PMM(46) 4th Meeting LONDON, 25 April 946, 3.30 p.m.

TOP SECRET

Egypt

1. MR. ATTLEE said that he wished to inform visiting Ministers of
recent developments in the negotiations in Egypt. The British
delegation had reached a position at which they must commit
themselves to formal proposals to the Egyptian delegation. They
had reported that two courses were open to them. The first
alternative was to propose the evacuation of British troops from
Cairo and Alexandria and the removal of combatant troops from the
rest of Egypt. They were satisfied, however, that the Egyptian
delegation would reject these proposals. Insistence on them was,
they felt, likely to provoke serious disorder in Egypt. British
troops would have to be used in an attempt to restore order, and
the resulting situation might be brought before the Security
Council. The second alternative was to offer at the outset
complete evacuation of all British troops from Egypt. This would
take time to complete owing to the extent of the British
installations in the country. Evacuation from Cairo and Alexandria
would be completed first and evacuation from the Canal zone after.

The delegation thought that the Egyptian Government would
recognise that complete evacuation would require a period of
perhaps five years.

The delegation had recommended the second alternative. They had
been much impressed by the strength and unanimity of feeling in
Egypt. They recognised the obvious disadvantages of losing a
British base in Egypt, but they felt that the disadvantages of
attempting to hold it against the hostility of a whole people were
even greater. The offer of complete evacuation would in itself
help to create an atmosphere in which it would be possible to
arrange for British troops to return at a time of emergency or
actual war. Before evacuation was complete, the attitude of the
Egyptian Government and people might become more favourable. They
might come to have a better appreciation of the realities of
foreign policy and of the cost of maintaining full defence
installations on their own.

The United Kingdom Cabinet had discussed the matter on the
previous evening and had decided that in all the circumstances the
path of wisdom was to offer at the outset complete evacuation. The
decision had been a difficult one to take. Mr. Attlee added that
the British objective was to build up a partnership for defence
throughout the area under the United Nations Organisation. The
Egyptians would, he hoped, now be ready to consider such a
proposition.

The visiting Ministers thanked Mr. Attlee for his statement. They
appreciated the difficulty of the situation.

DR. EVATT said that he hoped that the negotiations would in the
result allow elasticity for the building up of a new basis of
defence in the region. There could not be a more unfortunate time
for a weakening of Commonwealth defence arrangements there.

Organisation for Commonwealth Defence
2. The Meeting had before them a memorandum by the Secretary of
State for Dominion Affairs (P.M.M.(46)4) embodying recommendations
by the Chiefs of Staff as to the organisation for Commonwealth
defence.

LORD ALANBROOKE said that the Chiefs of Staff in drawing up their
recommendations had taken as a basis the war-time system which had
been worked out with the United States of a Combined Chiefs of
Staff. He explained the manner in which the United Kingdom Chiefs
of Staff organisation worked. it made recommendations on major
matters of policy to the Defence Committee, which, if need be,
could refer them to the full Cabinet. Once the policy had been
approved, the Chiefs of Staff had machinery for putting it into
execution. In the preparation of their recommendations as to
policy, they had the closest links with other Departments of the
United Kingdom Government.

When the United States entered the war it had been decided to send
a mission to represent the United Kingdom Chiefs of Staff in
Washington, and as a result the Combined Chiefs of Staff
organisation had been formed. This had enabled military plans to
be thrashed out in detail on the Chiefs of Staff level with
constant reference by both the United Kingdom and the American
Chiefs of Staff for their Governments for guidance. Matters of the
first importance had, of course, been dealt with at the highest
level in communications between the Prime Minister of the United
Kingdom and the President of the United States.

The Chiefs of Staff now suggested that a comparable Organisation
throughout the Commonwealth, with representatives of the Dominion
Chiefs of Staff in London and representatives of the United
Kingdom Chiefs of Staff in the various Dominions, would provide an
organisation which could study strategical problems in peace and
also function effectively in war. They hoped that it would also be
sufficiently elastic to allow the central direction of effort in
war to be shifted from the United Kingdom to one of the Dominions
in case of need.

