This telegram entirely personal to you alone, unless you care to
pass on to the Prime Minister, and Minister.

2. In Australia, it was impossible for me to ascertain from Graham
and Van Zeeland their predispositions (if any) to possible or
probable bases of settlement and naturally, the three of us were
each wary of committing ourselves too early in case the support of
one or the other might be lost.

3. United States State Department representatives on Graham's
staff obviously had his ear and at first their attitude seemed to
me one of excessive caution both on procedure and thoughts of
possible bases of settlement let alone outright discussions
thereon. However discussions with Graham and Scott separately on
the journey here, and soon after arrival made me quite confident
that
(a) United States idea of real settlement was based on completely
independent and sovereign republic by January 1949 over Java,
Sumatra and Madura on the one hand, and on the other hand,
continuance of economic property and trading rights of the Dutch
by long-term treaty and over all, some sort of United Nations
supervision which could be 'sold' to each party owing to the
distrust expressed by each party of the other.

(b) United States caution on procedural matters was based on the
view that Security Council jurisdiction was only secure with
regard to action based on the prevention of actual hostilities and
here they privately informed me United States was determined that
if the Dutch committed a breach, the United States would invoke
the Security Council to impose sanctions or even more severe
measures, under Article 40.

4. In return for privately expressed determination by the United
States to follow para 3(a) and 3(b) of this telegram and follow me
at the appropriate time on auxiliary matters and in general
completely co-operate with me on the main settlement, I agreed
privately to use every, endeavour to obtain from both parties
invitation for the Committee to make actual suggestions on (a)
meeting place, (b) procedural matters or methods of adjustment,
(c) probable bases or terms of settlement.

5. Although I do not entirely accept the United States contention
that the Committee cannot make suggestions on these three matters
in the absence of invitation from both parties I thought it best
to work in wholehearted co-operation with the United States plan
for two reasons: (1) my confidence that their ideas on sovereignty
and independence coincide with mine and (2) that Graham would not
make any suggestions as to terms of settlement in the absence of
expressed invitation from both parties except possibly after
protracted and futile discussions between the parties.

6. The result has been that Graham and I together with respective
staffs are now co-operating both in ultimate aim and methods of
achieving it. Caution of course is exercised and I do not think
Van Zeeland suspects this. For your information the latter is, I
sometimes think, capable of being persuaded to agree with us if
approach is not made until the time of perfection and in the
meantime if, a big if, he be persuaded that his original
conception of the Republicans as brigands and political
irresponsibles is wrong.

7. Previous telegrams [1] show that the Republic (after private
and personal interviews by me with the Prime Minister Setiadjit
and other leaders) invited the Committee in writing at formal
meetings to make suggestions on the three matters mentioned in
para.4 of this telegram. This was in Jogjakarta on our second
visit when the Republic agreed to co-operate fully with Committee
on implementation of Security Council resolutions.

8. After the Republicans had given invitation to the Committee and
promised such co-operation Van Zeeland expressed to Graham and
self the hope that the Dutch would act in the same way and himself
suggested he 'lobby' them to this purpose. Meanwhile Eaton and
others reported to me private conversations with Van Vredenburch
[2] where he said the Dutch would not withdraw 'one single troop'
under the November 1st resolution and would not agree to have any
discussions on substantive matters with the Republic or the
Committee. Van Zeeland had discussions with the Dutch which he
reported to Graham and self as inconclusive.

9. On November 6th, the Committee had a formal meeting with the
Dutch at which proceedings opened with statements that the Dutch
would not commence substantive discussions with the Republicans
through the Committee and that they were not bound by and would
not comply with the cease fire resolutions. Although these
statements were made 'off the record' a complete break-down
appeared inevitable. In the course of long discussions with the
Dutch and the Committee I said that the Dutch would have to take
full responsibility for such decisions and for my part I would
urge the Committee to report at once to the Security Council if
such decisions were communicated formally and also the fact that
the Republic had already given full co-operation and promised the
same in future. This meeting adjourned after midnight and was
followed by a meeting of the Committee in which the first real
dispute occurred between Van Zeeland on the one hand and Graham
and self on the other hand. Van Zeeland complained that Graham and
I had been unfair to the Dutch and were trying to force them into
an attitude of non-co-operation. The meeting adjourned in the
early hours and resumed after breakfast when document [was] drawn
up setting out the Committee's views of obligations under the
cease fire resolutions and on substantive discussions (see my
following telegram). [3]

10. Formal meeting with the Dutch followed informal discussions
between the Committee and Vredenburch in which I repeated that if
Dutch refused to co-operate on the cease fire or substantive
discussions the Committee would immediately report back to the
Security Council. At both informal and formal meetings Vredenburch
agreed as in paragraph 2 my telegram 300. [4]

11. As previously reported, Republic has appointed Committee to
meet Dutch under the resolution of November 1st under assurances
our Committee [5] and the Dutch have agreed to appoint similar
Committee on November 10th. [6]

12. Committee brought back Hadji Salim, Setiadjit and Leimena from
Jogjakarta to meet the Dutch informally in an endeavour to break
down the hostile atmosphere before the talks commence but first
meeting only very partially successful.

