1. With further reference to your 252. [1] There have been
meetings of the Defence Committee presided over by the Prime
Minister [2] followed by a meeting of the Chiefs of Staff [3] and
myself
2. The following is an extract from covering letter by the Chiefs
of Staff on the memorandum dealing with telegram [4]:

After very careful consideration of the Commonwealth Government's
telegram we find ourselves unable to answer, in isolation, the
hypothetical proposals put to us. To attempt to do so would not
only be unhelpful but possibly dangerous. Without minimizing our
difficulties we cannot regard the situation postulated by the
Commonwealth Government as being ['reasonably Proximate']. [5]

A full appreciation of the situation in the Mediterranean and the
Middle East and its effect on the other theatres is in course of
preparation and we hope that it will answer some of the problems
put forward by the Commonwealth Government. In the meantime we
have prepared the attached survey of the situation which may be of
some value to the Commonwealth Government.

We wish to point out that this survey represents our views but has
not yet been approved by the Prime Minister.

3. Churchill's attitude might be summarised by stating that he is
so determined that the defence of Egypt must be made secure that
the prospect of any alternative cannot be contemplated. To do so
would in his opinion undermine the morale if it were known that
plans were being prepared.

4. Whilst fully agreeing with this resolution of determination and
appreciating certain energetic measures in hand to improve the
position, I pointed out that it was essential to be prepared for
all eventualities and he agreed to my proceeding to a conference
with the Chiefs of Staff. At the latter meeting I was informed that
the Middle East headquarters had a skeleton plan prepared and they
are being instructed to see to its completion. We had a frank
discussion and I can elaborate the position on my return.

5. The following is extract of the essential part of the survey
referred to in paragraph 2:

Our main object in the Mediterranean is to secure our position in
Egypt. To do this we must first interrupt effectively the enemy's
long and vulnerable lines of communication by attacking with the
greatest vigour his sea communications, large ports and extended
land routes from Tripoli. Ultimately we hope to re-establish our
position at Benghazi and so keep German Air Forces at a distance
from the main fleet base at Alexandria.

In order to operate against the enemy's sea communication it is
most important to retain the use of Malta as a base for air and
naval forces and for this purpose to retain there a comparatively
large fighter force.

We intend to hold Crete and as soon as possible build up our
defences with a view to using it as an operational base for naval
and air forces. In the meanwhile Crete will undoubtedly be
subjected to a very heavy scale of air attack and may, in
addition, be attacked by airborne or possibly seaborne forces.

Our policy in Iraq is to increase forces that we have already sent
to Basrah with a view to stabilising the situation in that theatre
and keeping out Axis influence. The forces that we send to Iraq
will also add security to our oil interests and our air merchant
route. At Basrah we intend to establish a large assembly base for
American aircraft reinforcements to the Middle East.

To sum up, the Middle East is short of necessary requirements to
provide adequate security to meet the increased German threat,
particularly of armoured fighting vehicles, anti-tank and anti-
aircraft guns. These are the very weapons of which there is a
general shortage. There is also a shortage of aircraft in the
Middle East because capacity of all possible reinforcements routes
has been insufficient to meet recent heavy wastage in Greece and
North Africa.

Our problems are complicated by the vast distances which our
reinforcements normally have to travel. The delivery route is
approximately four times as long as the route from Germany to
Egypt and the Cape route six times as long.

Anything that can be done to bring relief to our sea routes via
the Cape and the Red Sea, and to speed up shipment of aircraft to
the Middle East will have a profound effect on the issue.

Finally in considering the extent to which we can afford to
reinforce the Middle East, we must at all times bear in mind the
fact that the war can only be won or lost in and around the United
Kingdom. During the period in which we are building up our
resources with which to win the war, we must ensure that we do not
lose it at home, by taking too great risks in strengthening our
forces overseas.

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