Examination of Dumbarton Oaks Proposals

[matter omitted]

MR. FORDE said:-

I intend to deal, as Deputy Prime Minister of Australia, with
certain broad principles of the Dumbarton Oaks proposals. At the
conclusion of my remarks I should like my colleague, the
Australian Minister for External Affairs, Dr. Evatt, to make a
more detailed statement on some of the questions involved.

On many occasions the Australian Government has laid it down that,
while hostilities continue, the basic principle of current
Australian policy must be the winning of the war. This objective
has rigorously governed our domestic as well as our external
affairs. We are now, happily, approaching the point where victory
in Europe is in sight. I need not remind this meeting that victory
in Europe will not end the war. There is still a long and hard
struggle ahead in the Pacific and the Far East. We have already
had an assurance from the United Kingdom Government of their
intention to press towards early conclusion of the war against
Japan, and we are confident that with the lessening of war demands
in Europe the effort in the Far East will correspondingly
increase.

The Australian Government has insisted frequently that this is a
global war, in the sense that the war cannot be regarded as over
until victory has been achieved in all parts of the world. It
follows as a consequence that arrangements made as a result of the
cessation of hostilities in any theatre of war should pay due
regard to the requirements in other theatres where the conflict is
still raging. These observations apply not only to the disposition
of forces and of material, but also to any political and other
arrangements which may foreshadow the peace settlements. It will,
of course, be necessary to conclude armistices with enemy
countries at the time of surrender, and to set up associated
machinery for control, but, in our view, no arrangements of a
permanent character should be made with any single enemy until all
our enemies have been defeated. There should also be full
opportunity for all the belligerents to participate in armistice
arrangements, armistice control and preliminary arrangements
connected with the peace settlements.

A second general point in Australian policy is that we are vitally
interested in all the arrangements to be made in regard to
cessation of hostilities and the peace settlements. This interest
is not confined to any single region of the world. Australia has
plainly demonstrated, by going to war in September 1939, by her
employment of forces in the Middle East and in the Mediterranean,
and by the participation of a very large number of airmen in the
European and other theatres, that she regards events in Europe as
being very much her concern. That view has been expressed on
numerous occasions in communications which have passed between us
and the United Kingdom Government on various aspects of the war in
Europe and the arrangements to be made regarding the cessation of
hostilities in Europe. Our interest in Europe derives partly from
our close links with the people of Britain and a realisation that,
if the heart of the Commonwealth is endangered, then the future of
the whole Commonwealth will be imperilled, and partly from the
lesson of history, for twice within one generation we have seen a
war which broke out in Europe grow to the magnitude of a world
struggle.

While insisting on our interest in European affairs, I would refer
to a further point of Australian policy, namely, that because of
our situation we have an even more direct concern with what takes
place in the Pacific, South-East Asia and the Indian Ocean. We
believe that in the course of developing our own national life in
that region we have developed an individual point of view and
gained a specialised knowledge of the circumstances in which we
are placed. On some points our outlook may not be identical with
the point of view of other members of the British Commonwealth
whose most immediate interests lie in other quarters of the globe.

In co-operation with the sister Dominion of New Zealand we have
given very careful thought to some of the special problems of the
region in which we live, and we believe that because of this we
are able to make a useful and necessary contribution to the
conduct of the external relations of the British Commonwealth as a
whole as well as of our own countries. When we speak with emphasis
regarding the situation in the Pacific and the problems which are
arising there, we do so with a sense of responsibility to the
security and welfare of our own peoples, to whom we are
immediately responsible, but also in the belief that emphasis is
necessary in order to ensure that, both in British Commonwealth
affairs and in international relations generally, those problems
are not overlooked.

We do not wish to treat the affairs of this region as rigidly
separate. Some of the problems of our region have their
counterpart in other regions. Whatever arrangements are made
regionally should be made within the framework of the proposed
World Organisation.

