Your telegram No. 303 [1] and refer also my 323 [2] paragraph 1.

From maps submitted to you by Brigadier Dyke it can be seen that
some centres of Republican resistance are located up to 100 miles
within the area formed by lines joining the forward positions of
Dutch Forces on 4th August and also up to 100 miles within the Van
Mook demarcation lines of 29th August. This is illustrated by the
incident of the forced landing of American plane. [3]

Two. Without surrender of Republican Forces within present area of
Dutch strategical control not considered practicable to withdraw
troops 5 kilometres from either side of line joining Dutch forward
positions of 4th August.

Three. Consider impracticable to establish several demarcation
lines to embrace extensive areas of Republican resistance within
area of Dutch strategical control.

Four. If both sides withdrew troops from disputed areas, namely
those areas brought under complete partial or strategical control
of the Dutch between 21st July and 29th August, a Police Force
would be necessary to safeguard interests of either side and
maintain law and order with strict neutrality.

Such a Police Force could be controlled internationally or jointly
Republican and Dutch and be composed of Foreign Police or of
Indonesians who were members of Field Police before the war and
Dutch. These are questions which can only be decided after
discussions between Dutch and Republicans arranged and sponsored
by Committee of Three. A Police Force constituted as above should
not provide the Dutch with the opportunity to extend their
influence at the expense of the Republicans observing that the
disputed areas, other than centres of Republican resistance, are
at present under complete, partial or strategical control of the
Dutch.

Five. Present endeavours to establish separate States in West
Java, East Coast Sumatra and Madoera will confuse the issue for
Committee of Three.