Lord Alanbrooke emphasised that the system they proposed of an
interchange of Service Missions would not involve any encroachment
on the sovereignty of the different Governments of the
Commonwealth which it was, of course, necessary to respect to the
full. Each Dominion Government would retain, as at present, full
authority over their own
Chiefs of Staff and would, he hoped, take the lead in defence
plans for that area.

The despatch of representatives of the United Kingdom Chiefs of
Staff to Australia to cover the activities of the British
Commonwealth Occupation Force in Japan had been in the nature of
an experiment in the system they proposed. In sending this
mission, which might perhaps appear rather overweighted for its
single task, the Chiefs of Staff had had in mind that its duties-
might eventually be enlarged if the system they now proposed was
agreed.

The Chiefs of Staff had hoped that a system, which had worked
efficiently with the United States in the war, would function even
more efficiently amongst the Commonwealth members. It would be
necessary, however, for the efficient running of the system, that
the defence organisation in each Dominion should run on parallel
lines throughout the Commonwealth. He understood there was some
divergence of practice at present. One essential of the system was
that the Chiefs of Staff in each country would be in close
personal contact with the members of their Government. In
Australia there might be difficulty about this as the Chiefs of
Staff had their headquarters in Melbourne whilst the seat of
Government was in Canberra.

LORD ADDISON drew attention to two factors which he thought of
particular relevance in paragraphs 2 and 8 of the memorandum.

First, it was important that any Commonwealth defence organisation
set up must allow for machinery of co-operation with the United
States of America. Secondly, whilst the machinery of government
might differ in each Dominion, he hoped that it would in each case
be founded on the same principles.

MR. CHIFLEY, referring to paragraphs 1-4 of the memorandum, agreed
that in a future major war the Commonwealth must rely on the
active assistance of the United States. This had been proved by
the experience of Australia in the recent war when the United
Kingdom was heavily committed in other theatres. He agreed,
therefore that a Commonwealth defence organisation must include
machinery for cooperation with potential allies. This principle
was also contemplated in paragraph 2 of the paper which he had
circulated (P.M.M.(46)6) [1] relating to regional security in the
Pacific, including the use of bases by the United States.

He had also circulated to the meeting a paper on Australian
Defence Policy (P.M.M.(46)7). [2] He wished to call attention to
three principles set out therein. First, the Governments concerned
must have an effective voice at an early stage in the formulation
of defence policy and in the higher control of planning. Secondly,
responsibility for the development of the defence aspect of
matters relating to regional security in the Pacific should be
assigned to the Australian Government machinery. Thirdly, there
should be Dominion representation in the United Kingdom machinery
corresponding to any United Kingdom representation in the
Australian machinery.

Australia had had considerable experience of working with the
United States Forces in the South-West Pacific area. Though
operational control had been vested in the Commander-in-Chief, a
close link had been established between General MacArthur and the
Australian Government. The Americans had worked through the
machinery of the Australian Government and their machine had been
integrated with it. This was particularly the case in regard to
their extensive supply requirements, for which Australia had been
the source. The same course was followed for the requirements of
the British Pacific Fleet.

The United Kingdom Chiefs of Staff had expressed the hope in
paragraph 3(d) of their paper that the system of defence
organisation now to be set up should be framed so as to allow the
central direction of effort in any further war to be carried out
from an alternative location to the United Kingdom. As mentioned
earlier, Australia would expect to have an effective voice in that
central direction. If it should hap-pen that the central direction
should be transferred to Australia it would, of course, have to
use the machinery of the Australian Government, broadened to an
Empire basis. Mr. Chifley assumed that, under the Chiefs of Staff
plan, the final co-ordination and effective decisions of policy
would be achieved, in the absence of a meeting between Prime
Ministers, by discussion between Governments, each having received
recommendations from the defence organisation in its part of the
Empire.

The United Kingdom Chiefs of Staff had proposed in paragraph 5 of
their paper that each member of the Commonwealth should be asked
to maintain Service Missions in London, who would represent the
views of their own Chiefs of Staff to the United Kingdom Chiefs of
Staff. Similarly, the United Kingdom would maintain a similar
mission in each Dominion. This would enable military views on
Commonwealth defence matters to be co-ordinated before being
referred to Defence Committees. Mr. Chifley said that Australia
contemplated the strengthening of her Joint Staff Mission in
London, but there were one or two points regarding this particular
proposal to which he would call attention.

