1. In continuation of my P.M.49 [1], the meeting with MacArthur
[2] today was convened to achieve the following purposes:-

(i) That the Australian Government might ascertain the views of
the Commander in Chief as to the forces necessary for the defence
of Australia as a base for offensive operations and for the
ultimate offensive itself.

(ii) That the Government could then relate its policy to the
general plan in respect of the forces, war equipment and supplies
which it can provide towards the common end.

(iii) That the Government could support the plan of the Commander
in Chief through its representatives on the United Kingdom War
Cabinet and the Pacific Councils in London and Washington, in
order to secure the provision of the forces, war equipment and
supplies which are necessary for its fulfilment.

2. MacArthur was in entire agreement with the following
observations that were submitted:-

(a) Security of Australia as a Base for Offensive Operations
(i) The Australian Chiefs of Staff have indicated that the defence
of Australia as a base for offensive operations can be secured by
adequate naval and air forces, otherwise extensive land forces are
necessary. [3]

(ii) The United Kingdom Chiefs of Staff have replied that this is
a matter between Australia and United States of America, and the
aim should be to build up land, air and local naval forces in
Australia to a point where they can stand without the immediate
support of the United States fleet and can hold out until the
United States fleet can sever the communications of an invading
force. [4]

(iii) The Australian Government understands that, in addition to
certain miscellaneous troops, two United States of America
divisions are so far definitely assigned to Australia.

It has been advised by the Minister for External Affairs of the
number of aircraft allocated to United States forces in the
Australian area. [5]

In regard to naval forces, no advice has been received of any
increase or intention to increase the American strength in the
south-west Pacific area.

(iv) The directive of the Commander-in-Chief imposes on him the
following obligations [6]:-

(a) Hold the key military regions of Australia as bases for future
offensive action against Japan, and strive to check Japanese
aggression in the south-west Pacific area. In view of the
responsibilities of the Combined Chiefs of Staff in Washington to
deal with the grand strategy of the war, which presumably implies
the duty of allocating forces and equipment to theatres of
operations, it is essential that a clear indication should be
given of the programme of intended allotments to the south-west
Pacific area. In their statement of policy for the near future,
the United Kingdom Chiefs of Staff stated in March that it was
essential to provide reinforcements as quickly as possible to
safeguard essential points vital to the continuance of the
struggle against Japan, such as Australia. [7]

(b) Offensive Policy
(i) The directive of the Commander in Chief provides as follows:-

Prepare to take the offensive.

(ii) The United Kingdom Chiefs of Staff state that, for the
present, we must remain strategically on the defensive, both in
the Indian and Pacific Oceans, until the minimum defensive
strength has been built up, until the United States Pacific fleet
has regained parity with the Japanese and the necessary offensive
in forces and equipment are ready. [8]

(iii) It is essential that the Combined Chiefs of Staff should
indicate the programme for the allotment of forces and equipment
to the south-west Pacific area.

(c) General
(i) It is of interest to note that the United Kingdom Chiefs of
Staff, in intimating on 3rd April that the defence of Australia is
now a matter to be concerted between Australia and United States
of America, qualify the degree of American support by stating-
'There is a danger that by over-insurance in Australia we may
prejudice the building up of adequate forces in the Middle East
and India. We also have to consider Russia who is likely sooner or
later to come into conflict with Japan.' [9]

(ii) The south-west Pacific area is the only one with unity of
command. This provides for directness of action and promptness of
decision. It is of vital importance that these advantages should
not be discounted or lost through tardiness in laying down a
clear-cut plan and providing the necessary forces and supplies for
its fulfilment.

3. MacArthur is now to work out with the Chiefs of Staff a
statement of his case for the forces and equipment he requires.

4. As you will have read, the Australian combat forces were
assigned to the Commander-in-Chief at midnight on 18th April [10],
and all arrangements are running smoothly. However MacArthur has
not yet received his directive from his own Government.

CURTIN