I stated earlier that the winning of the war was the immediate and
current objective of the Australian Government. Beyond this we
believe that a concerted effort can and should be made to use the
opportunity which will be afforded by Allied victory to establish
in all parts of the world a peace which will afford 'to all the
men in all the lands a prospect of living out their lives in
freedom from fear and freedom from want'. In some quarters
nowadays there is a tendency to suggest that the Atlantic Charter
is unrealistic, but for our part we still regard it as a noble
statement of objectives and we will continue to strive for the
attainment of its objectives, particularly those set out in the
third, fourth and fifth principles of the Charter. [1]

We in Australia are not alone in feeling that it would be wrong to
over-emphasise the importance, for the security and the
maintenance of peace throughout the world, of what I may call the
'security' aspects of the proposed World Organisation. Wars cannot
be prevented merely by the process of suppressing them. They can
be prevented only by building such an understanding and mutual
helpfulness and tolerance among the peoples that war will no
longer appeal as an instrument of national policy. To say that,
however, is merely to express an ideal. To realise that ideal will
require constant and unremitting effort by all men and all peoples
of goodwill. It is for that reason that we desire to see a greater
emphasis placed, in the machinery to be set up at San Francisco,
on the more positive aspects of the great task of making and
keeping the peace. That means that we wish to see a more vigorous
grappling with the economic and social causes which in the past
have underlain so many of the world's confusions and conflicts. We
desire not only to see an amplification of the field within which
the effort to peace will be exerted, but also to ensure a wider
and more binding assumption of obligations and responsibilities by
the constituent members of the new World Organisation. This, we
realise, involves some modifications in the proposals which are
now before us, and at the appropriate time we shall bring forward
our own suggestions for their improvement along these lines.

On a previous occasion, speaking at the conclusion of the
Conference held at Wellington last November between the Australian
and New Zealand Governments, I summed up our policy in two words-
security and welfare. We are concerned both with the maintenance
of peace against aggression and with the creation of conditions in
which peace will be possible. We recognise that to achieve our
objective we must have, on the one hand, a guarantee of security
so that any threat to peace can be suppressed by the combined
forces of peace-loving States, and, on the other hand,
collaboration between all nations to ensure that poverty is
reduced, employment maintained and standards of living raised in
all countries. The amendments which we will suggest to the
Dumbarton Oaks proposals will be designed to serve those
objectives.

In our position of comparative isolation, we probably have as much
to gain from international co-operation as any other country. We
believe that only by international co-operation can many of the
material ills which afflict the world be remedied, and that only
by working together under the leadership of the Great Powers can
we obtain the reasonable prospect of military security which is
necessary to allow any country to proceed vigorously and hopefully
towards the progressive improvement of the conditions of its
people.

We extend these principles beyond our boundaries to the people of
neighbouring lands, the majority of whose population live under
conditions which, comparatively at least, can only be described as
backward; and it is our earnest hope that the system of
international co-operation finally established will be
comprehensive enough to assure to these peoples, as well as to
ourselves, the opportunity of attaining higher standards.

Having this outlook, it is necessary that we should place a very
high value on the success of the San Francisco Conference and the
early establishment of a General International Organisation which
will provide improved means for international co-operation in both
security and welfare.

With your consent, Mr. Chairman [2], I should now like my
colleague, Dr. Evatt, to develop in detail our views on some of
the matters which I have outlined in general terms.

DR. EVATT said:-

I desire to refer in general terms to some aspects of the
Dumbarton Oaks proposals for World Organisation. We in Australia
strongly endorse the decision to proceed at once with the
establishment of permanent machinery, directed first towards the
maintenance of world peace and, secondly, towards the promotion of
economic and social welfare. We think there is a far better
prospect of enduring peace settlements if they are made against
this background, and subject to the operations of an established
world system of security, than there would be if the settlements
had to be made piecemeal after the overthrow of our enemies.

The kind of World Organisation that Australia desires to see
established was sketched out, in principle, in twelve resolutions
drawn up at the Australia - New Zealand Conference at Wellington
in November 1944. [3] These resolutions are printed as Annex 'C'
in the paper numbered B.C.M. (45) 4 [4], which has been issued by
the Government of the United Kingdom.

