Please give the following, which is brief review by our military
advisers of the present strategic position, to the Prime Minister
[1] for his most secret and personal information.

BEGINS.

1. Invasion of the United Kingdom probably remains Germany's 1941
objective. Apart from the battle of the Atlantic enemy's main
effort now is directed to capture of Egypt.

2. Middle East. Threat to Egypt from the West is more immediate
than from the North. Maintenance alone limits enemy air and land
strength in the Western Desert. Possession of Crete increases
threat to Alexandria base and fleet in eastern Mediterranean. It
will enable the enemy to establish direct supply route via West
Coast of Greece to Cyrenaica in addition to Italy-Tripoli line.

3. By an early land advance we may be able to secure Cyrenaica
aerodromes from which to attack Greece-Cyrenaica line and protect
our own communications to Malta on which interference with Italy-
Tripoli line depends.

4. Threat from the north through Turkey and/or Syria is less
immediate. Even with full Turkish co-operation estimated that it
would take six weeks to concentrate eight German divisions on
Syrian frontier.

5. German sea-borne expedition to Syria is a danger. Forces
transported and maintained by air alone would be strictly limited,
though a threat to alternate naval base at Haifa and to general
stability in Palestine and Iraq. Cyprus valuable to enemy to cover
his sea communications and as air base, but we have insufficient
forces to make it impregnable. Measures now being planned to
secure early control in Syria.

6. In Iraq, an outpost of India, we must have good base at Basrah
from which to protect Abadan oil and overland communications to
Haifa and Turkey. We are striving to clear up Iraq before
effective Axis aid can arrive. Forestalling Germans in Syria is
most important for this.

7. Air Forces in Egypt are being reinforced by every possible
means and armoured formations increased and re-equipped.

Liquidation of East Africa is releasing some forces for use
further north.

8. Western Mediterranean and North-West Africa. Without reducing
effort elsewhere, Germany could occupy Portugal and Spain,
including Spanish Morocco. Neither country is likely to offer
serious resistance, and, even if we had forces available, they
could not arrive in time to help either in Europe or Africa.

Gibraltar would hold out, but be useless as a naval base. Enemy
control of Straits would react badly on naval operations in the
Mediterranean. We should have to deny Atlantic islands to Germany
and obtain a base in them in lieu of Gibraltar. It will be
difficult but vitally important to avoid being forestalled by the
Germans in those islands.

9. Such German action would directly threaten the United States
and their interest and support in this area would be invaluable.

10. United Kingdom. Invasion is not imminent, since it would take
Germany up to eight weeks to bring back necessary air forces from
the Middle East. Scale of invasion is estimated at six armoured,
four air-borne and 26 infantry divisions. Five to seven days would
elapse before concentration of naval forces against the enemy sea
communications could be completed.

11. We are confident of maintaining air superiority so long as our
aerodromes are adequately defended against all forms of attack.

Our chief weakness is in armoured forces which are now less than
half strength considered necessary for security. Equipment is
short and many formations only newly constituted. Infantry is
widely dispersed owing to length of vulnerable coastline and
demands for defence of aerodromes and vital points.

12. We have had to take risks with our land strength at home,
particularly in tanks, to meet the needs of the Middle East.

Nothing sent overseas can be brought back within limited period of
warning. Land strength at home cannot be sensibly reduced this
summer.

13. Far East. Security of Singapore remains vital interest, since
on it depends our ability to secure the sea communications of
Australia, New Zealand, India and the Far East. Fortunately
Japanese intervention is even less an immediate menace than
invasion of the United Kingdom. Fear of American intervention must
be a powerful deterrent. Nevertheless the menace remains and
before Singapore is secure more anti-aircraft and anti-tank and
field artillery and air forces must be sent.

14. General. Lack of equipment makes it impossible to meet all
demands, and being on exterior lines to enemy superior in land and
air forces greatly adds to the difficulties of allocation. Risks
must be accepted but security of vital points must not be
jeopardised. ENDS. [2]