In the first place, he assumed that in referring to Defence
Committees the United Kingdom Chiefs of Staff had had in mind
committees of Ministers. In Australia the corresponding body would
be the Council of Defence: the Australian Defence Committee
comprised the three Chiefs of Staff and a representative of the
Minister for Defence. It was important that there should be no
confusion owing to the difference in terminology. The Australian
Government contemplated that representatives from other parts of
the Empire should be co-opted to the Council of Defence when it
was dealing with Empire matters coming within its scope and
jurisdiction. The proposals as drafted appeared to involve
centralised control of defence policy. This he was sure would be
politically impracticable.

MR. ATTLEE said that the system proposed provided for consultation
on a staff level only, and it was not intended that military
consultation before reference to Defence Committees should detract
from the responsibilities of Dominion Governments for the final
decisions.

DR. EVATT explained that their chief apprehension was that
consultation between Empire countries on a military level would
mean that a certain measure of agreement had been reached and
opinion would have so crystallised that it would be difficult to
change when the plan was presented to Ministers.

MR. MORRISON said that experience in the United Kingdom showed
that if military problems threw up political considerations,
inevitably guidance was obtained by the Chiefs of Staff either
from the departments concerned or from the Defence Committee or
Cabinet.

MR. CHIFLEY said that that had not always been the experience in
Australia. Members of the Services did not always realise the
political implications of their plans or decisions. He was thus
anxious that there should be political consultation at all levels
in the preparation of military plans.

LORD ALANBROOKE said the danger foreseen by the Australian Prime
Minister was emphasised by the separation of the Chiefs of Staff
Committee in Australia from the seat of Government. He thought
that if they could be brought together (and he understood the
intention was that this should be done) the danger of decisions
being taken by the Chiefs of Staff Committee without political
consultation would to a certain extent be obviated.

He illustrated the manner in which he hoped that a Combined Chiefs
of Staff would work in Australia. He thought it should be possible
to introduce adequate safeguards to ensure that military thought
did not become crystallised before reference was made to
Governments at each end.

MR. NASH said that the memorandum before the meeting gave in
places the impression that the centre of control would be in
London. As he understood it, the intention had been that there
should eventually be an exactly parallel organisation in each part
of the Empire. In that event, and provided that there was an
assurance of adequate political consultation at all stages of
military planning, he was quite ready to accept the proposals in
principle. He recognised that they could not come fully into
operation immediately. He feared, however, that it would not prove
easy to secure as effective co-ordination between five different
Governments as had been secured between the United Kingdom and
United States Governments during the war.

LORD ALANBROOKE said that, while it was the ultimate intention
that the United Kingdom and each of the various Dominions should
be represented in each other country, the conception was that to
begin with only those countries primarily concerned with an area
should have a full Mission of three members in it. Other countries
might maintain a Mission of one member representing all three
Services or no Mission at all. For example, in the Pacific zone
where the Government of Australia would be the controlling
authority, the only countries which at first had anything like
full Missions might perhaps be the United Kingdom and New Zealand.

The Meeting then discussed the proposals in paragraph 6 of the
memorandum and the following comments were made:

Sub-paragraph (a)
MR. CHIFLEY said that the Australian Joint Service Staff would be
responsible to the Australian Defence Committee (which was the
equivalent of the United Kingdom Chiefs of Staff Committee), the
channel of communication being through the permanent head of the
Defence Department.

It was agreed that this was a matter of form rather than a
difference of principle. If the memorandum was to be revised, it
could take account of this point.

Sub-paragraph (b)
MR. CHIFLEY said that in Australia Service Missions would have to
maintain touch not only with the Service Departments but with the
Defence Department, which included the joint services and
interdepartmental machinery and its organisation. There were also
the related Departments of Munitions, Aircraft Production, and
Supply and Shipping.

Sub-paragraph (c)
MR. CHIFLEY said that the Australian Joint Services Staff in
London was being strengthened to provide an agency for advice to
the Resident Minister in London on defence matters.

