Historical documents
Cablegram C4 LONDON, 5 November 1939
TO THE PRIME MINISTER MOST SECRET
Following are the most important matters that have emerged so far:
Germany has 130 Divisions and can probably produce up to 160.
France has 114.
Britain has 5 Divisions in France and will have a total of 10 in
France within 6 months. Britain aiming to have a total of 51, from
her own and Empire sources. Is organising for productive capacity
to equip this number.
France is pressing strongly for additions to British land forces
in France. Britain most anxious to increase Empire land forces in
France as rapidly as possible in order to hearten the French.
Land figures of 160,000 British troops in France has not impressed
the French public, which has been informed that France has
mobilised a total of 4 million men. While this figure probably
true, it includes, besides 100 Divisions, reserve troops and
military guards at innumerable vulnerable points throughout the
whole of France.
Strategic point of great consequence made by the Chiefs-of-Staff
is that the French frontier which the Germans have to watch is
only from Luxemburg to Basle-which is only about 175 miles-whereas
the frontier which France and Britain have to watch is from the
sea at Dunkirque(?) south-east to Luxemburg and on to Basle-a
distance of 400 miles. This is by reason of the fact that the
Germans know the Allies will not invade Belgium, whereas the
Allies anticipate Germany will do so, This, in effect, enables
Germany to concentrate any sector of their own choosing-having 2
to 1 superiority in land forces over the Allies.
Britain and France have welcomed the inactivity on Western Front
by reason of the opportunity to press on with the organising of
their war measures. In addition, if inactivity continues
throughout the Winter, some of the smaller countries may regain
the confidence which was shattered by Germany overrunning Poland
and may be rallied to the cause. Unless Germany attacks within the
next fortnight it is believed there will be no land operations of
consequence until the European Spring.
All efforts are being made to be ready for whatever may develop by
then.
There is no firm opinion as to whether Germany will go through
Holland and/or Belgium. Even if she does, the Maginot Line between
Luxemburg and the sea is reasonably well organised. Experience of
war in Poland emphasised the absolute necessity to base resistance
against the German tactics by closely coordinating intensive
attack by land and air forces on strongly fortified line. Allied
land forces win not advance ahead of the Maginot Line unless they
can occupy similar fortified line in Belgium. It is regarded as
absolutely essential that Germany should not break through our
line in France-which would be regarded as a calamity and would
enable Germans to employ the same tactics as in Poland.
The French Government has recently asked the British Government to
consider the question of Allied war aims with a view to
announcement.
Chamberlain [1] is reluctant as he does not believe it possible to
say anything now that would be other than broad generalisation
which would be either obvious or meaningless to the public.
On the way through Paris, the British Embassy told me that the
French public reacted strongly against the statement that the
Allied aim was confined to the destruction of Hitlerism. Memories
of 1870 and 1914 still strong.
I have been asked on several occasions how soon we can get our
special division over this side of the world, and I have replied
that this depends on the Japanese situation and on the British
plans for the reinforcing of Singapore by an adequate force of
capital ships. The British Government is in consequence cabling
the British Embassies at Tokio and China and Washington in order
to have an up-to-date appreciation of the Japanese position-which
expected within 10 days. They are also considering the Singapore
position and will let us know as soon as possible. I will
definitely cable you at once further information regarding Japan
and Singapore.
I may say Chiefs-of-Staff, Britain, appreciation is that immediate
danger to Australia and New Zealand from Japan is remote, but that
even if Japan were to adopt aggressive policy against Allies this
would most likely be directed against the Allied interests on the
Chinese mainland.
They clearly want us to send a Division as soon as possible, both
for added strength that it would provide and also for the moral
effect-which they rate highly. Their tentative suggestion is that
our Division should go to Egypt or Palestine at the earliest
possible moment for training-thus relieving the British Divisions
in this area. They would provide equipment such as Bren guns,
anti-tank guns, etc. that our Division would lack, but desire that
we should bring artillery equipment.
I should also tell you that their hope is that we should despatch
a second Division, making an Australian Corps as soon as we can.
Canada is arranging transportation of their first Division to the
United Kingdom beginning the first week in December. India is
sending a Division to Egypt and a Brigade group to Burma and
another to the Persian Gulf.
Air: Germany has two to one numerical superiority over Britain and
France in Air Forces. There appears to be reason to believe that
British aircraft are superior to German, but German numerical
superiority is in doubt and is disappearing. On information so far
it appears that the combined British/French aircraft production
probably now rather more than German and this is expected to
increase in the Allies' favour.
Practical inactivity of all combatant air forces up to date is
apparently due to the desire not being charged with the
responsibility of being the first to kill. If one side advances
other side will retaliate immediately.
According to German airmen prisoners, they were instructed to bomb
only warships at anchor at Rosyth and to avoid the Forth bridge
and the vessels at wharves and quays.
Said here that Germans are very anxious about our bombing the Ruhr
area in which three-quarters of their vital heavy industries are
located. The vulnerability of the Ruhr is thought to be one reason
why Germany may hesitate to invade Belgium-distance from England
to the Ruhr is much reduced flying over Belgium.
Radio Physics: Long range seaward spotter apparently in activity
and successful operation here. But I gather other applications not
yet in practical use. More about this later.
Navy: Suggest you get from Navy Office location of British
warships. Admiralty believe no German warships are at present
moment out of German ports.
Northcott [2] and I are going to France on Thursday evening 9th
November, arriving back in London Monday night.
CASEY
[DEFENCE: SPECIAL COLLECTION 1, SR I/I, BOX 384, STRATEGICAL
APPRECIATION BY U.K. CHIEFS OF STAFF]