1. In spite of the deterrent effect of the Japanese military
commitments in China, the possible hostility of U.S.A. and Russia
and our military and economic strength, there are indications that
Japan may be contemplating a move to improve her strategic and
economic position. While it is not thought that war with Japan is
necessarily imminent, the Chiefs of Staff are reviewing the Far
Eastern strategy. Their views are briefly as follows:-

2. The security of our imperial interests in the Far East lies
ultimately in our ability to control sea communications in the
South Western Pacific for which purpose adequate fleet must be
based at Singapore. Since our previous assurances in this respect
however, the whole strategic situation has been radically altered
by the French defeat. The result of this has been to alter the
whole of the balance of naval strength in home waters. Formerly we
were prepared to abandon the Eastern Mediterranean and despatch a
fleet to the Far East relying on the French Fleet in the Western
Mediterranean to contain the Italian Fleet. Now if we move the
Mediterranean Fleet to the Far East there is nothing to contain
the Italian Fleet which will be free to operate in the Atlantic or
reinforce the German Fleet in home waters using bases in North
West France. We must therefore retain in European waters
sufficient naval forces to watch both the German and Italian
Fleets and we cannot do this and send a fleet to the Far East.

3. In the meantime the strategic importance to us of the Far East,
both for Empire security and to enable us to defeat the enemy by
control of essential commodities at the source, has increased.

4. The Japanese advance in China and Hainan has increased the
threat to Malaya and any further advance into French Indo-China,
Dutch possessions or Thailand would endanger still more our
position at Singapore which is the key point in the Far East.

Owing to the increased range of aircraft and the development of
aerodromes, particularly in Thailand, we can no longer concentrate
on the defence of Singapore Island entirely but must consider the
defence of Malaya as a whole, particularly the security of up
country landing grounds. For this reason and because we cannot
spare a fleet for the Far East at present, it is all the more
important that we should do what we can to improve our land and
air defences in Malaya.

5. In your telegram 290 of 13th June [1] you mentioned the
possibility of supplying further land forces. The Chiefs of Staff
consider that the urgent movement of one division and two
squadrons of aircraft to Malaya is desirable as an added immediate
deterrent. They ask particularly whether the equivalent of a
division equipped as fully as possible could be made available,
drawing if necessary on your Militia pool of equipment. They
realize that you could not equip these troops up to full Western
standards nor would this be necessary in view of the unlikelihood
of the Japanese being able to bring mechanized troops with the
latest form of equipment to attack them. They consider that the
employment in Malaya would, for the time being at any rate, be in
the best interests of the Empire.

6. If owing to equipment or other difficulties you cannot make a
whole division immediately available, the Chiefs of Staff
recommend the movement by brigade groups as they become necessary.

[2]