Historical documents
Cablegram 191 (extracts) LONDON, 8 September 1939
MOST SECRET
In accordance with suggestions from the Prime Ministers of Canada
and New Zealand, defence authorities here have put forward
suggestions as to possibilities of Naval, Army and Air Force co-
operation which we should like to see those Dominions affording in
the present war.
2. As a result of consultation with Bruce [1] we understand that
he is telegraphing to his Government to the effect that he has
asked that similar suggestions should be drawn up as regards the
Commonwealth and that you will be in a position to communicate
details to the Commonwealth authorities. You should accordingly
communicate the following outline. [2]
NAVY
3. The following suggestions are based on the assumption that
Japan will be neutral.
4. H.M.A.S. Perth has already been under Admiralty orders and it
would be appreciated if a second cruiser and 5 R.A.N. Destroyers
could also be lent for service other than on Australian Station.
So long as Japan remains neutral it is considered that Australian
waters may be regarded as unlikely to suffer submarine attack.
[Matter omitted. This and subsequent omissions referred to details
of defence planning outside the concerns of this volume.]
5. The most likely danger to be guarded against on Australian
Station under present circumstances is that of attack on shipping
by armed raiders. It is considered that two cruisers and H.M.A.S.
Australia (when ready) should prove adequate for this purpose.
6. Proposals put forward previously to Australia with regard to
acquiring a capital ship can no longer be considered (? owing to
our) immediate requirements.
7. As regards naval personnel we should like to avail ourselves of
the services of the following:-
(a) trained naval reserves surplus to Australian requirements to
be made available to the Royal Navy.
(b) officers recruited from civil life, viz. trained civil pilots
for service in the fleet air arm, and yachtsmen or ex-mercantile
marine officers suitable for R.N.V.R. commissions.
(c) telegraphists and signalmen, artificers of all kinds,
scientists-electrical and w/t for signal school, and skilled
electrical workmen, recruited from civil life.
It would be appreciated if Commonwealth Government could furnish
approximate numbers of personnel likely to be immediately
available under above categories, and could indicate capacity for
increasing the numbers of trained personnel that will become
available as the war progresses.
8. It is presumed that Australia will take up and equip two local
A.M.C.s in addition to three A.M.C.s now fitting out in Australia
and that manning commitments for all these ships can be met
locally.
9. It is hoped that Commonwealth Government will be able to meet
all requirements for D.E.M.S. staffs at Australian posts and will
assist in the provision of gun-layers (D.E.M.S.).
10. It is hoped that Australia will be able to meet requirements
in mines and local defence equipment from local sources. It would
be of further assistance if Australia could indicate whether she
could meet any requirements of New Zealand and eastern parts of
the Empire.
11. We should be grateful if the possibility of increasing the
facilities of Cockatoo Island for building destroyers and escort
vessels may be examined; and if building in private yards of whale
catchers and trawlers for local defence may be considered. The
extent of the requirements for trawlers is large and cannot yet be
estimated.
ARMY
12. Recommendations are based on two alternative hypotheses:-
(a) That Japan is not only neutral but adopting a friendly
attitude towards the democratic countries.
(b) That Japan is neutral and reserving her attitude towards
democratic countries.
13. Under hypothesis (a) while hoping that war may be of short
duration we must prepare for a long war that will call for
employment of all our resources. We therefore hope that Australia
will exert her full national effort including preparation of her
forces with a view to the despatch of an expeditionary force. It
is not at present possible to make any suggestion to the
Commonwealth Government as to the destination and composition of
any expeditionary forces which they may see fit to provide.
14. The Commonwealth Government may like to consider whether they
would prefer to relieve United Kingdom units and formations in,
say, Singapore, Burma and India as and when brigades become
available or whether they would prefer to delay despatch of
suitable formations until complete divisions can be made available
for a main theatre of war.
[matter omitted]
16. Under hypothesis (b), it might be thought unwise for Australia
to despatch an expeditionary force overseas but the Commonwealth
Government can assist by holding ready formations at short notice
for reinforcement of Singapore, New Zealand, or British and French
islands in the Western Pacific. [3]
AIR FORCE
17 At the present time the main weakness of the allies, vis-a-vis
Germany, is in respect of their air strength. It is extremely
important that we should do everything in our power to reduce this
discrepancy as rapidly as possible and we look to the Dominions,
whose resources lie outside the range of any German bombers, to
ensure that this is achieved.
18. There are three possible ways by which this could be done:-
(a) The direct despatch to Great Britain of complete units of
R.A.A.F.
(b) The substitution of Australian for U.K. squadrons overseas
e.g. Singapore, thus releasing latter for home service.
(c) The supply of aircraft, material and trained personnel from
Dominion resources.
19. Having regard to the requirements of local defence and to the
fact that, as a result of delays in the production of certain
types of aircraft in England, the squadrons in Australia are still
equipped with obsolescent types and cannot reinforce Singapore by
air, we do not recommend either (a) or (b) in the preceding
paragraph as an immediate course of action.
20. We should however like the proposal in (b) to be carried out
as soon as appropriate Australian squadrons have completed their
re-equipment. We also suggest that Australian pilots and crews now
in England waiting to fly the first Sunderlands to Australia
should be allowed to remain, together with their aircraft, at our
disposal. This assistance would be most valuable in view of our
immediate requirements for trade protection.
21. With regard to proposal (c) we are aware that the Commonwealth
Government have drawn up an agreed programme for the expansion of
their air force. This was, however, a long term project to be
developed in peace and we consider the present situation calls for
a change, assuming that the immediate object is now to assist
Great Britain in the European theatre.
[AA:A1608, H33/1/1]