13. This lack of success due to Vredenburch bringing along two
Indonesians with him a development [7] which is obvious part of
the plan to impress the Committee and the world that the Dutch
have the confidence of non-extremist Indonesians. This bluffs or
[at] any rate pleases Zeeland but merely infuriates Graham.

However, the main Dutch plan is obvious to strain every resource
to persuade us that the Republicans lack real support here. Graham
and I agree that the Dutch are obviously going to endeavour to
repudiate their recognition of de facto control by the Republic of
Sumatra, Java and Madura and Graham strongly disapproves such
tactics. However, at present the Dutch opinion of Graham and self
is, I think, we are trying our best to reach impartial decision
and we have both agreed to foster that impression.

14. The Committee met the Consular Commission on November [7]th,
when it was arranged that military observers would report on the
plan to implement observance of the cease fire resolutions. [8]
This report is now under consideration but although unanimous,
contains suggestions very disadvantageous to the Republic [9], and
there is very decided difference of opinion on it in our
Committee. Van Zeeland and I are opponents and Graham will I hope
support me. Time and staff and stenographic shortage do not permit
me of fully informing on this dispute now, but it does, I think,
indicate that Van Zeeland will try and dispute the 1st November
resolution requiring the Dutch to move back troops to lines of 4th
August. [10] Graham will support me on this but for a number of
reasons neither Graham nor I desire a 'show down' on this yet.

15. Time at present is being fully occupied by meetings of the
Committee with Consular Commission, informal representations of
both sides and a good deal of 'lobbying'.

16. In my opinion the only possible early conclusion of this work
could be caused by the complete breakdown of negotiations which
would not help the Republic or chances of political settlement
unless breakdown was caused by the Dutch in a blameworthy manner.

Rest assured that Graham and self will act immediately on such
contingency by reporting to the Security Council.

17. Reference your telegram 332 [11], I say in a most friendly way
that it is hard to believe that you considered the contents and
implications. We are on the spot and are working at the highest
pressure with full knowledge all complaints submitted to us by
either party. The Republic has not mentioned the subject of your
telegram to us in spite of the fact that we are seeing their
representatives daily and have left Brookes and Ogburn in
Jogjakarta as our contact with the Government there with
communication with us available twice daily. In those
circumstances, I can hardly suggest to the Committee that we take
notice of radio statements or complaints when the matter not
reported to us.

18. Further, the present position of Dutch troops means really
that most hostilities are by Republic[an]s behind Dutch lines and
the Dutch are just boiling to have us commence investigations of
alleged breaches of the cease fire resolutions which we are
persistently avoiding both because of the time element and overall
strategy.

19. On this subject the Security Council resolution [12] far from
assisting us is most hampering to our real task. Although we will
pass the matter of practical implementation over to the Consular
Commission and military observers as agents [as] soon as possible
we cannot do so now because in my opinion they entirely
misconceive the position and could do real and permanent harm [to]
the Republic unless supervised carefully. This is annoying and
delaying but nevertheless true. of course Eaton is co-operating
with me very well and is eminently satisfactory in every way.

20. Time does not permit passing on to you every problem and every
aspect of the situation but I still feel as in Australia that a
report to the Security Council on the Committee's views on the
best bases of settlement is most desirable. Further it looks now
as if I have managed to change from an almost certain minority
into part majority. Nevertheless I must so act as to keep in
majority and we can only report when the situation allows us to do
so.

21. As an example of Dutch tactics East Indonesia has invited us
to see conditions there. Van Zeeland wants the Committee to accept
but I oppose. Graham wants to accept 'to give an air of complete
impartiality'. I am endeavouring to arrange a complete tour of
Sumatra, Java and Madura by the Committee but am delaying until
the Republic can furnish names of people in Dutch occupied
territory who can without personal danger to themselves give us
authoritative information. More of this later.

22. Must also mention that if the present lines remain the Dutch
have control of plantations which will give them economic plunder
and I am desperately trying to prevent this yet am really
frightened they will use any cease fire troop movement to
manoeuvre Republican troops into real error and thus imperil our
whole plan.

23. I really feel I would like to return soon for discussions with
you. Excuse could be the return of the special plane for
maintenance and inspection and arrangement of my judicial duties.

Please telegraph reply on this aspect. Have had to communicate
contents of this telegram but have fears on the security angle and
have much more to discuss.