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212 Commonwealth Government to Lord Cranborne, U.K. Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs

Cablegram 627 1 December 1940,

MOST SECRET IMMEDIATE

The Commonwealth Government has considered the report of the
Singapore Defence Conference [1] and is gravely concerned at the
most serious position revealed in regard to the defence of Malaya
and Singapore. We realize of course that the United Kingdom
Government also has great interests at stake in the Eastern
Hemisphere which are dependent on the security of Singapore as a
capital ship base.

2. It is appreciated that the war has to be won in the main
theatres of operation but it will be fully understood that the
extent of Australian co-operation in overseas theatres is
dependent on the Australian public's impression of the degree of
local security that exists. It is realized that, with the
defection of France and the advance of Japan southwards to Indo-
China, the land and air threats to Malaya have greatly increased.

3. However, the advice received by the Commonwealth Government
from the United Kingdom Government, particularly during the
discussions in London in 1937, regarding the defence of Singapore,
had led us to believe that the situation would have been much
better. The following extracts from the Notes of Discussions in
1937 [2] summarize the assurances given to us:-

'Our policy was to render Singapore secure from military attack,
using the term military in the broadest sense.'
'Our whole defence policy in the Far East was directed towards
ensuring that Singapore would hold out.'
4. It would appear to be a sine qua non to American co-operation
in the Pacific that Singapore should be as secure as we can make
it if we are to expect them to base strong naval forces in that
region.

5. In the three Squadrons we have made available for service at
Singapore, we have done all we can to help in the air, and in the
succeeding paragraphs an outline is given of the additional
assistance that can be rendered, but we would urge immediate
action to remedy deficiencies in Army and Air Forces both in
numbers and equipment, which is all important, in view of
inadequacy of Naval Forces.

6. If Imperial strategic considerations call for despatch of
Australian troops to Malaya, the Commonwealth Government would be
willing to make available a Brigade Group and necessary
maintenance troops with modified scale of equipment only, for
service in Malaya at an early date as a contribution to the
deficiencies in the land forces. It is still considered preferable
for Indian troops to be used for the reinforcement of Malaya for
the reasons advanced against the despatch of A.I.F. troops to that
region, in paragraph 2 of my cable No. 457 of 29th August, 1940.

[3] It is therefore desired that the Brigade Group should only be
located in Malaya as a temporary measure whilst completing their
training and until such time as the 8th Division A.I.F., of which
they are part, can be concentrated in the Middle East, when they
should be relieved by Indian troops. The scale of equipment to be
supplied from Australia for the Brigade Group will be taken up
direct with the War Office.

7. If the United Kingdom Government so desire, the Commonwealth
Government will make available for immediate despatch to Malaya
the following equipment and ammunition: such items to be
additional to present commitments for supply of munitions to the
United Kingdom:-

Rifles 2,000
S.A.A. .303 5,000,000 rounds
S.A.A. Tracer 100,000 rounds
S.A.A. Revolver .455 20,000 rounds
Grenades No. 36 5,000
Grenades No. 63 5,000
Wireless sets No. 109 40
The Commonwealth Government are also prepared to make available
against the order for A.A. guns for the United Kingdom Government
an additional eight 3.7 inch guns. In view of deficiencies in
anti-aircraft equipment at Malaya, it is suggested that
consideration might be given to the diversion of these guns to
Malaya. We also hope to be able to supply 3 inch mortar equipments
for Malaya when these are available early in 1941.

8. We are in agreement with the recommendations of the Conference
concerning the scheme of air defence, and are prepared to provide
the necessary ground facilities within Commonwealth territory as
far as is practicable. Aircraft concentrations in the strengths
recommended are, however, not possible with aircraft at present
available in Australia. The Commonwealth Government, therefore,
presses the urgency of early allotment of modern Service types of
aircraft required to implement the approved expansion of the
R.A.A.F., details of which have already been supplied to the
United Kingdom Government,
9. We note that the minimum Naval Forces, excluding local defence
forces, required to safeguard essential commitments in Australian
waters, in the event of war with Japan, can be provided by the
return of the Australian Naval Forces now serving overseas, with
the exception that, for troop convoys, a capital ship escort is
required in the Indian Ocean. This is on the assumption that the
scheme of air defence referred to in paragraph 8 above is
proceeded with and adequate Air Forces are provided.

10. It is agreed that the shortage of anti-submarine and
minesweeping vessels referred to in Part 3 paragraph 10 of the
report could be made up from vessels building in Australia on
Admiralty account, if the United Kingdom Government agree to such
allocation. With regard to mines and depth charges, Commonwealth
Government will render whatever assistance is possible, but this
is dependent on creation of increased capacity for production of
T.N.T. which is now being undertaken.

11. The financial liability for the measures to be taken by each
Government to give effect to the decisions of the Conference
should, it is suggested, be a matter for arrangement between the
Governments concerned. [4]

1 Dated 31 October. See PRO:ADM 1/11183.

2 See Documents on Australian Foreign Policy 1937-49, vol. I,
Document 47.

3 Document 84.

4 This cablegram was repeated to Peter Fraser, N.Z. Prime
Minister, and to R. G. Casey, Minister to the United States, as
nos 80 and 28 respectively. S. M. Bruce, High Commissioner in
London was asked in cablegram 1418 of 1 December (on file
AA:A1608, AA27/1/1) to see Cranborne's copy and give all possible
support to the representations contained therein.


[AA:A3196, 1940, 0.9503]
Last Updated: 11 September 2013
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