Commonwealth Government's telegram No. 87 of 13th February. [1]

NAVAL DISPOSITIONS. Matter has been very carefully considered
here, and following sets out our views:-

1. It is agreed that the South Western Pacific: area should be
regarded as a whole, irrespective of station limits, but it is
further considered that all Far East waters, including the South
Western Pacific and Indian Oceans, must be considered together
strategically.

2. This area again must be balanced in with the whole Empire war
effort. Attacks by Germany in the Atlantic will certainly not be
any the less. The threat in North Western Approaches both by air
and submarine is expected to increase in Spring. Attacks on our
home convoys have already been experienced; attacks by armed
raiders in all Oceans must be expected to continue; indeed to
increase with the co-operation of Germany and Japan.

The invariable threat to British Isles necessitates the holding of
a certain number of forces in home waters. Our war effort in the
Mediterranean is likely to increase.

3. The addition of Japan to our enemies would add additional
threat both to our territory and to our trade from the East coast
of Africa to the Pacific.

Inside this area an investigation has already been made with a
view to reducing the amount of essential trade that must be kept
running and it is essential that the following important trade
routes and supply lines should be kept going:-Cape to Aden, Cape
to Colombo, Colombo to Aden and Australia to Panama, Australia to
Singapore, Australia to Cape and Panama. The trade, even after it
has been reduced to a minimum, is so big that it will be out of
the question to run it entirely by convoys and a certain amount of
diverted routeing will have to be accepted.

4. Many of our troubles would be alleviated by stationing of
P.B.Y.'s [2] or other long-distance aircraft on the trade routes.

In fact, however, the situation must be faced that only six
P.B.Y.'s have so far been delivered, and that any delivery in
quantity cannot be expected for several months.

5. The forces to be stationed in Indian Ocean and Far East cannot
at present be substantially increased beyond those already there,
except by the addition of one battle cruiser and aircraft carrier
and by the return of Australian and New Zealand naval forces now
serving overseas. However, from the moment that Japan enters the
war, the situation in all Oceans will be carefully watched and an
immediate re-distribution of forces will be made should threat to
our communications in Pacific and Indian Oceans be relatively
greater than that in the Atlantic.

A more precise statement of the total numbers and types of various
vessels likely to be available in the whole area under discussion
is being telegraphed to the Commander-in-Chief, China [3], and
will be available at present Conference at Singapore as a basis
for planning.

6. In the above circumstances it appears, viewing the theatre of
war as a whole, and the total forces available for defence of
various imperial interests concerned, that the disposition of
Dominions forces proposed at the previous Conference might be
regarded as slightly out of balance.

It is appreciated that at this Conference it was not possible to
compare the relative strengths of forces in Australian and New
Zealand waters and elsewhere, in the lack of information as to
total forces which would be available. The information referred to
in paragraph 5 should now allow this to be done. We should
therefore be glad if the Commonwealth Government and New Zealand
Government would authorize their Service advisers to re-examine
naval dispositions (in consultation with the Naval Commander in
Chief, China, and East Indies Stations [4]) in the light of
information which will now be available with a view to producing
plan for the best employment of combined naval forces in the whole
area of the Indian Ocean, Far East, Australia and New Zealand
waters.

7. Whilst situation would be alleviated by the entry of the United
States into the war we cannot allow for this anyhow in our initial
dispositions. Even should the United States come into the war,
indications are that they will not station any forces in the
Pacific, west of Hawaii, except for an Asiatic fleet. Their main
Pacific fleet will be at Hawaii and a considerable . . . [5] will
be directed towards stiffening our forces in the Atlantic and so
relieving certain of our forces including capital ships for the
Far East. [6]