In view of the situation which appears to be developing as
outlined in my Despatch No. 12 [1] and your personal telegram to
me No. 1996 [2], I think it may be as well to think out for
ourselves the way in which the situation is likely to develop. As
I see it the President and the British are preparing for a full
discussion on Dependencies at the next important meeting on World
Organisation and the asperity in tone of the British telegram [3]
to Australia and New Zealand may be taken as indicating that the
British and U.S. views are far apart and they fear that our ideas
on supervision may lean to the U.S. point of view.

I entirely agree, if I may say so, with the view expressed in your
telegram that it is desirable to come to a satisfactory
arrangement with Great Britain and that future discussions should
be confidential and provisional in character. I was a bit afraid
of a public discussion and of course there is little likelihood of
our carrying a policy opposed by Great Britain, little chance of
doing it indeed unless we convert her to our views.

It must not be forgotten that your Wellington resolution [4]
proposes a universalisation of the Mandate System-its application
to all Colonial dependencies. I have for years advocated this, but
it must be admitted that it is a large order. A number of powers
like Netherlands, Belgium, will oppose it and rather than agree to
it will oppose the whole system. Portugal and Spain will, I
presume, not be among the United Nations and their Colonies will
be held as at present. The early announcement of your views will
not only set these powers working against the system but may
create a certain amount of antagonism to us. This raises an
interesting tactical question. Great principles of this kind are
not realised without public advocacy but on the other hand logic
does not play much part in international settlement. They are not
likely to be implemented without a lot of finesse and the
mustering of forces in their favour. If we want to get anything
through, we must make a most careful appreciation of the alignment
of forces for or against it, and in this we must take account of
interest as well as principles. Frankly, I would have been happier
if the declaration had not referred to any extension of the system
to dependencies not involved in the war. The question of extending
it could be brought in when the main principle was accepted. There
was little prior discussion of the Mandate System before it was
brought before the Peace Conference at Paris in 1919. But it was
accepted without much question because Britain and U.S. had
determined on it.

If the case for Mandates has to be argued over again there are
several important points that should be developed.

(1) Strategical
The mood of some people is that the Mandate is an idealistic
device which failed because the Japanese Islands were fortified.

This is a very shortsighted view. The fortification of the
Japanese Islands could have been prevented if there had been a
system of inspection. The new World Security System will be based
apparently upon an international Air Force which will require
bases which can be held. A series of isolated bases over the world
will apparently be chosen. It seems to me to be obvious that this
system will not work if in the country surrounding the bases the
local state can build up extensive military installations. Neither
an International Air Force nor an International Police Force can
operate if armaments are built up in territory adjacent to the
bases from which they operate. The value of the Mandate System is
that large areas of territory can be held on terms which forbid
the construction of bases of operation and in which preparation
for war can be confined only to these bases which are required for
an International Police Force. This, of course, presupposes a
World Security System backing up the International Police Force.

But if we do have an effective International Security System then
the larger the area which can be regarded as militarily passive
the better, the less the strain on the forces used for the
Security System. Of course, if the Security System broke down such
areas would be vulnerable but the fact is that the Colonial areas
are now vulnerable as has been shown in the war.

(2) Political and Economic Development
I suggest also that the Mandate System is the only way in which
the political development of dependent territories can be secured.

Undeveloped States can only go through the discipline required for
the satisfactory growth of political institutions if they are free
from fear of military attack. Such a fear inhibits all the freedom
of expression and action which are necessary for democratic
institutions. The influence of the Mandatory Power may not of
course be sincerely applied for this purpose, and that is why some
responsibility should be acknowledged to a general International
Authority. There is a rather naive idea in U.S.A. that all human
groups are capable of self-government and are prevented from
exercising these privileges by sinister influence. I will deal
with some of these ideas later but the main reason why it is
difficult to develop political institutions in backward countries
is that there are no economic foundations for them. The Mandatory
Power should therefore assist in the economic development of the
country and not only in the production of crops for world markets,
but in the improvement of living standards. This will not be
possible on a large scale unless some steps are taken to promote
international investment. It must not be forgotten that it is easy
for backward peoples to absorb the shibboleths of western
political thought without understanding them and without any
thought of implementing them in any practical way. Thus, the
concentration on purely political controversies is always
unfortunate in a developing state. These doctrines are only real
to people who have some economic status. It is a great pity that
in India both the British and the Indians concentrate purely on
political questions and though the British Raj has done a great
deal of economic development of a primary character it is seldom
referred to and hardly known.

