Historical documents
Cablegram unnumbered PARIS, 21 August 1946, 1.20 p.m.
MOST IMMEDIATE SECRET
The following is the Text of Statement being released here today 3
p.m. Paris time. It should not be released in Australia. Please
pass to the Prime Minister-Begins-
The Australian Delegation is putting forward a number of proposals
for improving the Draft Peace Treaties. Some of these proposals
are new and take the form of additions and others are amendments.
Our proposals stem solely from a desire to make all settlements
just and therefore more enduring. They are in the main designed to
bring the Draft Treaties more closely into conformity with those
principles of International Relations that have already been
introduced by the Governments who subscribed to the Atlantic
Charter and are signatories of the United Nations Charter.
1. BOUNDARIES
In all questions where boundaries are still in dispute, that is,
where any Nation objects to the proposals contained in the Draft
Treaties the Australian Delegation will suggest the setting up of
Committees to investigate and report on the disputed clause or
clauses. As yet the facts and documents which were placed before
the Council of Foreign Ministers have not been made available to
this Conference. In some cases the basis of the decisions taken
has not been made clear and the Council's reasons for decisions
should be obtained. In this way all the relevant documentations of
the Council of Foreign Ministers will be made available.
These Committees should be asked to report facts so that
subsequent recommendations by the Committee can, so far as
possible, be based on the principles of the Atlantic Charter.
Countries bound by that Charter (including all the 21) agreed:
(1) Their countries should seek no aggrandisement, territorial or
other;
(2) They desire to see no territorial changes that do not accord
with the freely expressed wishes of the peoples concerned;
(3) They respect the right of all peoples to choose the form of
Government in which they will live and they wish to see Sovereign
rights and self-Government restored to those who have been
forcibly deprived of it.
Decisions should also be based on the economic principles of the
Atlantic Charter.
(4) They should endeavour, with due respect for their existing
obligations, to further the enjoyment by all States, great or
small, victors or vanquished, of access on equal terms to the
trade and to the raw materials of the world which are needed for
their economic prosperity.
(5) They desire to bring about the full collaboration between all
Nations in the economic field with the object of securing for all
improved labour standards, economic advancement and social
security.
(6) After the final destruction of the Nazi tyranny they hope to
see the establishment of a Peace which will afford to all Nations
the means of control in safety within their boundaries and which
will offer an assurance that all men in all lands may live out
their lives in freedom from fear and want.
The United Nations Charter also contains principles which should
be applied in the matter of boundaries and in fact reparations[.]
Article 55 states, with a view to the creation of conditions of
stability and wellbeing which are necessary for Peaceful and
friendly relations among Nations, based on the respect for the
principles of equal rights and selfdetermination of peoples,
[that] the United Nations shall promote-
(A) Higher standards of living, full employment and conditions of
economic and social progress and development.
(B) The solution of International economic, social, health and
related problems and International cultural and educational co-
operation.
(C) Universal respect for and observance of human rights and
fundamental freedom for [all] without distinction as to race, sex,
language or religion.
2. ITALIAN COLONIES
The question of the future disposal and administration of the
Italian Colonies should in our view be determined, not by the
Council of four acting alone and jointly (as contemplated in the
Draft Treaty) but by a larger body including representatives of
those countries which liberated these territories and earned a
vital interest in them. Further, we have proposed that a Committee
representing the four invited powers together with three others
chosen by this Conference should make the joint decision in
relation to the Italian Colonies.
Failing agreement within it or by this group of seven nations our
suggestion is that the matter be referred, not to the Assembly of
the United Nations, which will include many neutrals and ex-enemy
states and also many non-belligerents, but [to a special meeting
of the 21 Powers] [1] [which] can be arranged without difficulty
during a meeting of the Assembly.
3. TRIESTE
The Administration of Trieste is not a matter that can effectively
be handled or supervised by the Security Council. Its decisions of
substance can at any time be blocked by the exercise of the
separate veto of the five permanent members. We have suggested
therefore, that the four powers with three other belligerents
elected by this Conference would be more appropriate for the
functions of electing a Governor, receiving his reports and such
matters. Nor is it at all satisfactory that the Treaties should
purport to give to the Security Council the responsibility of
assuring the independence and integrity of Trieste. The Security
Council is not empowered to give so specific a guarantee. This
being the case the assurance is misleading because it will give a
false impression of special protection.
What are the alternatives in the case of Trieste? We would propose
instead that all signatories to the Treaty with Italy undertake to
refrain from the threat or use of force against the territorial
integrity or political independence of the free territory of
Trieste; that is an undertaking parallel to that of Article 2 of
the United Nations Charter. Such an undertaking of all the
Signatories should be effectual and if in spite of that there was
a Breach of Peace or a threat thereto, the Security Council
jurisdiction might be invoked as in any other case of aggression
or threat to Peace.
In our view that is a more satisfactory solution than the
legal[ly] ineffective assurance contained in the Draft.
In respect of the actual delimitation of the Boundary line the
Committee of the Four Powers and three other States elected by
this Conference should we think take the place of the four
Ambassadors who it is suggested in the Draft Treaty are to
determine any question on which there is no agreement.
4. REPARATIONS AND RESTITUTION
Reparations should in our opinion take into consideration:
(I) Actual proved losses suffered by all countries claiming
reparations.
(II) The reasonable capacity to pay [of] all ex-enemy countries
and,
(III) The interest of all those of the United Nations who will be
trading with ex-enemy countries.
