PMM(46) 6th Meeting (extracts) LONDON, 28 April 1946, 2 p.m.

TOP SECRET

[matter omitted]

Disposal of Italian Colonies
3. The Meeting then discussed the attitude to be taken at the
Council of Foreign Ministers regarding the disposal of the Italian
Colonies. They had before them a memorandum by the Secretary of
State for Foreign Affairs (P.M.M.(46)15) setting out the salient
features of the question.

MR. BEVIN recalled that before the meeting of the Council of
Foreign Ministers in London in September last, the United Kingdom
Government had taken the view that the best arrangement would be
on the following lines:-

(a) Tripolitania to be placed under international trusteeship with
Italy as Administering Authority;

(b) Cyrenaica to be placed under international trusteeship with
the United Kingdom as Administering Authority;

(c) Italian Somaliland, together with British Somaliland, the
Ogaden and the Reserved Areas, to be placed under international
trusteeship with the United Kingdom as Administering Authority;

(d) Eritrea to be given to Ethiopia, except for the North-Western
Lowlands which would be joined to the Sudan.

These proposals had not been submitted to the Council because the
situation was radically altered by the presentation to them of the
United States plan for collective trusteeship and the Soviet
demand for Tripolitania. [1]

The United Kingdom Government thought that the best means of
combating the embarrassing Russian demands was to give conditional
support to the United States suggestion. There was also this
argument in favour of supporting the United States proposal that
it was much to our interest to engage American responsibility in
this field.

The Council of Foreign Ministers had referred the matter to their
Deputies for further consideration and report. During their
discussions, the United Kingdom representative had suggested that
the Peace Treaty with Italy should do no more than provide for
renunciation by her of her rights in her Colonies, the disposal of
them being left over for later settlement by the United Nations.

There were admittedly disadvantages in delay-these were set out
fully in the memorandum before the meeting-but on the other hand
this course would have the advantage of removing one main
difficulty in the way of the negotiations for the peace treaties
and it would perhaps be easier a little later on to see the shape
of things to come.

Mr. Bevin said that he had asked Mr. Byrnes his present attitude
on the question. It appeared that he still remained firmly opposed
to the Russian request but equally firmly in favour of collective
trusteeship. Mr. Bevin said that the subject would be one of the
most important which the Council of Foreign Ministers had to
discuss in Paris and much depended on a satisfactory solution of
it. It was urgent to settle the terms of the peace treaty with
Italy so that some progress might be made with her rehabilitation.

The terms of the armistice, even if some relaxation of them were
allowed, were too rigid to permit of this. He would welcome the
views of Dominion Ministers as to the line he should take. He was
himself inclined to the view that he should continue to press that
the treaty should only provide for the renunciation of Italian
rights, the disposal of the Colonies being left over for later
settlement.

[matter omitted]

MR. CHIFLEY and DR. EVATT agreed that a single trusteeship over
Tripolitania should not be granted to the Soviet Government. This
was not because there were strategic objections to this course but
because Russia had no grounds of principle or justice for her
claim. Nor did return of any of the colonies to Italy seem to them
a good solution, for, as the inhabitants harboured a violent
antagonism against Italy, it would invite further trouble. If
there was to be an individual trustee, the British Commonwealth
had the superior claim. The decisive actions in Africa had been
won by the forces of the British Commonwealth. Individual
trusteeship would probably be more efficient than joint or
collective trusteeship. Collective trusteeship by the United
Nations Organisation was experimental because there might be top-
heavy administration, and it should be noted that the United
States Government had not suggested collective trusteeship for the
Japanese islands in the Pacific in which they had a special
interest themselves.

The Australian Government were not in favour of delaying a
decision. If the Council of Foreign Ministers did not reach a
decision on the subject, the proper authority for doing so would
be not the United Nations Organisation but the twenty-one former
belligerents who would be represented at the forthcoming Peace
Conference. France, although a member of the Council of Foreign
Ministers, had less right to an effective voice than the Dominions
who would be represented at the Peace Conference. Above all there
was no reason why members of the United Nations, which had taken
no part in the war and had perhaps not even been well disposed to
the Allies, should have any voice in the decision.

DR. EVATT said that the Australian Government was not in favour of
delaying a decision. If the Council of Foreign Ministers did not
reach a decision on the subject, the proper authority for doing so
would not be the United Nations Organisation. It was unthinkable
that a decision should be left to over 50 nations, the majority of
whom had not been active belligerents. The twenty-one former
belligerents who would be represented at the forthcoming Peace
Conference should decide this matter. Dr. Evatt said that his
first reaction to the Russian claim had been to regard it as
frivolous and merely a bargaining counter. She had no claim in
justice.

The aim of trusteeship was ultimate independence. This meant in
the case of Libya that it would eventually become an independent
Arab country. This concession to the Arabs should be taken into
consideration in any Palestine settlement, where the Arabs
continually claimed without justification that they were unfairly
treated.

Summing up his views, Dr. Evatt said that they were, first, a
straight refusal to Russia; secondly, if a single trusteeship was
decided upon, the British Commonwealth or the United Kingdom
should be trustee; finally, if the ideas of the United States for
a collective trusteeship were pressed they should be supported. It
was experimental but it might turn out to be a success.

MR. CHIFLEY said that, in his view, one of the fundamentals of the
present world situation was the necessity for us of British-
American cooperation. It might be helpful to build up the strength
of other countries -of Italy and France for instance-but it was of
infinitely greater importance to cement our friendship with the
United States and to secure their active interest in every part of
the world which was also of interest to us. United Nations
trusteeship of the Italian Colonies as proposed by them would at
least have the advantage that it would ensure that the United
States maintained some degree of interest in these countries.

[matter omitted]