Sub-paragraph (d)
MR. CHIFLEY said that the strengthening of Australia's Joint
Service Staff in Washington had been related to the work of the
Military Staff Committee of the Security Council. Australia would
expect to be associated with the work of that Committee in
accordance with Article 47 of the United Nations Charter when it
was considering questions of regional security in the Pacific.

In further discussion, MR. CHIFLEY called attention to the
proposal in paragraph 9 of the memorandum that each member of the
British Commonwealth should assume the main responsibility for
joint planning within its own regional area. He said in this
regard that it would be necessary to reach agreement on the
definition of the area. The extent of the military commitments
which any country could accept in that area would have to be
decided by the Government concerned.

MR. CHIFLEY suggested that there was need for more accurate
definition of some of the proposals in paragraph 10. [3] This was
agreed. Mr. Chifley pointed out that the power to take decisions
as mentioned in sub-paragraph (a) would have to be determined by
each Government concerned. The authority to implement decisions as
proposed in subparagraph (c) would, in relation to matters within
the Australian Government's area of responsibility, require to be
taken through the Australian Government machinery. The necessity
for this had been proved by experience during and since the war.

In conclusion MR. CHIFLEY said that it was not desired that the
memo. under consideration (P.M.M.(46)4) should go on record
without these preliminary and provisional observations. It would
be necessary to refer the proposals for detailed examination to
the Australian Government's advisers`, after which they would be
considered by the Government. The proposals could then be reviewed
and a memorandum based on the conclusions could be prepared in
relation to the Australian machinery for further consideration on
the Inter-Governmental level.

MR. ATTLEE summing up the discussions said there appeared to be a
considerable measure of agreement with the main theme of the
memorandum that it was necessary to provide for the maximum degree
of co-ordination on defence matters between the different members
of the Commonwealth, having regard at the same time to their
independent sovereign status. There were, however, certain
reservations to be made on the form of the machinery and the
duties of the proposed Service Missions in order to meet the
differing defence organisations. He suggested that every effort
should be made before visiting Ministers left this country to
reach precise agreement on the principles of the organisation
required and for this purpose he suggested that officials of the
three Governments should meet together to amend the memorandum by
the United Kingdom Chiefs of Staff so as to take account of the
points made in the discussion.

There was general agreement with this view.

MR. CHIFLEY made it clear, however, that he would not be able to
commit his Government to these proposals until there had been an
opportunity for him to discuss them with his advisers and fellow
Ministers in Australia.

Responsibilities for Commonwealth Defence
3. The Meeting had before them a memorandum by the United Kingdom
Chiefs of Staff (P.M.M.(46)5) on the Responsibilities for
Commonwealth Defence. In an earlier memorandum (P.M.M.(46)1), the
Chiefs of Staff had argued that in any future war the war effort
of the Commonwealth would depend on four main support areas-the
United Kingdom: the American Continent: Southern Africa: and
Australia and New Zealand-and on the communications between them.

The memorandum now before the Meeting set out the requirements of
a main support area and the steps which they suggested that the
members of the Commonwealth should take to render their territory
capable of acting as such an area.

Dealing with paragraphs 1 and 2, MR. CHIFLFY referred to the
discussion at an earlier meeting on the fundamental basis from
which the Chiefs of Staff made their approach. (P.M.M.(46)1.)
As had been stated by him, the Australian Government could not, at
this stage, accept the premise of the Chiefs of Staff as a basis
from which to proceed to mutual defence plans and arrangements.

The Australian Government's views on this aspect were expressed in
the paper circulated as P.M.M.(46)8 containing extracts from a
statement to Parliament by Dr. Evatt on the place of the United
Nations in Australian external affairs policy and the future of
international co-operation. [4]

In the paper circulated as P.M.M.(46)6 he had expressed views on
regional security in the Pacific and in P.M.M.(46)7 he had
referred to the method of approach and to planning for a regional
arrangement and for co-operation in Empire defence in respect of
the South-West Pacific area in particular, and also for co-
operation generally.

MR. CHIFLEY said that it was recognised that, in the future,
Australia must make a larger contribution towards British
Commonwealth defence than before the war, and he believed that it
was in the Pacific that this contribution could best be made. The
main factor governing the extent of the contribution was the
appropriate percentage of the national income which should be
devoted to defence.

