Skip to main content

Historical documents

81 Beasley and Makin to Evatt

Cablegram 946 LONDON, 9 February 1946, 11.52 p.m.

TOP SECRET

1. Your 686 bases. [1]

2. A Conference was held this morning [2] between representatives
of the Commonwealth governments. Addison briefly reviewed the case
and referred to the Australian proposal to widen the contemplated
purposes of discussion and hold a Conference at Canberra.

3. We spoke of the impossibility of settling the question
piecemeal, of our main concern in the whole of the Pacific, our
particular interest in Manus and aviation bases and our objections
to a Conference at this stage with limited objectives.

4. Fraser and Addison both felt they had committed themselves to
Byrnes to hold such a Conference and that it would create
misunderstanding if they withdrew the proposal which the United
States had accepted. They emphasised that this advance was a good
one and should not be jeopardised.

5. Further nothing would be lost it was claimed by purely
exploratory and preliminary discussions which would give us at
least a clear idea of what the United States had in mind. We made
the following reservations-
(i) Question would have to be referred to the Australian
Government.

(ii) We wanted it to be understood that at this stage we did not
accept the restricted approach.

(iii) If we entered into preliminary talks we would propose that
the discussion be wider in scope or alternatively that a full
Conference be held later in Canberra.

6. During the general discussion the following points were made by
various speakers-
(i) We had to be careful in regard to our obligations as regards
the Security Council. We had fought hard to get military
agreements strategical areas and regional agreements linked
closely with the Security Council and it might be unwise if we
went right outside the Security Council at this early stage.

(ii) It would be difficult to talk about overall defence in the
Pacific without including the Japanese islands.

(iii) in overall talks would we not have to consider including
France, Netherlands, China and the Soviet Union.

(iv) The Soviet Union was already very suspicious about any prior
British-American understanding about the Pacific Islands and
bases.

(v) The Secretary of State for Colonies asked if anything might be
gained to have talks in London now with Dunn, United States, on
the question purely of the Sovereignty of the disputed islands.

There was no objection to this as islands were British or New
Zealand.

(vi) General Jacob on behalf of Chiefs of Staff wanted
clarification as to whether they should prepare documents for
exploratory talks on restricted or wider basis and stated he would
welcome any Australian staff suggestions as to the matter and the
best method of approach in regard to wide conversations.

(vii) Fraser emphasised his idea was that the Washington talks
were merely informal and private to clear the ground and that if
it were desirable in the light of developments anyone could then
raise wider proposals and the question of further Conference
elsewhere.

1 Dispatched 6 February and responding to Document 55, it sought
information on the progress of negotiations.

2 The conference was held on the morning of 8 February.


[AA:A3300, 46/386]
Last Updated: 11 September 2013
Back to top