Your cablegram No. 50 of 28th January [1] received through the
United Kingdom High Commissioner [2]-
Service advisers of His Majesty's Government in the Commonwealth
of Australia have most carefully considered the views put forward
in your telegram referring to the Singapore Conference Report.

Part 1 of the Report surveys the problems and puts forward
proposed plan to achieve our object. Unfortunately, the naval part
of the plan was not completed, as the forces necessary in the
Indian Ocean were not assessed (vide paragraphs 22 and 28).

Neither are dispositions of China Squadron shown in this section.

The only specific dispositions are those for Australian and New
Zealand waters, and these are given rather baldly in specified
areas.

The naval plan, therefore, as far as this report is concerned, is
very incomplete, and makes it appear that Australian and New
Zealand forces are allocated for certain narrow and closely
defined local areas.

2. Further, as no plan for naval protection in the Indian Ocean is
shown, it is not possible to compare the relative strengths of
forces allocated as between south-western Pacific and the Indian
Ocean. The only forces mentioned regarding the latter are a battle
cruiser and an aircraft carrier.

My Government is greatly concerned as to the naval strength which
will be available in the latter area. We realise the difficulties
with which you are confronted but would appreciate full statement
from your Government as to naval force available there and any
action proposed to augment it in event of hostilities with Japan.

It is important we should have as precise a statement as possible
in order that we may make our own plans accordingly.

3. Referring to telegram No. 50, the Australian Service advisers
subscribe to the principles set out in paragraph (A) but in their
opinion the implications of paragraph 1 (B) and 1 (C) have not yet
been set out or fully considered by all defence authorities in the
Far East.

4. The Australian Chiefs of Staff consider that this should be
done as soon as possible, and the forthcoming Conference at
Singapore would be a suitable opportunity. Before this Conference,
however, it is considered that certain aspects of the naval
strategic plan should be put forward and considered by the United
Kingdom Chiefs of Staff, so that the Conference can have all
relevant directions and terms of reference before them.

5. The following considerations are therefore put forward by the
Australian Chiefs of Staff-
(a) South-west Pacific area must be considered as a whole,
irrespective of station limits.

(b) Under present conditions, the relief of Singapore depends
essentially on United States naval assistance, which must move
from the northeastern Pacific to the western Pacific to exercise
the necessary pressure.

Great emphasis is laid on the importance of the line of approach
to Singapore, i.e. Honolulu, Fiji, Darwin, Singapore. This line is
considered to be the most favourable for United States naval
reinforcemews. The desirability of preventing the Japanese gaining
a foothold across this line, i.e. New Guinea-New Hebrides-New
Caledonia-Fiji, and thus making the passage of American
reinforcements most hazardous, is a strong argument for the need
for adequate naval and air forces in the area and the advisability
of strengthening the defences of our existing ports and bases
there.

(c) The war effort of Australia and New Zealand has its principal
focus in the area of the Tasman Sea, and, if the command of this
area is lost, the transport of troops and trade of both Dominions
would cease or be reduced to a trickle.

This area is, in fact, an extension of the Indian Ocean routes
referred to in your telegram, and one very much more important
than, for example, the Fremantle-Colombo route, which could indeed
be almost cut out except for troop convoys.

The Australia-New Zealand-Cape route west of Australia is remote
from attack.

In a war with Japan, the Tasman Sea area is one very open to
attack. With their existing bases in the mandated islands and the
numerous potential advance bases further south, there will be
little difficulty and every advantage in the Japanese maintaining
there constantly a cruiser force, which could well be spared even
though the main attack were elsewhere.

In the absence of a British cruiser force adequate to counter
them, Australian and New Zealand trade and shipping could be held
up indefinitely outside the range of shore based aircraft. Such an
enemy force may also be assessed by Japan as a means of containing
potential reinforcements in Australia.

(d) The permanent commitments of escorting convoys of
reinforcements part way to the Middle East have largely occupied
the services of Australian cruisers, and these convoys must
continue if the A.I.F. is to be maintained at full strength and
equipment.

(e) Conclusion: It is considered that Japanese strategy will aim
at maintaining a cruiser force in the Tasman Sea area, possibly
backed up by a heavier unit or aircraft carrier, and that this
would be part of their main plan in any attack on Malaya or the
Dutch East Indies.

In view of the important considerations set out in (a) to (d)
above, my Government, after consultation with the Australian
Chiefs of Staff, must emphasize the importance of giving effect to
the conclusions of the Singapore Conference that the minimum naval
forces considered necessary in Australian and New Zealand waters
can be provided only by the return of all Australian and New
Zealand forces now serving overseas. They consider that the main
disposition of these forces should be in the Tasman Sea area, with
regular allocation of cruisers for convoy escort, at any rate
until U.S.A. has shown her hand.

The Commonwealth Government would be most grateful for the views
of the United Kingdom Chiefs of Staff on these matters prior to
the assembling of naval Commanders-in-Chief at Singapore.