He emphasised that the approach of the Australian Government to
this question must be governed by the fundamental principles
outlined in the papers relating to external affairs and defence
policy and as expressed verbally by Dr. Evatt and himself.

In paragraphs 3 to 8 of the memorandum the Chiefs of Staff
suggested the extension of industrial activities, an increase in
man-power, the accumulation of materials and supplies, the
provision of facilities for training, the extension of research
and development trials and the formation of an intelligence
organisation.

MR. CHIFLFY and DR. EVATT suggested that the expression 'region of
strategic responsibility' should be used instead of 'main support
area'. This would be more in harmony with the suggestions made in
the memorandum by Mr. Chifley, circulated as P.M.M.(46)7. They
also said that in considering the memorandum it should not be
assumed that war was inevitable against any particular enemy. Such
an attitude would lead to the resolution of outstanding questions
by reference to strategic considerations instead of the principles
of justice and freedom.

MR. CHIFLEY said that Australia had long been pursuing the
development of her industrial potential for war purposes and she
was prepared to co-operate in this to the greatest extent
possible. The proposal for a more even spread of man-power
throughout the Empire was in harmony with Australia's immigration
policy. Equally, the proposal that materials and supplies should
be accumulated in the Dominions was in keeping with her general
views on the dispersion of resources. Arrangements for the
production and storage of stocks would be a matter for examination
in regard to the details of specific proposals. The extent to
which training facilities could be established or maintained for
expansion and use for Empire purposes was a matter for
consideration in relation to other defence requirements and for
examination in regard to the basis on which any such arrangements
would be made. The question of research and development had been
referred to in his memorandum circulated as P.M.M.(46)7. As
regards intelligence, Australia was at present considering the
establishment of a Joint Intelligence Bureau for the Pacific area.

In paragraphs 9 to 11 of their memorandum the Chiefs of Staff
argued that the primary responsibility for the security of each
main support area and for the maintenance in peace of the forces
necessary for it fell naturally upon the member of the
Commonwealth concerned. They suggested that the responsibility
should include responsibility for the strategic co-ordination of
any Commonwealth defence measures throughout the strategic zone of
which each main support area was the heart. They also argued that
the security of the communications linking the main support areas
should be accepted as the joint responsibility of the members
immediately concerned. To this end they proposed discussions on a
number of matters on a staff level.

In paragraphs 12 to 15 of their memorandum the Chiefs of Staff
dealt with areas of strategic importance outside the main support
areas. These areas were: Western Europe, the Iberian Peninsula and
North-West Africa, the Middle East, India, and South-East Asia.

Each member of the Commonwealth should, they suggested, agree to
take all steps, political and military, in those areas for which
they were directly concerned so as to maintain conditions
favourable to the Commonwealth in peace and should also accept
joint responsibility for their defence in war.

Commenting on these parts of the memorandum MR. CHIFLEY said that,
in regard to the defence of the main support areas, Australia
naturally accepted primary responsibility for her own security and
was very willing to make a greater contribution to the common
defence of the British Commonwealth than she did before the war.

But the extent to which she could go would require close
examination. For instance, the proposal to extend her
responsibility to include co-ordination of defence measures
throughout the strategic zone of which she was the centre would
require a careful examination. She might well find that it was
beyond her capacity in men and financial resources. Mr. Chifley
said that he must also make the fullest reservations in regard to
proposals which implied that Australia should accept special
responsibilities in South-East Asia.

The proposal that the security of the main Commonwealth
communications linking the main support areas should be accepted
as the joint responsibility of the members immediately concerned
in each case was again governed by the approach from the aspect of
regional responsibility, but the extent to which Australia could
go was a matter for closer examination and precise determination.

It was considered that the proposed discussion on the staff level
would be premature until the Australian Government had obtained a
better over-all view of the extent of its commitments on the basis
of approach which he had outlined.

MR. CHIFLEY stated that the implications of the following
statements in paragraph 14 were so wide and far-reaching that he
must make the fullest reservations in regard to them:-

'Each member of the Commonwealth therefore should agree to take
all steps, political and military in those areas in which they are
directly concerned, so as to maintain conditions favourable to the
Commonwealth in peace and to accept joint responsibility for their
defence in war.'

