Your Z cablegram [2] indicating the possibility of an early French
collapse must impel the earliest examination of British
Commonwealth policy and course to be pursued.

The absence of a French counter attack on a large scale against
the flank of the German breach, and the failure to employ or have
in position a strategical reserve to meet any breakthrough led us
to assume something was radically wrong with the French Army. The
view that a collapse may be possible must have been due to sudden
developments, for it has apparently not been possible for us to be
supplied with the facts or appreciation which support this view.

It is therefore difficult for us to form a judgment or consult
effectively unless we have full information of the military,
economic and moral factors, especially so far as they affect
France. Consequently we would request such an appreciation at the
earliest possible moment, with particular regard to the following
points-
1. What are the major reasons for believing that a French collapse
is possible? Is it due to moral and psychological factors,
affecting the whole population, which have undermined the fighting
spirit of the Army, or is it due to purely military factors such
as overwhelming air superiority, armament and strength of German
divisions? If the former, the position would be desperate unless
immediate steps could be taken to counteract it by radical change
in political leadership. Another change in high military command
might prove fatal at this juncture. On other hand, if latter is
true, and fighting spirit Army is unimpaired, France might well be
determined to fight on defensive until unfavourable factors are
counterbalanced by supreme war production effort on part of
Allies. In face of crisis, this is spirit and resolve of our
people here, and we are certain it is true throughout Empire. We
have difficulty in believing a similar spirit is not actuating
France, especially if reinforced by strongest assurances from us
that we are fighting to finish.

2. Assuming worst, however, the nature of the collapse must
profoundly affect our own course of operations. Would it be
(a) complete capitulation of France and exit from war, or
(b) surrender of French Armies in France only, withdrawal of
French Government to London or Algeria, and continuation of
struggle by her overseas forces and Navy.

If (a) then our own position in the Mediterranean, Egypt and Near
East calls for immediate examination, because it would appear
inevitable that Italy would enter the war at this stage, even if
she had not done so previously.

3. To our mind, another feature merits immediate consideration.

The main theme of German propaganda has been that England has let
down in turn Czechoslovakia, Finland, Norway, Holland, and will
certainly let down France as well. If British Army withdraws from
France or is forced to surrender by failure of supply, as a
prelude to French collapse, then it is obvious utmost will be made
of alleged inadequacy of British support with strong probability
of disastrous effect on neutrals, especially United States. It
would seem advisable that consideration should be given to this
contingency, by preparation of joint communiques and anti-
propaganda measures.

You will appreciate the object of this cable is to ensure we shall
be in position to send our views if and when the crisis under
contemplation arises, with promptitude, and to enable us to form
opinion as to manner and theatre our own efforts can best be
directed.