2 On 19 March 1940 Menzies instructed Casey to discuss the
memorandum with Earl Newsom, a New York public relations
consultant (see unnumbered cablegram on file AA: A1608, L37/1/5).

Casey replied on 20 March (see cablegram 44 on file AA: A1608,
L37/1/5): 'I agree with the first two pages of the memorandum but
disagree with remainder. My first reaction is that the proposal
rather dangerous, as the suggested organisation would be obliged
to register under the United States Act for registration of
propagandists and I believe that its activities would be quickly
exposed by some of many people hem who investigate any and all
suspected propagandist bodies.' In the copy of the memorandum
Clunies Ross gave to Bruce the second page ended after the
paragraph 'Any attempt by Englishmen . . .'

Enclosure

Memorandum by Dr I. Clunies Ross, Australian Member of
International Wool Secretariat in London

Extract [?22 January 1940] [1]

CONFIDENTIAL

AUSTRALIA AND THE UNITED STATES

THE PROBLEM or ESTABLISHING CLOSER RELATIONS

During the present condition of the world the relationship of
Australia to the United States has a very special importance in
view of:-

1. The bearing of such a relationship on problems of Australian
security in the Pacific, and
2. The possibility of establishing a better understanding of Great
Britain and her problems in the United States through the
interpretation of those problems by Australia.

1. Australian security and the U.S.A.

Australia to-day is fortunate in finding in the United States (a)
a traditional dislike and suspicion of Japan and her designs in
the Pacific, and (b) a latent fund of interest in and sympathy for
Australian social ideals and character.

In contrast to a rooted objection by Americans to the involvement
of their country in European problems, there is to-day evident a
much greater readiness to accept responsibility for conditions in
the Pacific. This has even been shown in California by the
statement to us that the United States is virtually an ally of
Britain since she has shown her willingness to restrain Japan at
this time through such action as the transference of her fleet
from the Atlantic to the Pacific. Were Japanese aggression
contemplated against Australia in particular the latter would have
the advantage that her people wherever they are known are liked by
Americans, whom they are considered to resemble in their general
outlook, their freedom from convention and the democratic nature
of their ideals and institutions.

That such sympathy for and appreciation of Australia and her
people exists is the more remarkable in view of the little
conscious effort that has been devoted to its development by
either country. Moreover, Australian opinion of the United States
and its people is too often influenced by ignorance of all but the
most undesirable aspects of American life and by the fact that
Australians are the heirs to that attitude of condescension and
superiority too frequently shown by the English, which in itself
is a bar to the fuller development of understanding.

The conjunction of American dislike of Japan and her liking and
sympathy for Australia, however meagre the knowledge on which the
latter is based, offers a foundation on which by careful planning
could be built an immeasurably stronger friendship and
understanding. So strong could this be made that it could entirely
change Australia's strategical position in relation to Japan. It
would in addition create a more favourable atmosphere for the
improvement of trade relations and other interchanges.

2. Australia as an interpreter of Britain to the United States
In relation to the war, the understanding of the British case by
the U.S.A. suffers from misconceptions which, on the one hand,
lend support to the views of the more vigorous isolationists, and,
on the other, cause uncertainty and doubt to the great body of
conscientious and earnest people who are anxious to decide how
great their obligations are in the present conflict. The
isolationists maintain that (a) the allies are largely responsible
for losing the peace, (b) they are first involved in the old game
of power politics and only secondarily concerned with fundamental
rights, (c) Britain is still an imperial power rather than a
collection of free democracies, and (d) America was mistaken in
intervening in the last war and is free from responsibility both
in regard to the postwar situation or towards the present war; all
this in spite of their decided sympathy for the allies and their
dislike of Hitler and Stalin. Though moderate opinion is by no
means decided in regard to these matters it suffers doubt and
uncertainty in regard to all of them.

Any attempt by Englishmen whether official or unofficial to
present the true position in regard to either the objectives of
the allies, as no less real democracies than the United States, or
the joint responsibility of U.S.A. for the postwar deterioration
and the outcome of the present war, suffers (a) from the fact that
any expression of opinion by an Englishman is regarded as
propaganda and suspect, while (b) the American too often senses a
feeling of superiority and a lack of understanding and sympathy in
his relations with Englishmen.

These difficulties are so fully appreciated by those responsible
for British propaganda that it is considered unwise to make any
real effort to state the British case, but rather to hope that
with the lapse of years truth will out. Such an attitude must
result in the abandonment of hope that anything except the
pressure of events, such as even more blatant acts of aggression
on the part of the Dictators, or evidence of a direct threat to
American security would lead to more active participation of the
U.S.A. in the war.

There is, however, the possibility of Britain finding in Australia
an interpreter in the U.S.A. who would be subject to none of the
above suspicions provided the techniques followed were skilfully
conceived and executed. Australia could present her own attitude
to the war as a free and independent democracy but still a member
of the British Commonwealth; she could present herself as the heir
to British democratic institutions and ideals; she could express
her understanding of such problems as British India, Palestine,
etc., which are both vexing and confusing to the Americans; she
could express her attitude as a country far detached from European
problems to such questions as American responsibility for the
failure of the peace; and finally as a far-off country and like
America of the Pacific, she could express her attitude to the
fundamental responsibility and obligation of all free peoples for
the preservation of law and order and democratic ideals in Europe
as elsewhere.

THE METHOD OF ATTACK ON THE DUAL PROBLEM OF DEVELOPING AMERICAN-
AUSTRALIAN UNDERSTANDING AND THE INTERPRETATION OF BRITISH POLICY
TO THE U.S.A.

The following proposals for the setting up of an organisation to
achieve the above objectives are based on the conviction that the
technique to be followed in changing public opinion is essentially
the same whether applied to a commodity or to social and political
principles. Instead of seeking to change habits of food or
clothing one seeks to change habits of thought. The one is no more
difficult than the other. The aim is not to influence a limited
income group in the one case or a small body of intellectuals in
the other, but the widest possible public. In the case under
consideration the aim would be to create such a body of informed
and vocal opinion in the U.S.A. that it would support if not
dictate political action towards the objectives sought.

THE TECHNIQUE
With the safeguards dealt with below the technique to be followed
would be that employed by a Counsel in Public Relations in the
United States, in relation to an ordinary business contract. In
this case the contract would be not on behalf of International
Wool or International Tea, but International Relations, and
specifically American-Australian and British-American Relations.

The function of a Counsel in Public Relations does not include
advertising but rather the creation and dissemination of news
designed to change and create public opinion towards a specific
end, but so disguised that its purpose, unlike advertising, is not
apparent. It must first be news and be accepted without payment by
media such as newspapers, magazines, the radio, etc., purely for
its news value.

[AA: M104, 1940, ITEM 8]

1 Clunies Ross forwarded this memorandum to Bruce with a covering
letter dated 22 January 1940 (on file here cited).