In determining amounts to be paid account should be taken of
equipment and goods removed from enemy territories since the
Armistice. A reparations plan should, as far as possible, avoid
the establishment of requisitioning all administrative machinery
inside the ex-enemy countries and should interfere as little as
possible with the gradual peacetime development of their
economies. Further, instead of a further requisitioning of
commodities we have suggested an annual payment to countries whose
claims are upheld by a Reparations and Restitution Commission of a
sum equivalent to a proportion of Italian exports, that proportion
being determined by this same Commission after it has taken into
account all the relevant facts already mentioned.
5. ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT OF EX-ENEMY STATES
We have proposed that ex-enemy states should apply for membership
of certain international organisations which have been brought
into relationship with the United Nations, such as the food and
agriculture organisation, the Health Organisation. If this is done
signatories should support their application.
6. TRIBUNAL OF HUMAN RIGHTS
The Australian Delegation will propose the establishment by the
treaties of a special court of human rights. To this proposal
might be attached great importance. The history of the Territorial
adjustment made at the Conference of Versailles suggests that
basic and essential rights and freedoms of the individual, who is
so often the cipher in Territorial adjustments, should not hinge
simply upon declarations made by the State. Such declarations
standing alone are not sufficient to guarantee the inalienable
rights of the individual and behind them it is essential that some
sufficient sanction be established. That is why we have suggested
the setting up by treaty of a European Court of human rights to
implement the relevant clauses of the treaties. The court should
have a status parallel to that of the International Court of
Justice with jurisdiction to hear and determine, subject to
reasonable conditions and safeguards against abuse of legal
process, disputes concerning the enjoyment of human rights and all
fundamental freedoms or any disputes as to citizenship resulting
from the treaty provisions. In the draft treaties the declarations
did not deal with minorities as such but with human beings and
their rights as human beings. None the less the declarations would
operate for the protection of minority groups because it is
usually amongst members of such groups that oppression is likely
to be exerted.
The power to invoke the jurisdiction of the proposed court would
extend to individuals and to groups as well as to states and its
judgment would be accepted by the parties to the treaties as
enforceable not only against individuals and of groups but also
against states and legal agencies. The jurisdiction of such an
International tribunal might not be invoked frequently because its
very existence would act as a strong deterrent against the non-
observance of the declaration to be contained in the treaty.
We are deeply indebted to the United States for its initiative in
relation to the inclusion of these formal declarations in the
present treaties but the proposals should in our view be strong
and reinforced in the manner proposed by the Australian amendment.
7. SURPLUS WAR EQUIPMENT
The present draft provides that there will be limitations of
armaments and supplies of war material in ex-enemy countries and
that any surplus will be placed at the disposal of the four
powers, presumably for distribution by them. In our view the
question of disposing either by destruction or distribution of ex-
enemy war material is not a matter for final determination by the
four powers or even by this conference of 21 Nations. The United
Nations Charter places an obligation on the Security Council,
acting in conjunction with the Military Committee, to submit to
members of the United Nations plans for the establishment of a
system for the regulation of armaments. The stated objective is to
promote the establishment and maintenance of security with the
least diversion for armaments of the world's human and economic
resources. The question of disposal of surplus war material should
in our view fall within the broader question of a plan for the
regulation of armaments.
Secondly, we propose that the matter be referred to the Security
Council for immediate consideration and that meanwhile there be no
distribution of surpluses.
8. REVISION OF TREATIES
There is no provision in the present draft for treaty revision.
Some mistakes will certainly be made and serious grievances will
easily multiply. We propose therefore a procedure analogous to
that contained in the amended provision of the United Nations
Charter. An executive of this conference consisting of the four
powers with three other belligerents nominated by this conference
should be empowered by a two thirds majority to call a meeting of
countries at this conference to consider the revision of any
portion of the treaty. If there has been no treaty revision at the
end of five years a simple majority of this group should suffice
to call a meeting to consider any proposals proposed. Revision
however would be effective only when ratified by a two thirds
majority of the nations at this conference including the four
powers. The calling of such a meeting need present no difficulties
as it could take place during a meeting of the Assembly of the
United Nations.
9. PEACE TREATIES EXECUTIVE
Throughout the draft treaties there are references to a large
number of matters which will arise out of the treaty and to be
dealt with by small groups of nations. For example, the future of
the Italian Colonies, Boundaries Commission, Conciliation
Commission and so on. In each case Australian amendments are
suggested which are designed to include in these groups
representatives of the conference at Paris. We have in several
instances made the suggestion of the four major powers plus
another three to be nominated by this conference. In one instance
in particular there is an indisputable extension and that is in
respect of Article 75 of the Italian treaty which names the Four
Ambassadors at Rome the representatives of all Allied and
Associated powers in the dealings with the Italian Government in
all matters concerning the execution and interpretation of the
present treaty. We seek the amendment of that article to include
three other Governments represented at and elected by this
conference at Paris.
The frequent reference to continuing bodies indicates a
desirability of the establishing of a Peace Treaties Executive
Council appointed by this conference. its duty would be to
supervise the carrying out of these treaties and the calling of a
conference of the 21 for the purpose of revision or for any other
purpose arising out of the treaty. We are proposing a specific
amendment to Article 75 but we should also refer to the right to
introduce when the need becomes even more apparent a specific
suggestion for a Peace Treaty Executive Council.
[AA:A1067, E46/38/14]