PMM(46) 11th Meeting, Confidential Annex LONDON, 3 May 1946

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CONFIDENTIAL ANNEX

THE Meeting had before them a note by the Secretaries
(P.M.M.(46)19) to which was annexed-
(i) a note on United Kingdom arrangements for research and
development work on atomic energy;

(ii) a note on the proposals for the international control of
atomic energy.

MR. ATTLEE said that, in view of the delicate negotiations which
were at present in progress between the United Kingdom Government
and the Governments of the United States and Canada on the subject
of atomic energy, it was important that there should be no public
disclosure that this matter had been discussed in the course of
the present consultations.

On the question of research and development, the Dominion
Ministers were aware that our work had been based upon the close
partnership with the Canadian and United States Governments which
had grown up during the war. Much of the information which we
possessed derived in part from American and Canadian sources and
we were, therefore, bound to act in agreement with them in the use
which we made of it. We had not yet negotiated a revision of our
war-time agreement with the Americans and they were naturally
anxious, on the one hand, that proceedings before the United
Nations Commission on Atomic Energy should not be prejudiced by
any fresh bilateral understanding, and on the other that knowledge
of American origin should not be spread to a wider circle in
advance of concessions which they might have to make as a result
of recommendations of the Commission. We were still hoping to
reach an understanding with them providing for the full exchange
of scientific and technical information between us; but the
position was delicate and there were at present limitations on our
freedom of action. Subject to these limitations, we were most
anxious that there should be the fullest possible co-operation
between the Governments of the Commonwealth.

Such co-operation might be concerned with any of the following:-

(a) Fundamental scientific research.

(b) Production of raw materials.

(c) Large-scale plants for the production of fissile material.

The position with regard to the international control of atomic
energy was set out in Annex II to P.M.M.(46)19. The United Nations
Commission had not yet begun its deliberations, and its first task
would be to consider what effective safeguards could be devised,
by way of inspection and other means, to protect complying States
against the hazards of violations and evasions. Mr. Attlee said
that, in general, he was inclined to be sceptical about the
possibility of control through an international inspectorate, and
felt that in practice it would probably be necessary to build up
any system of international control by stages.

Mr. Attlee then invited Lord Portal to make a statement on the
United Kingdom atomic energy project.

LORD PORTAL made a full statement explaining the lines on which it
was proposed that the Harwell Research Establishment should be
developed and the progress already made with the setting up of the
establishment. Research and development work on a considerable
scale was expected to start there early next year and the existing
plans for the whole establishment should have been substantially
implemented by July 1947. He emphasised that the services of any
scientists from the Dominions who were considered by Dominion
Governments to be suitable for the work and could be spared for a
time would be warmly welcomed at Harwell. He hoped that Dominion
Ministers would accept in principle the temporary posting of
suitable men for a period of service at Harwell after which they
would return to their own country, and that in view of the
difficulty of direct recruitment at such a great distance, each
Government would accept responsibility for selecting and paying
their own scientists during the period of attachment. If this form
of co-operation were approved in principle, the details could be
discussed at the official level.

Lord Portal explained that the supply of raw materials had a
powerful bearing on policy and that investigations carried out in
recent months tended to show that previous estimates had been
optimistic. We had a fairly clear picture of where substantial
supplies of uranium were likely to be found and there had been
informal discussions with representatives of the Dominions on the
question of carrying out raw material surveys within the
Commonwealth.

With regard to the preparations for large-scale production in the
United Kingdom, the headquarters of the production organisation
had been set up at Risley in Lancashire and the necessary staff
was being recruited. Design work was in hand for the plant
required for the production of uranium metal which would be
carried out at Springfields, near Preston, and the fundamental
research work into the processes used in the purification of
uranium ores and the manufacture of uranium metal had been carried
out. On the basis of this, negotiations for the purchase of the
various raw materials which were required for the processes had in
some cases been completed and in other cases were actively in
hand. It was hoped that production operations would start at the
Springfields factory in September 1947 and that the first uranium
metal would be produced at about the end of that year. Preliminary
consideration had also been given to the question of selecting a
site for the pile and the plutonium separation plant, though it
would be necessary to operate the uranium metal fabrication plant
for a year before sufficient stocks of metal to start the pile
were available. A great deal of other fundamental organisation
work was going on at Risley and steps such as the standardisation
of engineering stores, the development of systems for purchasing,
progressing and programming, and estimating are well advanced.

