JAPAN AND THE INTERNATIONAL SITUATION

(The three Chiefs of Staff [1] and the Minister for Air [2] were
present during the latter part of the discussion on this subject).

At the request of the non-Government members, a discussion took
place in regard to the position of Japan in her relation to the
Axis and Allied powers.

The Minister for the Army [3] stated that from advices now being
received the situation was veering towards Japanese intervention
in the war against us, and that European politics were the main
determining factor in this. It was felt that Germany must act very
soon, her main purpose being to secure Japanese intervention, thus
diverting the efforts of the British Empire and interfering with
supplies to Great Britain from the United States.

Japan now appeared to be uncertain as to the action she should
take. Hesitation was caused by the determination of the British
Forces and the stand they had made against Italy, and her fear of
an encirclement policy by an alliance between the United States
and the British Empire. Nevertheless, there was every possibility
of Japan making a move against us in the next three months, due to
a great extent to the influence being exerted by an irrational
section who were working up the masses against the British Empire
by claiming that British actions were the cause of the
deterioration in the economic life of the community, which in fact
had been largely brought about by the disastrous effect of the war
in China. A major problem therefore confronted us, which was made
more difficult by the doubt as to whether the United States would
intervene unless her own territories were involved.

The immediate effect of war with Japan would be felt in Australia
in her interstate trade, which was largely dependent on sea-borne
traffic. The Minister for the Army stated that, in the view of the
military advisers, it was doubtful whether an invasion of
Australia would take place, but no doubt existed that serious
dislocation and harm would be done by continuous and effective
raids.

Mr. Curtin [4] stated that Japan's policy was one of opportunism.

If she thought the situation favoured it, she would make war
against us tomorrow, when she would use her navy to demobilise
Australia, with disastrous effect on our commercial and economic
life. He also could not overlook the possibility of temporary
occupation by the Japanese of some portion of Australia.

Psychologically the effect of such an occupation would be very
great, as the Axis powers would advertise to the world that Great
Britain was losing territory. Australia was dependent for her
overseas trade and for the reinforcement of her troops abroad on
the vital route through the Indian Ocean. Therefore it was logical
to say that to meet the Japanese menace additional Naval Forces
were required on the Australia Station. He had been impressed by
the fact that Japanese vessels were cruising the seas without
their presence being known to the authorities in Australia. This
was evidenced by the unexpected arrival recently of a Japanese
whaler at Fremantle.

The important aspect of the situation in the Mediterranean
appeared to be not so much our military successes in Libya, but
the German attempt to bomb the British Navy out of those seas,
while in the Atlantic the submarine and long-range bomber menace
was doing tremendous damage to the vital trade routes of Great
Britain. Notwithstanding the desirability of reinforcement of the
Australian Naval Squadron, these factors indicated that at present
it was not practicable.

The next six months would, in his opinion, be fatal to one side or
the other. It was therefore essential that we should dissipate
internal friction and that all sections of the community should
put their best efforts forward to maintain both Australian and
Empire integrity. He recommended that the above facts should be
given to the Premiers of all States, that Parliament in a secret
session similarly should be given all information possible, and
that in the meantime we should enlarge our Defence Programme to
ensure that all steps possible are being taken for effective
defence. While major questions of this nature were demanding
attention, he thought that matters such as petrol rationing, ban
on overtime and other relatively unimportant matters which had
been receiving consideration by the Advisory War Council should be
placed in the background.

To meet the international situation, Mr. Curtin suggested that the
Army effort should be made as large as could be managed and that:-

(a) The Naval training facilities at Fremantle appeared to be
insufficient and should be investigated.

(b) While he realised that it was impossible at present to obtain
more ships, the Naval strength should be doubled to train
personnel.

(c) The resistance to attack of the R.A.A.F. should be
strengthened.

The danger to Australia would come in the first place from the
sea, secondly from the air, while the Army would only be brought
into full action after both the Navy and Air Force had failed.