He pointed out that this passage absolutely impinged on the
sovereign control of policy by Governments.

The same observation applied to the statement in paragraph 15:

'It seems reasonable that, as this principle develops, besides the
United Kingdom, other members directly concerned should contribute
to the effort required to maintain our position in these areas.'

In his opinion this was a political matter for determination by
the Governments concerned.

In conclusion, MR. CHIFLEY stated that, as in the case of
P.M.M.(46)4, it was not desired that P.M.M.(46)5 should go on
record without these preliminary and provisional observations. He
was agreeable to the proposals being referred to the Australian
Government's advisers for examination in the light of and subject
to the views which he had expressed. The proposals could then be
reviewed and a memorandum on the Australian viewpoint could be
prepared for further consideration on the inter-Governmental
level.

MR. ATTLEE said that he had been much struck by Mr. Chifley's
comment that strategic requirements must be considered in relation
to man-power and financial resources. That certainly was the case
with the United Kingdom. The United Kingdom had very heavy
overseas commitments at present, which were a great strain on her
resources.

THE CHIEFS OF STAFF then gave statistical details of United
Kingdom armed forces overseas deployed to meet their international
obligations and for clearing up the after effects of the war. The
United Kingdom Government hoped to reduce these armed forces to 1
million by the end of 1946, but they could only reach this target
if they were able to withdraw from occupational commitments in
Italy, Greece and Venezia Giulia. Their problems were aggravated
by the possibility of serious troubles in the Middle East and
India, and further complicated by technical developments demanding
increased complements of men to fight and supply the weapons of
war.

MR. ATTLEE said that even when the armed forces were reduced to 1
million they would be much larger than before the war. The
comparable figure before the war was only 450,000. The maintenance
of these forces, a very large proportion of whom were overseas,
was a very considerable burden on the United Kingdom. It increased
her great manpower difficulties and strained her financial
resources. The removal of so large a number of able-bodied men,
moreover, seriously reduced her capacity to earn the foreign
exchange which was now more than ever necessary for her. Mr.

Attlee hoped that the establishment of a system of security under
the United Nations Organisation might in due course enable her to
reduce this heavy burden.

MR. NASH said that the New Zealand Government considered that the
cost of provision for security must in future be shared between
British Commonwealth Governments in such a way as to provide
relief for the United Kingdom Government, who, before 1939, had
borne more of the burden than was her due. Unfortunately, it was
still too early to be sure that the security arrangements of the
United Nations Organisation would be an adequate substitute for
defence measures taken by the British Commonwealth itself. In the
view of the New Zealand Government the responsibility for such
measures ought to be shared between the members of the British
Commonwealth in respect of both financial expenditure and
contributions of man-power and resources. He suggested that an
investigation should be made to ascertain the requirements.

Mr. Nash observed that the proposals made by the United Kingdom
Chiefs of Staff for transfer of industrial facilities implied
drastic changes in the economies of the British Commonwealth
countries concerned and raised far-reaching questions outside the
sphere of defence. Similarly, the proposed transfers of population
carried wide and fundamental implications. While New Zealand would
welcome a great increase in her population in the next fifty years
drawn from the best elements of the United Kingdom population, he
questioned whether the United Kingdom could contemplate with
equanimity the corresponding reduction of her population,
especially if a proportionate transfer was made to other
Dominions. Careful examination of the proposals was, therefore,
required.

LORD ADDISON, summing up the discussion, said that he felt that it
had been most useful and encouraging. He appreciated very highly
the spirit of the remarks by the visiting Ministers. He suggested
that the proposals made by the Chiefs of Staff should be further
considered by officials in the light of the discussion.

There was general agreement with this view.

MR. CHIFLEY said that, as in the case of the memorandum on
Organisation for Defence (P.M.M.(46)4), it would not be possible
for Australian Ministers to commit themselves finally regarding
any proposals without discussion with their advisers and fellow
Ministers in Australia. Nevertheless, he agreed that further
discussions would be of value in clearing the ground.