As we have already stated at this Conference, we accept and
endorse the Dumbarton Oaks plan in its broad outlines. We shall
propose amendments, both in principle and in detail. In
essentials, however, we think that the plan does embody a workable
procedure by which international disputes which may lead to war
can be adjusted promptly; by which a threat to use force will be
countered not by the single State threatened, but by the authority
of the whole organisation; and under which the Organisation will
have control of sufficient military force either to prevent or to
make a quick end to any armed conflict.

THE 'MIDDLE POWERS'
The approach of Australia to the Organisation supports in
principle that outlined in the speeches and despatches of the
Canadian Government. We think there is need to recognise the
distinctive position of the nations which are coming to be called
the 'middle Powers', but which, in effect, belong (like the five
Great Powers) to what may be called the 'Security Powers'. I am
interested to find that this view has been expressed also by the
Governments of France and of the Netherlands. We feel it is
vitally important, if the Organisation is to be effectively
established, to place the responsibility for leadership upon those
who-as the French Government memorandum puts it-'will undertake an
obligation to participate, and will have the means of
participating, to a substantial degree in the active defence of
world order'. Australia herself belongs to this category of
Powers.

THREE MAIN ISSUES
The paper circulated by the United Kingdom Government contains
communications which suggest a number of changes in the Dumbarton
Oaks text. [5] These can readily be discussed later, in the order
in which they appear. At this stage, however, I wish to deal with
a few matters of principle that are not explicitly raised by the
paper that has been circulated. I shall mention briefly-
(i) the role assigned to the Security Council in the settlement of
disputes, and the principles on which the Council should act in
these matters;

(ii) the role assigned to the World Court in the organisation of
peace;

(iii) the provision made for the amendment of the Charter.

One of the central questions about the Dumbarton Oaks plan is: how
far the Organisation is pledged to the maintenance of the status
quo, what mechanism exists for orderly and peaceful change, and on
what principles any such change is to be based. Until an answer
has been given to these questions it is impossible to go far in
drawing up a Charter, or at any rate in formulating a statement of
its Purposes and Principles.

These questions require a rather close consideration of the
Dumbarton Oaks text at one or two points. I shall, however, go
into no more detail than is required for seeing what the
organisation is intended to do, and how it is to act.

PROVISION FOR PEACEFUL CHANGE
On these vital matters the Dumbarton Oaks text is neither clear
nor satisfactory. There is, indeed, (negatively) an absolute and
universal prohibition of the use or threat of force in
international relations (Chapter II (4)). In effect, though not
explicitly, this includes the guarantee proposed in No. 4 of the
Wellington resolutions, i.e. a guarantee against any attempt to
impair by the use or threat of force the political independence
and territorial integrity of another member. There is also
(positively) an absolute and universal obligation to settle all
disputes by peaceful means (Chapter II (3)). But there is no
express positive guarantee of either the territorial integrity or
the political independence of members, comparable with Article X
of the League Covenant. The Organisation is clearly not pledged to
the maintenance in all circumstances of the status quo.

On the other hand, the powers of the Security Council to recommend
or prescribe peaceful changes in the existing rights of members
are not clearly stated, nor are the principles that are to guide
its action clearly laid down. The commentary circulated by the
Government of the United Kingdom plainly regards the text as
authorising the Security Council to take cognisance or
jurisdiction of a dispute and to recommend terms of settlement at
the earlier stages, and, later, if the dispute reaches the stage
of an immediate threat to peace or an actual breach of the peace,
to prescribe terms of settlement, under threat of its powers to
impose sanctions if it deems them necessary to maintain or restore
peace. (See Commentary, paragraphs 15-16, 35-37; text, Chapter
VIII (A) (5), (B) (1) and (2)). This interpretation is, in my
opinion, sound, but it is not altogether certain that it is the
correct interpretation, having regard to certain departures at
Dumbarton Oaks from the United States draft, under which the
Security Council would certainly have had the powers in question.

There should be no room for doubt on this point, and the present
text should be made explicit.

The powers assigned to the Security Council under the British
interpretation, place upon it the final responsibility for
recommending, or prescribing, measures of peaceful change. By what
criteria is the Council to be guided?
The text as it stands gives only a vague answer to this question.

