FOR CHIEF OF NAVAL STAFF. [1]

FROM NAVAL ATTACHE [2]

Fourth Progress Report.

Following is summary of the United Kingdom Delegation
appreciation, vide paragraph (2) of my telegram 117 [3], begins.

Maintenance of fleet base at Singapore cardinal point in British
strategy. Stratagem based not only on pure strategy but political,
economical and colonial considerations which even if not vital on
strictly academic view are of such fundamental importance to the
Empire that they must be taken into serious account.

Compare with the United States attitude to the defence of the
Western Pacific area. The Empire is comprised of various Dominions
and Colonies held together by communications and trade routes
across the oceans.

Home population depends on imported food and overseas trade.

Security and prosperity of India our trust and responsibility.

Defence of all these interests, vital to the maintenance of the
associated war effort, depends on the capacity to hold Singapore,
and in the last resort to base the battle fleet there.

2. Until recently it was the policy of the United Kingdom
Government to despatch the fleet to the Far East on the outbreak
of war. This now impracticable. If the United States do not come
in we would hope to hold out in Malaya for a long time though the
air forces there are far below the strength required. But if
Singapore in serious danger of capture and the United States still
withheld aid, we should be prepared to send the fleet to the Far
East even if this would compromise or sacrifice the position in
the Mediterranean.

3. Active intervention of the United States would profoundly
modify the situation. If the United States Navy were active in the
Pacific, invasion of Australia and New Zealand would be precluded.

These Dominions would only withhold their collaboration in the war
effort in the last resort and, with the United States active
allies, proportion of their trade and military contribution could
be transported eastward across the Pacific provided the United
States Navy could ensure reasonably safe passage.

4. In reply to the argument which was put forward by United States
representatives in the discussion we agreed that the Japanese with
a hostile United States fleet on their flank would not base the
main fleet on captured Singapore; that even if we retained
Singapore, the Japanese operating from Kamranh Bay or Batavia
would threaten seriously our Indian Ocean communications and that
we could afford measure of protection to those in the Western
Indian Ocean from Colombo but not as much as if we can use
Singapore.

5. If the United States intervene we might thus still hope to
maintain cohesion and the war effort of the British Commonwealth
of Nations without abandoning the position in the Mediterranean.

We still consider the issues at stake so fundamental that the loss
of Singapore would be a disaster of the first magnitude, second
only to the loss of the British Isles.

6. Then stressed the importance of Singapore [card of re-entry, so
that if] [4] threat in the Indian Ocean and Western Pacific
[became] intolerable [w]e could still accept risks elsewhere and
send the fleet. Failure to do so would mean that Japan becomes the
undisputed master of East Asia, Netherlands East Indies and
Western Pacific. Empire and United States would lose resources in
food and vital irreparable war materials. Japan would become self-
supporting and the United States economic weapon useless. Our
morale and prestige would suffer resounding blow with grave
consequences during and after the war. All hope of Chinese
resistance would end and Russia might throw in her lot with the
Axis. India and Burma would become a liability. Unless we retain
this foothold, even if Italy was eliminated and Germany defeated,
highly problematical whether we could ever undertake combined
operations necessary to restore the position in the Far East after
an exhaustive and desperate struggle.

7. We then went on to give Japanese courses of action, suggesting
Japanese plan was to avoid implicating United States and possibly
Dutch and to attack Malaya. In reply to the question as to how
long Malaya could hold out we discovered imponderable factors,
namely, stage at which United States might intervene, whether or
not the Dutch would fight; effect of the present deficiencies in
our forces in the Far East and the ability of the joint Asiatic
forces to neutralise the Japanese forces in the South China Seas,
and the extent to which operations of the United States Pacific
fleet would contain Japanese forces in the North. We stressed the
need for the fleet to undertake active operations against Japan
and finally pressed home the point that the Asiatic fleet required
reinforcements if it was to constitute a real menace to the
Japanese advanced sea communications.

8. In reply to further United States arguments put forward in the
discussion we went on to discuss the meaning of their phrase
'holding the Malay barrier' and minimum forces required. No
question of sustaining the whole of our position in the Far East.

For instance no hope of retaining Hong Kong, Philippines or Borneo
indefinitely. Irreducible minimum which must be held was
Singapore, and to do this must deny the Japanese uninterrupted
freedom of action to carry out sustained operations in the waters
and from territories surrounding Singapore.

Japanese attack on Malaya would involve sustained operations with
large land and air forces and establishment of naval control in
South China seas. Such operations would not be carried out
satisfactorily without capital ships in South China Seas if
effective associated naval forces were operating from Singapore
and any possibility remained of capital ships appearing in those
seas.

9. Strength of Asiatic forces must be determined to some extent by
strength of forces that may not be contained by operations of
United States Pacific fleet. The only real solution is capital
ship force at Singapore. Realizing, however, that there were
initially many real difficulties we pointed out that, in view of
the weakness of the British and Dutch forces, essential that we
should be able to gain time to move land and air reinforcements to
Malaya when the emergency arises or in last [resort] adjust and
concentrate necessary naval forces.

10. We should therefore be in a position to dispute the Japanese
control of the sea communications in the South China Seas. In the
absence of capital ship force this can only be done if United
States or British Asiatic Naval Forces are reinforced to an extent
which would constitute a real threat to the Japanese advanced sea
communications and enable us at least to interrupt them.

Naval reinforcements of the order of one carrier, a division of
heavy cruisers and auxiliary craft in proportion would be minimum
required to fulfil this role in early stages.

11. In view of the fact that the main theatres will be the
Atlantic and Mediterranean obviously desirable that naval
reinforcement of Asiatic forces should not be at the expense of
these areas which means that it should be found from United States
Pacific Fleet. Fleet must be strong enough to fulfil its strategic
function, i.e. contain rival forces away from South China seas;

but distances involved are immense and if Japanese are to conduct
serious operations in South China seas they will be compelled to
make substantial detachments from their main fleet including
capital ships. It is suggested therefore that the small reduction
in the strength of Pacific fleet proposed above could be accepted
without weakening the capacity of main fleet to fulfil its
offensive role, exposing United States interests to attack or
exposing United States naval forces to insecurity. (This in reply
to points made in discussion).

12. Then expressed our conviction that if United States Pacific
Fleet was to draw off Japanese from sustained operations against
Malaya it was essential that it should be extremely active in
Japanese waters and against Japanese mainland.

13. Finally, we invited the United States representatives to agree
with the contention of His Majesty's Government in the United
Kingdom that security of the Far Eastern position, including
Australia and New Zealand, is essential to the maintenance of the
war effort of associated Powers. Singapore is the key defence of
these interests and its retention must be assured.

Appreciation ends.

Summary of United States staff committee's written reply will be
telegraphed shortly.

CASEY