Now that Dr. van Mook has arrived in Australia [2] and discussions
may be expected on the Netherlands Government's desire to set up a
Netherlands Indies Administration in this country, it may be
useful to examine how far Dutch co-operation may be secured for
the aims of Australian national policy, and to have on record an
account of Netherlands official activities in this country since
the fall of Java.

2. Major aims of Australian policy in the South-West Pacific and
South-East Asia are:-

(1) The formation of a South-Western Pacific zone of security, in
the establishment of which Australia will act with the United
Kingdom, the United States, New Zealand, Holland, France and
Portugal;

(2) Collaboration with other nations to promote the economic
development of the South-Eastern Asiatic and South-West Pacific
region and the welfare and advancement of the indigenous peoples,
looking to the long-term need of political and economic stability
of strength in the area;

(3) The development of communications, especially of air routes,
involving terminal facilities for direct air lines to these
territories and staging facilities there for international trunk
routes;

(4) Co-operation with other powers with major interests in the
area, especially with smaller powers, to ensure that major
political decisions are not decided on a basis of power politics
by the three great powers alone. [3]

3. As the Netherlands Indies is the most important and the nearest
of neighbouring countries, the place in Australian policy of the
Kingdom of the Netherlands (the whole Dutch policy, including
Holland, the Netherlands Indies, Curacao and Surinam) is clearly
of the first importance.

4. While it is very difficult to estimate the probable nature and
strength of the Dutch hold on the East Indies after the war, or to
estimate the importance of the Netherlands in world affairs
generally, it is safe to assume that these will approximate
closely to those prevailing before the war. The whole Dutch nation
will of course have been considerably weakened. Holland will have
been economically disorientated by the German occupation and the
Indies by the Japanese, while in each territory the governing
political and economic class will have been reduced in numbers and
strength. On the other hand assistance in restoring the Dutch
position both in Europe and Asia is likely to be forthcoming from
the United Kingdom on strategic grounds. The United Kingdom
Government has already given a formal undertaking to restore the
Netherlands and its possessions and although leading Dutch
personalities have expressed concern at the possible development
of United States policy, it is unlikely that the United States
will depart greatly from the United Kingdom attitude in this
regard, although the United States might well seek a considerable
voice in the Malaysian [4] settlement. It is therefore prudent to
assume that the pre-war political shape of the Netherlands Indies
will be in the main modified only in so far as this is brought
about by the Dutch themselves.

5. The main indication of Dutch intentions in this respect is
contained in a broadcast by the Queen of the Netherlands in
December, 1942, announcing that a conference would be held after
the liberation of Netherlands territory to discuss the structure
of the Kingdom of the Netherlands 'in order to adapt it to changed
circumstances'. The address contained this statement:-

'I visualize ... a Commonwealth, in which the Netherlands,
Indonesia, Surinam and Curacao will participate with complete
self-reliance and freedom of conduct for each part regarding
internal affairs, but with readiness to render mutual assistance.

It is my opinion that such a combination of independence and
collaboration can give the Kingdom and its parts the strength to
carry fully their responsibility, both internally and externally.

This would leave no room for discrimination, according to race and
nationality. Only the ability of the populations will determine
the policy of the Government.'[5]

6. The outcome of this conference can at present only be guessed.

The creation as its outcome of a fully autonomous Netherlands
Indian dominion is highly unlikely, owing to the economic
dependence of metropolitan Holland on the Indies, the lack of
political consciousness or of administrative experience of all but
a very small number of Indonesians, and the possibly weakened
position of the so-called 'Blijvers', or locally-born European
Dutch. On the whole therefore we shall probably have to deal with
an administration in the Indies of European Dutchmen actuated by
motives of self-interest, reluctant to delegate authority to
Indonesians, severe in repression of nationalist agitation, and
tenacious of the position in the Pacific of Holland as a western
colonial power.

7. This rather unpromising prospect may present very difficult
problems for the development of Australian policy.

8. A primary factor in this connection will be Dutch fear of a
second Asiatic conquest, and a consequent willingness to enter
wholeheartedly into any scheme of South-West Pacific regional
security. The experience of 1941, when the Indies' inadequate
supply of war material could not be augmented from Europe or
America will also lead the Indies administration to look to
Australia as a source of defence materials in time of emergency.

Similarly a sense of solidarity with their western neighbours to
the south may prove a considerable influence on the Indies Dutch
in their relations with Australia, of which Australia may tacitly
take advantage, while, of course, itself following no policy which
would offend Indonesian aspirations, or compromise our long-term
aims.

9. The second important consideration will be Dutch fear of United
States imperialism, or alternatively of internationalist forces in
the United States which would endanger Dutch sovereignty in the
archipelago.

10. A third reason for expecting an accommodating attitude to this
country on the part of the Dutch, both in the Pacific and in
Europe, is the dislike of a small power of the present trend in
which all major decisions are taken by the three great powers
alone without consultation with other United Nations.

11. On both these points there is much to show that the Dutch
agree generally with the Australian Government's views. The Dutch
Foreign Minister [6] on 25th November, 1943, while making it clear
that he understood that 'for Holland there can be no security if
in the rest of the world no safety can be found' expressed the
opinion that security should be ensured by 'an organisation based
on regions, not neglecting the universal factor of an indivisible
peace. Such a thing can only be achieved by the collaboration of
like-minded States'. [7] The Dutch have betrayed anxiety also at
the tendency, mentioned in paragraph 2(4) for vital political
decisions affecting smaller members of the United Nations to be
taken by the three major Allies without those smaller powers being
permitted to exercise an influence commensurate with their
interest. The Australian High Commissioner in London said at the
end of 1942:

'I have gathered from recent conversations that members of he
Netherlands Government have been perturbed by views held in
certain quarters of the United States on European Imperialism and
the future of the colonies in South-East Asia', [8] and the
Netherlands authorities are known to be anxious at the views held
by Mr. Cordell Hull and other American politicians concerning
colonial reorganisation. [9]

12. The commercial connection between Australia and the
Netherlands East Indies was firmly established before the war, but
the value of Netherlands Indies petroleum and tea imported into
Australia greatly exceeded the value of imports from Australia,
although Australian food products found a ready market in the
Indies. There is clearly scope for an expansion of exports which
would contribute not only to Australian commercial progress but
also to the expansion of consumption which is necessary to 'extend
the frontiers of human welfare' as the Atlantic Charter envisages.

The impossibility of obtaining supplies from Europe will be
Australia's opportunity in the immediate post-war years, and the
Dutch have already begun to place orders here in connection with
U.N.R.R.A.

13. In the administrative sphere also, Dutch support may be
expected for a policy of closer collaboration. Before the war
scant attention was paid by the Dutch to their New Guinea colony
and relations between the Dutch and Australian colonial
administrations, although uniformly friendly, were not very close.

However, unprecedented efforts are now being made by the Dutch to
promote a more rapid development of the free zone of New Guinea,
and it is to be anticipated that they will welcome the
establishment of closer relations with the Australian New Guinea
territories. The Dutch are already indebted to Australia for
facilitating the establishment of a school for colonial
administration in Australia.

14. The discussions with Dr. van Mook may present an opportunity
for agreement on a common approach to the major questions with
which the Government is confronted at this stage.

15. For the sake of convenience an account of Netherlands
activities in Australia since the fall of Java is attached. [10]