(3) American ideas of Self-Government
These truths will probably come home to U.S.A. when dealing with
the Philippines. These islands have had very little developmental
work done in them, less than in India. The standard of living of
the people is as low as in most other of the Pacific Islands. The
'politicos' are a small class of people educated in Philippino,
and American universities who only know political catch cries. The
industries are capitalistic in form, worked with peon labour and
based on a protected U.S. market. There is a large proportion of
purely primitive peoples. Self-government under these conditions
will be difficult. It remains to be seen what power will be
retained by the U.S.A. when independence is given. That an Asiatic
state can develop itself, set up a stable regime is shown by the
example of Japan. Japan is so far in advance of every other
Pacific power that her military potential makes her a danger,
which will only be formally redressed when other Asiatic races are
developed. Another example is Thailand which was, with very
limited assistance from outside in the form of capital and expert
advice, making a very good attempt to develop her natural
resources and her communications. She had herself done very little
to improve the standard of living of her citizens or check the
pressure of debt. But the point is that Thailand was helpless
against the aggressive power of a better developed nation like
Japan and this would apply to the Philippines and every other
native state in the area.

Another matter to be borne in mind is that in many cases the only
political unity is that created by the Western Colonial power.

This applies to Netherlands East Indies, French Indo-China, Malaya
and Burma. Without the unifying influence of the Western Colonial
powers, each of these would be a congeries of decadent Empires,
small principalities and primitive tribes all mixed up together.

In most cases no community exists. This is what makes the idea of
an Indonesian Federated Republic so fantastic and ideas of simply
conferring selfgovernment absurd. To whom would one give self-
government in Malaya for instance? The Malay princes or the
Chinese? If one favours a democratic constitution the result would
be an internecine struggle between Chinese and Malays.

Corresponding difficulties would be encountered in French Indo-
China and Netherlands East Indies. In Burma would the Hsawbaws [5]
of the Shan states be given their old power?
Moreover, self-government includes the right of conducting
external policy. Experience has shown that these immature states
are incapable of defending themselves in a jungle world and
therefore their external policy is a matter very largely of
chance. The prospect of a number of half-developed states being
given free power of developing policy in this area is not a very
reassuring one. The effect would be to Balkanise the Pacific.

These small powers would come within the influence of a strong
local aggressive power like Japan. The lines of policy would be
uncertain and incalculable. They would have to be brought within a
strong United Nations organisation. I contend strongly that the
best way for the United Nations to work in these circumstances is
by deputing the government and political and economic development
of these territories to strong members of it-in other words, the
Mandate System.

(4) International Government
The President's idea is not clearly defined but it may take one of
two forms, either government by an International Governing
Authority or by smaller groups or Regional Commissions. It is as
well to state succinctly the objections to this type of joint
government. The main objection is that it is impossible to prevent
appointments to the administrative staff from being dominated by
national considerations and usually they are made rateably. When
appointments are made on this basis the appointee regards himself
as responsible not to the international organisation but to his
own nation. This has always been a fatal defect in international
government and it was to get away from this that the Mandate
System was designed in 1919. There is also as a result of similar
factors a confusion of policy in international organisations.

These difficulties were felt in the League of Nations. In spite of
all efforts to avoid them they are felt in U.N.R.R.A. but the most
conspicuous example is the condominium in the New Hebrides. It
would be desirable for somebody who has had experience in the New
Hebrides to write the story in all its gory details.

(5) Regional Commissions The three different schemes of Colonial
Government, that of U.S.A., U.K. and Australia - New Zealand, all
include the formation of Regional Commissions. In the case of
Australia these are intended to secure collaboration by different
authorities within an area in common problems. There is no
question of accountability to or government by these Regional
Commissions.

It is not clear what the purpose of the U.K. and U.S. Commission
is but I think that the President contemplates Regional
Commissions as governing authorities. The British do not appear to
contemplate accounting to the Regional Commission. They certainly
would not agree to government by the Regional Commissions.

I must confess to some concern at the multiplicity of Regional
Commissions, especially if they are only wanted for advisory
purposes. They will all require staffs both for the Commissions
and for the Government concerned and we have found staffing
problems exceedingly difficult. I believe in joint Health Services
and other administrative collaboration. In this respect Regional
Commissions are valuable. But I cannot see that they are of any
value as organs to whom responsibility is due. The regional
principle is fully realised from this point of view if the General
International Authority has two branches, a Pacific and an
Atlantic Branch (see my despatch No. 66 from Chungking [6]). If
however there are too many Regional Commissions the whole system
will break down.

Finally, it seems to me that the difference between the British
and Australian point of view may be due to the fact that the
British are thinking of A and B Class Mandates, the temporary
government of civilised peoples released from enemy control and we
are thinking of C Class Mandates, the government of primitive
peoples in territories of strategical importance. The A and B
Class Mandates may not be required but the primitive peoples will
need a lot of political tutelage.

F. W. EGGLESTON