The Council is, indeed, required, by Chapter VI (B) (2), to act in
accordance with the Purposes and Principles of the Organisation,
as set out in Chapters I and II. Apart, however, from a general
reference to the 'sovereign equality' of members, the only
indication is that peace and security must not be endangered. As
the Netherlands Government has said: 'Experience shows how easily
this may come to be done by seeking solutions calculated to induce
Powers threatening to use violence from carrying out their threat;

such solutions may well be at the expense of the threatened Power,
however innocent'.

LINKING POWER WITH JUSTICE
Over-insistence on the maintenance of legal rights will not, in
fact, suffice either to settle disputes or to maintain peace. In
the international sphere, as in industrial relations, the majority
of serious disputes arise out of a claim by one party for a change
in the existing legal position, whether territorial or otherwise.

Some balance must therefore be struck between mere adherence to
the status quo, on the one hand, and mere arbitrary interference
with existing rights on the other.

Such a balance may be sought by different methods. It may be
sought, for instance:-

(a) by giving some clearer indication, in the Purposes and
Principles, of the basis on which the Council should act;

(b) by providing that the Council must adopt a procedure specially
calculated to bring about a just result-for instance that the
Council, before making any recommendation or decision, shall refer
the matter for report to, or the finding of facts by, an expert
independent arbitral tribunal;

(c) by providing that, except perhaps in cases of emergency, the
Council's recommendations or decisions shall not be binding unless
concurred in by some other body-e.g., the Assembly; or
(d) by providing something in the way of an appeal from the
Council to some other body (as the Netherlands Government
proposes).

There is a powerful objection to proposals along any lines which
require the concurrence of any other body in recommendations or
decisions of the Council. The terms upon which disputes are
settled are so connected with the maintenance of security that to
divide responsibility may open the door to serious delays and
dangers. in the past, willingness to take enforcement action has
depended greatly on the merits of the dispute concerned. This
condition is not likely to disappear. The moral is to avoid
weakening the responsibility of those on whom the duty is cast to
maintain peace and security. The Assembly, moreover, may well lend
itself to 'block voting', and the existing provision for decisions
by a two-thirds majority, without regard to the position of the
'Big Five' might lead to confused situations paralysing the action
of the whole Organisation.

From the point of view of principle, a possible method of approach
would be by way of a combination of both the first two methods I
have listed-i.e., to lay down general principles as a basis for
the Council's action, and at the same time to require a reference
to an arbitral tribunal before the Council makes its final
recommendation or decision. This would ensure reasonable delay and
an opportunity for full consideration, and would give some
guarantee of a just solution. On the other hand, the risk of delay
in urgent cases must be fully recognised.

PRINCIPLES OF COUNCIL'S ACTION
The principles which are to guide the Council's action could only
be laid down in very general terms. For example, the Council might
be required to act by reference to 'equity and good conscience,
and the substantial merits of the case'. A formula of this kind is
undoubtedly broad. But it is not on that account valueless. It
explicitly links Power with justice. It affords a basis on which,
in the course of time, wise practice and precedent can be built.

We may usefully recall that the Governments of China, France, and
the Netherlands have all laid emphasis on the importance of
including in the Charter some such general formulas.

THE PERMANENT COURT
I turn to a very important point-i.e., the role in the
organisation of peace assigned in the Dumbarton Oaks text to an
International Court of Justice. In this regard the provisions of
the Charter should be amplified. An International Court of Justice
has a vital part to play. Of the alternative courses mentioned in
the text, I agree with His Majesty's Government in the United
Kingdom in expressing a general preference for preserving, though
with necessary changes, the continuity of the existing Permanent
Court of International Justice. That Court was the first
successful attempt to establish a permanent tribunal to administer
the law of nations. The Court has done valuable work.

We think that the World Court should be used to the maximum extent
possible in the service of international peace. It should not
merely be empowered to render decisions and advisory opinions on
questions of international law, but provision should be made for
possible resort to it for the purpose of ascertaining facts which
are of importance for the settlement of disputes and generally for
the work of the organisation.

