LONDON, 28 June 1939

SECRET

THE SITUATION IN THE FAR EAST

The Committee of Imperial Defence at its 362nd Meeting held on
26th June, 1939, had under consideration a Memorandum by the
Deputy Chief of Naval Staff [1] on the subject of the
communication to the Dominions of the policy recently approved by
the Committee of Imperial Defence regarding the despatch of a
fleet to the Far East (Paper No. D.P.(P) 55). [2]

2. In the course of the discussion the Secretary of State for
Dominion Affairs [3] suggested that he might see Mr Bruce [4] and
Mr Nash [5] and explain to them how matters stood in regard to the
Tientsin affair, and also the general position in regard to the
despatch of a fleet to the Far East.

3. The Prime Minister [6] agreed, and added that, in the
circumstances, it might be desirable for him also (the Prime
Minister) to see Mr Bruce and Mr Nash.

4. Accordingly, a meeting was held in the Prime Minister's Room in
the House of Commons at 5 p.m. on Wednesday, the 28th June, at
which the following were present:-

The Prime Minister.

The Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs.

The Minister for Co-ordination of Defence. [7]

The High Commissioner for Australia.

The High Commissioner for New Zealand. [8]

Major-General H.L. Ismay-Secretary.

5. THE PRIME MINISTER said that he thought that it would be
helpful to have a discussion on the situation that had arisen in
the Far East, more particularly in view of the telegram which had
been received from the Prime Minister of Australia, as recently as
the 24th June, asking for an assurance 'that Australia is entitled
to assume that, in the event of war with Japan, the United Kingdom
Government would send a fleet to Singapore within appropriate time
capable of containing the Japanese Fleet to a degree sufficient to
prevent a major act of aggression against Australia'. [9] The
Prime Minister then read out the reply which he had sent to Mr
Menzies (see Annex to this record [10]).

6. The Prime Minister continuing said that the contingency which
now confronted us was in a sense different from that which we had
previously contemplated. In the past, it had been thought that the
probability was that we should find ourselves involved in a war
with the Axis Powers, and that subsequently Japan might intervene
on their side. Now it looked as though it might be the other way
round: for, if we sent our fleet to Singapore to deal with Japan,
the temptation to the Axis Powers to take advantage of the
situation would be almost irresistible. Our position would then be
rendered extremely difficult in view of the engagements we had
recently undertaken in Europe. On the one hand, we had only a
limited number of battleships, and it was obviously essential to
retain a sufficiency in Home waters: on the other hand, it was
useless to send a fleet to Singapore unless it was sufficiently
strong to accept battle with the Japanese Fleet, and to achieve
the three main objects set out in his recent telegram to Mr
Menzies (Annex). Of course, Singapore itself was now much stronger
in the matter of defences and reserves. Nevertheless, the
exhaustive examination of the whole problem which had recently
been undertaken led to the conclusion that hostilities with Japan
would place us in such an awkward dilemma that they should be
avoided, if it was in any way possible to do so. We had now
succeeded in arranging negotiations in the calmer atmosphere of
Tokyo, and there were grounds for hoping for a satisfactory
settlement of the Tientsin affair. If, on the other hand, the
Japanese proved intransigent, it might be impossible to avoid
hostilities with them. He himself, however, did not think it
likely that the Japanese would wish to push matters to extremes:

they had their 'plate full' in China, and did not want war with
us. Nor were they unmindful of the fact that they might have to
reckon with the United States of America as well as ourselves. The
Prime Minister added that His Majesty's Government were keeping in
close touch with the United States of America over this business.

Their attitude might be described as wary but helpful.

7. THE HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR AUSTRALIA said that he could not say
for certain how the Australian Government would react to the march
of events, but it might be helpful to the Meeting if he were to
give his own personal estimate of what their reactions would be.

In the first place, he could say quite frankly that the Australian
Government felt that the United Kingdom Government had gone into
this business 'on the wrong leg'. They felt that in the dangerous
circumstances of the present time, the Foreign Office had taken a
somewhat too precise and exacting view of technicalities, and that
they would have been wiser to follow the advice of the Consul
General at Tientsin [11], and the Ambassador at Tokyo [12], rather
than that of the Ambassador in China. [13] The Australian
Government felt, in fact, that it was a pity that the business had
started in the way it had. He (Mr Bruce) thought that they would
cordially agree with His Majesty's Government in the United
Kingdom that every possibility of resolving the trouble ought to
be exploredshort of accepting intolerable humiliation. If it came
to that, the Australian Government would agree that some sort of
retaliation was essential; and the form of retaliation that would
most appeal to them would be increased assistance to China.

Further, if His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom came to
the conclusion that the imposition of some form of sanctions on
Japan was the only way of maintaining the position, the Australian
Government would probably raise no objection, and would co-
operate. If finally, it came to armed conflict, the Australian
Government would wish to have more specific information on a
number of points. What size of fleet would be sent to Singapore?
When would it be sent? How soon was the investment of Singapore
likely to commence?
8. Mr Bruce, continuing, gave an account of various conversations
which he had had during his recent visit to the United States of
America, all of which led him to believe that American opinion was
decidedly pro-Chinese, and not disinclined to take an interest in
Far Eastern affairs. Any question of intervention in Europe was
always connected with the despatch of Expeditionary forces and
prodigious losses, with the result that the isolationist spirit
was uppermost. Far Eastern affairs on the other hand, were a naval
business, and there was nothing like the same objection to
intervention, particularly as there was a feeling that the
American Navy cost a great deal and might as well 'earn its keep'.

9. THE PRIME MINISTER agreed that the United States were more
forthcoming as regards Far Eastern affairs than anything else, and
MR JORDAN said that Mr Wellington Koo [14] had told him at Geneva
that the supply of war material from America to Japan had entirely
ceased.

10. MR BRUCE said that as far back as 1938 he had doubted whether
it would be possible for the United Kingdom Government to send a
fleet to Singapore if, as even then seemed possible, they got
involved with Germany, Italy and Japan simultaneously. But he had
been assured by the Admiralty that it was the firm intention to
send seven battleships-two modern and five Royal Sovereign class.

He had therefore been surprised when he saw the Prime Minister's
telegram of the 20th March, 1939, to the late Mr Lyons. [15]

11. LORD CHATFIELD said that the position was different in respect
of the sequence of events. Previously, it had been hoped that it
might be possible to deal with Italy before being obliged to send
a fleet to Singapore. Now it looked as though the latter might be
the first move. Continuing, he explained that the British Navy
could no more stop the Japanese Army overrunning China than they
could stop the German Army overrunning France, All that the Navy
could do was to secure the objects set out in the Prime Minister's
telegram (Annex) and to support economic pressure by force. If the
Japanese wished to engage our fleet, they would have to come down
and fight in our waters. This would not be easy for them.

12. MR BRUCE, in conclusion, said that while he was in America, he
had asked the President what he would do if the Japanese were to
send naval forces south of the Equator. Mr Roosevelt had replied:

'You need not worry'. [16]