MR. CHIFLEY said that there was some reason to believe that there
might be in Australia substantial deposits of thorium which could
supplement the available supplies of uranium. It was hoped to
carry out a more careful survey with a view to determining what
quantities of materials were available and meantime the Australian
Government had already taken powers to protect the available
supplies of thorium from exploitation. He asked whether there was
not a danger that too much of the limited supplies of fissile
material available would be devoted to warlike developments, with
the result that possible industrial development would be
handicapped. On the question of international control, it had to
be borne in mind that any scheme of control could be vitiated by
failure to co-operate on the part of any one of the States
concerned.

DR. EVATT pointed out that the Lilienthal Report on the
International Control of Atomic Energy [1] seemed likely to form
the basis of the proposals which would be put before the United
Nations Commission by the United States Government. These
proposals might not be acceptable to other nations since the
implicit assumption in them was that the United States would not
share any information with regard to use of atomic energy for
warlike purposes with other nations until such time as these other
nations could in any event have obtained the information for
themselves. With regard to the proposal that an International
Atomic Energy Development Authority should be set up to conduct
all intrinsically dangerous operations in the nuclear field, the
success of this would seem to depend on the effectiveness of the
proposals for denaturing fissile material, as to which scientific
opinion appeared to be sceptical.

FIELD-MARSHAL SMUTS said that, although the original estimates
made by the Americans of the uranium deposits in South Africa had
been too optimistic, he believed that in fact the amount available
in South Africa would be found to be higher than had been
suggested in the later reports made by British investigators. He
was anxious that the world's supplies of material, which, so far
as could be seen, were limited, should be used to the best
advantage. He was most sceptical about the success of any scheme
of international control, since all the proposals which he had so
far seen appeared to be incompatible with the existing conception
of national sovereignty. He felt, therefore, that the British
Commonwealth should not place too much reliance on the outcome of
the proposals for international control and that in the meantime
every effort should be made to promote research and development
and to find sources of raw materials within the Commonwealth. He
hoped that it would not be found that the United States were
monopolising all the available Canadian supplies.

MR. NASH said that a recent expedition to a remote part of the
west coast of New Zealand had given some reason to hope that some
supplies of raw material would be found in New Zealand. The New
Zealand Government favoured international control and felt that
the right line of advance was that suggested by the Washington
Declaration [2], namely, the consolidation and extension of the
authority of the United Nations Organisation and the creation of
conditions of mutual trust in which all people would be free to
devote themselves to works of peace. Unless an advance could be
made on these lines he did not believe that mere fear of the
results of the use of atomic weapons would deter an aggressor. At
the same time he agreed that in the meantime the members of the
Commonwealth should safeguard their position by developing the
resources available to them.

MR. NOEL-BAKER said that he had been in the United States when the
Lilienthal Report had been published. The conclusions in the
report had not yet been accepted by the United States Government,
but it was not unlikely that they would be put forward by the
United States Government to the United Nations Commission, and it
might be that the concept of an International Atomic Energy
Development Authority would promote that spirit of international
goodwill and co-operation which was the essential basis of any
scheme of international control.

MR. ATTLEE said that the general feeling of the meeting seemed to
be that the members of the British Commonwealth should lend their
support to the establishment of a scheme for international control
under the aegis of the United Nations Organisation. At the same
time, however, it had to be recognised that the successful working
out of such a scheme was problematical, and it was essential that
we should go ahead in the meantime with research and development
and with the exploitation of raw material resources within the
British Commonwealth. For this purpose it was desirable that all
the raw material possibilities in the Commonwealth should be fully
surveyed, and he hoped also that Dominion Governments would be
willing to help forward the United Kingdom programme of research
and development by lending scientists to serve for agreed periods
with the team at Harwell. He thought there was general agreement
that we should do all we could to co-operate together in these
matters.