SUPPLEMENT No. 1 TO AGENDUM No. 135/1941 [1]-SINGAPORE CONFERENCE-
APRIL, 1941. WASHINGTON STAFF CONVERSATIONS-MARCH, 1941

(The Chiefs of Staff [2] were present for the discussion of this
subject).

The following papers were considered [3]:-

(a) Report of the American-Dutch-British Conversations at
Singapore, dated 27th April, 1941.

(b) Report of the British-Dutch Conversations at Singapore, dated
27th April.

(c) Report of the United States-British Staff Conversations at
Washington dated 27th March.

(d) Memorandum dated 11th May from the Leader of the Australian
Delegation to the Singapore Conference 1941 (Sir Ragnar Colvin)
and report by the Australian Chiefs of Staff dated 14th May on the
above papers.

MAIN FEATURES OF REPORTS
2. The Chief of the Naval Staff (Admiral Sir Ragnar Colvin)
outlined the main features of the reports, and gave his
observations thereon.

The report of the American-Dutch-British Conversations embodied
plans for the conduct of military operations in the Far East on
the hypothesis of a war between Germany, Italy and Japan on the
one hand, and the British Empire with its present allies and the
United States of America on the other. The plans were based on the
conclusions reached at the United States-British Conversations at
Washington.

Plans for a war in the Far East on the basis of American
neutrality were contained in the report of the British-Dutch
conversations, which also cleared up outstanding points arising
out of the Anglo-Dutch-Australian Conference of February, 1941.

The report of the United States-British Conversations set forth
the general strategic principles which should guide the military
collaboration of the United States and the British Commonwealth
should the United States be compelled to resort to war.

3. During the discussion which took place on this subject,he
expressed the following views in reply to enquiries made by the
Minister for the Army [4]:-

(i) Invasion of Australia. In regard to the statement made in the
report of the American-Dutch-British Conversations (paragraph 12)
that attacks on Australia can be ruled out initially, the Chief of
the Naval Staff stated the word 'attack' was intended to be used
in the sense of invasion, which conforms with the basis accepted
in previous reports of recent Singapore Conferences.

Provided that Singapore and the Netherlands East Indies should
hold out, he was of opinion that, at the most, Australia might be
subjected to intermittent bombardment from raiding cruisers and by
a sharp cruiser-borne raid on vital areas, the raid in such
instances consisting of not more than a force of 100 men or
thereabouts.

(ii) Attack through New Caledonia. Sir Ragnar Colvin suggested
that it was unlikely that New Caledonia would be occupied by
Japanese forces if Singapore should hold out.

(iii) Battleship attack. He expressed the view that an attack on
Australia by battleship was unlikely in view of the distance from
Japanese bases and the danger to its lines of communication. Japan
would also be unlikely to sacrifice one of its older battleships
for the moral advantage of an attack on Sydney. Such an attack was
possible but not probable, as Japan had no convenient docks or
repair establishments even in the Caroline or Marshall Islands,
and with Singapore and Borneo intact would be taking a big risk
for very little gain.

(iv) Australia as source of supply to Malaya. It was suggested to
the Chief of the Naval Staff that there might be good reason for
Japan to attack Australia, as she was, in effect, the main source
of supply to Malaya. The Chief of the Naval Staff agreed that, for
this reason, such an attack might be given consideration by Japan,
but nevertheless the risk was very great and if such an attack
were contemplated, it would probably be made by an armed merchant
cruiser.

(v) Australian Land Army in initial stage of war. In reply to the
Minister for the Army, Admiral Colvin stated that a land army on
the present basis contemplated by the Government would not be
required in Australia in the initial stages of a war, except for
training as a contingency against the fall of Singapore and the
Netherlands East Indies.

(vi) Convoy System. The Chief of the Naval Staff agreed that the
convoy system proposed in the report would slow up our trade in
view of the time that would necessarily elapse between convoys,
but nevertheless it would considerably aid the scheme for the
protection of merchant ships, which would proceed in convoys of 12
to 14 per month.

UNITED STATES VIEWS
4. Note was taken of the principal United States views summarised
in the report of Sir Ragnar Colvin, as follows:-

(a) Europe and the North American Atlantic Seaboard were the vital
areas.

(b) Singapore, while very important, was not in the United States
view absolutely vital, and its loss, while undesirable, could be
accepted. This view was not accepted by the British Delegation at
Washington.