In one particular we think that the Charter should go further than
it was thought possible to go in the League Covenant or the
Statute of the Permanent Court. In principle it should be a
condition of membership in the Organisation that the member
accepts the jurisdiction of the Court (unless some other tribunal
is agreed upon by the parties concerned) in all justiciable
matters. In principle, also, it should be a condition of
membership in the Organisation that the members should accept or
comply with any decisions rendered by the Court. The experience of
federal communities shows the great value of resort to a judicial
tribunal in disputes that affect the relations of political
communities. We think the time has come to make this a more
prominent feature of international affairs.

AMENDMENT OF THE CHARTER
I next express the opinion that the provisions made in Chapter XI
for the amendment of the Charter are too restrictive. In our view,
it is necessary for the success of the World Organisation that it
should be devised with close regard to the particular situations
with which it will in the early years of its existence have to
deal. We hope an enduring World Organisation will be built, but at
the same time we feel that such an Organisation will have to deal
immediately with an urgent world situation. One suggestion for
meeting this situation is to create a powerful body. Our view,
however, is that the nations should proceed with the attempt to
create a permanent World Organisation, and that the special
circumstances to which I have referred should be met by making the
periodical revision of the Constitution of the Organisation
reasonably easy. In other words, our objective at San Francisco
should be to bring into existence an Organisation which will be
capable of handling the immediate situations, but which will
contain within itself the possibility of further growth and
development.

As I have previously indicated, we attach considerable
significance to the revision of the Charter. The present
proposals, which give any one of the permanent members of the
Security Council an absolute veto on any change, appear likely to
cause the Organisation to congeal into a narrow mould shaped by
the nature of the world situation today, rather than to develop
into an active institution capable of serving the needs of to-
morrow. As an instance, it may prove, in ten or fifteen years'
time, absolutely necessary, in the interests of world security, to
change the list of Great Powers who are permanent members; but any
one of the present permanent members would be able, single-handed,
to prevent such a change.

ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL COUNCIL
The Australian Government attaches far more importance to the
economic aspects of World Organisation than is reflected in
Chapter IX of the proposals, entitled 'Arrangements for
International Economic and Social Co-operation', and than is
contemplated in the functions and powers of the 'Economic and
Social Council'.

We attach importance to the economic aspects of World
Organisation, both because of the importance we attach to welfare
as an end to itself, and also because we believe that a measure of
security can be obtained through the promotion of welfare. As
drafted, however, the Economic and Social Council is not given any
power which will enable it effectively to promote welfare, or
through the promotion of welfare to promote security.

It is our view that the Economic and Social Council should be
strong, by reason of the powers given it, to guide and in some
respects at any rate to co-ordinate the policies of the other
social and economic agencies which the United Nations might set
up. We believe it should be responsible to the Assembly on all
matters but at the same time directed in its activities by a
binding statement of principles and purposes set out in the
Charter. Given such a position and status it could then be
included as one of those 'principal organs' which are stated in
Chapter IV of the draft as forming the General Organisation.

The principles and purposes of the Economic and Social Council
should in our view be associated with the primary objective of
domestic policy, that is the maintenance of high levels of
employment and progressively increased standards of living. The
Australian and New Zealand Governments' insistence on full
employment and higher standards of living as the objective of
international economic co-operation is well known and has been, I
think, accepted in principle by the United Kingdom. In our view,
unless this is the objective of each nation and the basis of
international economic co-operation, the separate objectives of
the specialised organisations cannot possibly be attained.

It is because we believe that all United Nations agencies must
concentrate on the maintenance of high levels of employment as the
most effective means of achieving high standards of living, and
should be prevented from acting in ways which might create
unemployment, that we wish to see the Economic and Social Council
developed into an effective international organisation, bound by
the World Charter to pursue, and see that other agencies pursue,
policies, in the words of the Atlantic Charter, 'with the object
of securing for all improved labour standards, economic
advancement and social security'.

The approach of the Australian Delegation as shown in these
statements corresponds to some extent with that of all the other
Delegations. It would be fatal if the new Organisation were set up
with a rigid constitution and if, as in the Dumbarton Oaks
proposals, any one of the five Great Powers were able to veto
amendments to the Charter. I also consider that greater powers
should be allotted to the General Assembly in regard to the
handling of disputes.

[matter omitted]