It was decided at this stage of the proceedings to have the Chiefs
of Staff attend the meeting.

Mr. Curtin reiterated his earlier views regarding the
reinforcement of the Australian Naval Squadron to the Chief of the
Naval Staff, who replied that the loss of the French Fleet vitally
affected the position. Previously it had been relied upon, but now
the British Navy had not only to defend the Mediterranean area,
but in addition the whole of the French coast was available to the
enemy, giving him easy access to trade routes and enabling him
also to make air attacks on those routes from the French seaports.

The British Navy was at present extended to the utmost. All these
factors affected our pre-war planning for the relief of Singapore.

In the event of hostilities, the Japanese policy would be to
maintain a cruiser and submarine force and possibly an aircraft
carrier in the Pacific Islands. Our forces could not be regarded
as sufficient to meet this menace but should, on the other hand,
be able to maintain our trade if the Australian Squadron were
located in Australian waters.

Mr. Curtin asked whether a cruiser attack could not do
considerable harm to Western Australian shipping. The Chief of the
Naval Staff advised that it could not do a great deal of damage in
view of the 9.2-inch battery at Rottnest.

The Chief of the Naval Staff stated that he was of opinion that
minelaying in Australian waters was carried out by a lone raider,
either in bad weather or under cover of darkness. He discounted
the probability of the presence of enemy submarines in Australian
waters, and stated that all reports had been investigated but the
facts were against their presence.

In reply to a question by Mr. Curtin as to whether he considered
that any greater activity could be taken in hand by the Department
of the Navy for the effective defence of Australia, the Chief of
the Naval Staff stated that the maximum effort was now being made
and that this effort was not being hampered in any way by the
withholding of any authority by the Government, but that on the
other hand the Naval effort was being set back by continuous
strikes and labour problems in shipyards and docks, which of late
had shown a 25% lag in output over earlier months.

In reply to questions from non-Government members, the Chief of
the Naval Staff stated that he was satisfied with the organisation
of shipyards and internal administration of the industrial
establishments, but despite repeated appeals to the men working on
jobs delays continuously arose through industrial strife. It was
agreed that every effort should be made to overcome industrial
delays in the construction programme. Non-Government members
expressed the view that this might largely be overcome with better
publicity in Australia as to the real war position.

The Chief of the Air Staff indicated that the slowing down of
manufacture due to labour difficulties was also causing problems
in the Air Force. In reply to Mr. Makin [5], the Chief of the Air
Staff stated that the local defence requirements were not being
sacrificed by the operation of the Empire Air Training Scheme, and
that it was desirable for the scheme to be given full effect and
for pilots to be made available for the R.A.F. overseas, in
accordance with the original intentions of the scheme. The
required output of pilots for the local defence scheme of 32
squadrons and the reserve crews for local defence was being
maintained from schools.

Mr. Curtin asked whether there would be any change in these Air
activities if we were required to meet Japanese intervention. The
Chief of the Air Staff stated that our Home Defence scheme had
been planned to meet this contingency. Mr. Curtin expressed some
doubt as to whether Japan would follow normal strategical methods,
but would be more likely to collaborate with Germany and, if
possible, occupy some portion of Australia, which would be a blow
at British prestige. It was possible that she would make a bold
move contrary to strategy, and he quoted Norway as an example of
such Axis activities. The Chief of the Air Staff stated that
Norway was in a very different category from Australia, as she was
practically adjacent to Germany and there were no long lines of
communication to maintain such as would be involved in an invasion
of Australia. In addition, Japan must take into consideration the
British stronghold at Singapore and the possible assistance that
would be rendered by the Netherlands East Indies.

Non-Government members agreed that as a result of the frank
discussion that had taken place they had come to a fuller
appreciation of the alarming situation that Australia was in, and
recommended that a press statement should be issued so that the
position might be brought nearer home to the general public. It
was agreed that the Council should meet again later in the evening
to consider a draft press statement to be prepared on these lines.

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