(c) The United States intention was, while maintaining a Naval
Force at Hawaii superior to the Japanese, and thus protecting the
West American Seaboard and sea communications in the Pacific, to
use its Navy principally in the Atlantic, and they would, if
necessary, reinforce their Atlantic Fleet from their Pacific
Fleet.

(d) They intended to use the United States Pacific Fleet to
operate offensively against Japanese Mandated Islands, and
Japanese sea communications, and to support British Naval Forces
in the South Pacific.

(e) They did not intend to reinforce their Asiatic Fleet.

(f) They expected that the Philippine Islands would not be able to
hold out very long against determined Japanese attack, and were
anticipating being forced to withdraw from these islands.

(g) They were prepared to provide sufficient capital ships for the
Atlantic and for Gibraltar as would permit the release from these
areas of British capital ships for reinforcement of the Naval
Forces in the Eastern theatre.

In regard to sub-paragraph (g), reference was made to War Cabinet
Minute No. (1026) [5] regarding the proposed transfer of the major
part of the American Pacific Fleet to the Atlantic, in which the
need for the early reinforcement of Singapore was stressed
(cablegram No. 269 of 4th May to Secretary of State for Dominion
Affairs [6]).

DECISIONS OF WAR CABINET
5. War Cabinet were in agreement with the plans for military co-
operation outlined in the above reports. The following
observations and decisions were recorded on the aspects indicated
hereunder:-

(a) Unified Strategic Command-Far Eastern Theatre. (Section V,
A.D.B.; paragraphs 22 to 28 of B.D.) [7] The following
arrangements for unified strategic command of naval and air forces
operating in the Eastern Theatre were agreed to:-

(i) The British Commander-in-Chief China, will exercise unified
strategical direction over all the Naval Forces of the Associated
Powers in the Eastern Theatre (including Australia), except those
employed on local defence or operating under the Commander-in-
Chief, United States Asiatic Fleet. Part of the United States
Asiatic Fleet will, however, come under the Commander-in-Chief,
China, immediately, and the remainder under his strategic
direction when Manila becomes untenable.

(ii) The Commander-in-Chief, Far East, is to exercise similar
strategic direction of such Air Forces as the Associated Powers
may make available. Insofar as Australia is concerned, the Air
Forces available will not exceed two bomber squadrons, to be
allotted to the Ambon-Timor area.

(Note: This was approved by War Cabinet in Minute No. (909) [8]).

(iii) Operational control will continue to be exercised by the
various authorities as at present, except at Ambon, where a
Combined Headquarters is to be formed (War Cabinet Minute No.

(986) [9]) and at Timor, where, as already agreed, land forces are
to be under the control of an Australian Commander. It was noted
that there is little possibility of strategic offensive action by
land forces and a localised strategic policy is already
established for land forces.

(iv) The above arrangements are subject to the right of any
Government to withdraw or withhold its forces, provided that prior
information of such intention is passed to the strategic Commander
concerned.

The Chief of the General Staff stated that detailed arrangements
in respect of command of troops at Ambon were being discussed with
the Netherlands East Indies authorities, as authorised by War
Cabinet in Minute No. (986), and he would submit a report to War
Cabinet as soon as negotiations were completed.

(b) Initial Disposition of Naval Forces (Appendix 1, A.D.B. [10])
In the list of initial dispositions and functions of Naval Forces,
one Australian 6-inch cruiser is shown as operating in North
Australian waters to escort troop convoys to Ambon, Koepang and
Singapore, and is then to be at the disposition of the Commander-
in-Chief, China. This is a new commitment resulting from the
stationing of Australian Military and Air Forces in the
Netherlands East Indies, thus being outside the area of Australian
Naval operational control. War Cabinet approved of this
arrangement.

(c) U.S. Naval and Air Support (Paragraphs 42 and 71 (a), A.D.B.)
The extent of the support to be afforded by the United States to
British Naval and Air Forces south of the Equator is not defined
in the report. It was noted that the United States Delegation had
undertaken to make enquiries in this respect and that the matter
had also been taken up through the Australian Naval Attache,
Washington. [11]

(d) Reinforcement of Singapore. Note was taken of the view of the
Commander-in-Chief, Far East [12], (referred to in paragraph 18 of
Sir Ragnar Colvin's report) that the reinforcement of Malaya by
land and air forces since October last had so materially
strengthened their position that he was most optimistic as to the
ability of Singapore to hold out, and to continue to operate as a
Fleet Base.

Sir Ragnar Colvin stated that he understood that developments in
Iraq had resulted in the diversion of forces otherwise available
for Singapore.