; in her
absence it is doubtful whether this objective can be attained
unless or until some considerable change occurs in Japan's
military or economic position. The Conference may thus be faced
with the choice of
(a) deferring any action in the hope that such a change will
supervene.

(b) Expressing moral condemnation of Japan, without taking or
promising any positive action.

(c) Embarking on positive action in the form either of active
assistance to China or of economic pressure upon Japan.

Both (a) and (b) are open to the obvious objection that they are
tantamount to acquiescence in the aggression. Either course could
only serve as encouragement to peace breakers. Course (b) has
additional disadvantage that it would further exasperate opinion
in Japan to no purpose.

In these circumstances it would seem necessary for all the
Governments to go to Brussels realising the full implications of
course (c).

So far as assistance to China is concerned (even if the United
States Neutrality Law were not an insuperable objection to it in
the case of that country) it must be remembered that there are
material difficulties in the way of rendering assistance. If it is
to be effective it must directly or indirectly involve supplying
China with war material. The sea route is, or will shortly be, the
only practicable one, and if such supplies were to reach China on
a scale large enough to affect the issue of hostilities, it is
hardly conceivable that Japan would not extend the blockade to
neutral ships. The alternative of acquiescing in the extended
blockade or of keeping the sea route open by armed force would
then have to be faced.

So far as economic measures against Japan are concerned, a
preliminary investigation suggests that they might be effective if
they were applied by all countries of the British Commonwealth,
the United States of America and some six or eight other
countries, provided that satisfactory measures could be evolved to
prevent evasion through third parties and provided that the
measures extended both to imports and to exports. We are pursuing
our own study of this matter and will be happy to discuss it in
all its aspects. Whether economic measures would become effective
in time to affect the issue of war, unless China were
simultaneously assisted, is perhaps doubtful. But irrespective of
this, it would seem that if sanctions appeared likely to succeed
in their object, there would be a very real danger of Japan taking
violent action to prevent their success, either by making war on
one or more of the sanctionist countries or by seizing the
territory of some other Power from which essential raw materials
could be derived. In view of this danger it appears that no
country could afford to impose effective sanctions unless it first
received from the other participating countries an assurance of
military support in the event of violent action by Japan. It would
also be necessary to guarantee the territorial integrity of the
third parties. If such assurance were forthcoming it is possible,
although of course not certain, that Japan would be deterred from
taking any such action and that the knowledge that sanctions would
eventually prove successful might lead her to consider an offer
for peace.

These are briefly the considerations which present themselves to
His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom in their
preliminary examination of the problem. They are, however, not a
statement of policy, but an appreciation of the difficulties which
must be faced and discussed if possible before the Brussels
Conference meets. For this reason it is hoped that the United
States of America delegation win be able to call here on their way
to Brussels. [3]