MELBOURNE, 28 October 1947

TOP SECRET

AN APPRECIATION OF THE STRATEGICAL POSITION OF AUSTRALIA-
SEPTEMBER, 1947

The Chiefs of Staff have recently examined the general trend of
world affairs, and, in the light of this examination, have
prepared a paper entitled 'An Appreciation by the Chiefs of Staff
on the Strategical Position of Australia-September, 1947'.

2. During the past twelve months, the Russian attitude in general,
has been brought into clearer relief and the position of Russia,
as stated in the paper, is based on information received through
Service Intelligence Sources.

3. Meetings of the Chiefs of Staff, at which the scientific aspect
was discussed, were attended by the Defence Scientific Adviser,
and he is in agreement with the views expressed in the
Appreciation on matters of scientific interest.

RECOMMENDATION:

4. The Chiefs of Staff submit the attached paper 'An Appreciation
of the Strategical Position of Australia-September, 1947' for
consideration by the Minister, and recommend its acceptance as the
basic document on measures necessary for the defence of Australia.

(Sgd.) V.A.H. STURDEE. Lieut.-General
Chief of the General Staff
(Sgd.) L. HAMILTON. Admiral
Chief of the Naval Staff
(Sgd.) G. JONES. Air Marshal
Chief of the Air Staff (Sgd.) W.H. HARRINGTON.

Commander
Joint Secretary,
Chiefs of Staff Committee.

Attachment (extracts)

September 1947

TOP SECRET

AN APPRECIATION BY THE CHIEFS OF STAFF OF THE STRATEGICAL POSITION
OF AUSTRALIA

PART I

INTRODUCTION

AUSTRALIA IN RELATION TO WORLD AFFAIRS:

Australia emerged from the war of 1939-1945 with a greater
consciousness of world affairs and their impact on her political
and economic structure, and a realisation that her own domestic
affairs cannot remain unaffected by events overseas. The two years
which have elapsed since then have intensified this consciousness,
which is reflected in the part played by Australia in peace treaty
negotiations and other international problems.

2. As the United Nations arrangements for world security have not
been completed, this examination of Australia's strategic position
has been related to the situation as it now exists. It is
considered however, from indications to date, that even when the
United Nations arrangements for world security have been
established, they may be effective in dealing with minor powers
only, whilst the powers of VETO exist. In such circumstances,
Australia's dependence on close British Commonwealth co-operation
for her security becomes more clearly evident.

3. Growing Nationalist Movements, accelerated by the War of 1939-
45, have caused inevitable and definite grouping of political
sympathies throughout the world, with consequent repercussions on
the balance of power by which Australia's security was formerly
achieved, and on world trade. The effects of the partitioning of
India, and of the imminent withdrawal of Burma from the Empire,
are uncertain. The possible split in China, with Northern China
under Communist control, and Southern China divided within itself,
will have an effect on security in the Pacific. In South East
Asia-of particular concern to Australia-the Indonesian Movement
creates a security problem as well as an economic problem.

Similarly, the unrest in Malaya will have an impact on Australia's
security problem.

4. The recent war has reduced the military and economic strength
of the United Kingdom considerably, with the result that Australia
can no longer rely, to the same extent, on the assistance
previously provided by the United Kingdom in both these aspects.

Furthermore, the unsettled state of the world in general, and the
increase in nationalistic movements in Asia in particular, finds
Australia isolated from the remainder of the British Commonwealth
and separated by the great expanse of the Pacific from North
America. It is necessary, therefore, that Australia should make
greater efforts for self-sufficiency and also contribute to the
military and economic strength of the British Commonwealth to a
greater extent than in the past. By virtue of her geographical
position, Australia should assume increased responsibilities in
British Commonwealth matters in the Indian Ocean, South East Asia
and the Pacific. Australia is interested in events in Europe, Asia
and the Middle East, since these will affect events in South East
Asia, the Indian Ocean and the Pacific.

5. Australia's industrial potential depends, to a considerable
extent, on access to raw materials in which she is not self-
sufficient. The maintenance of friendly relationships with foreign
countries, particularly those from which these materials are
procured, is of obvious importance in this regard.

6. Military appreciations and plans will depend upon the potential
enemy and likely theatres of operations. Different plans would be
required to meet different circumstances, and those necessary to
deal with a minor aggressor would be inadequate in the event of
Australia's security being threatened by a major power. It would
be prudent, therefore, in order that preparations for defence
might be basically suitable to meet any emergency, to plan for the
worst possible contingency, which would consist of a threat by a
major Power, or combination of Powers, before the United Nations
becomes fully effective.

[matter omitted]

PART III

CONCLUSIONS RELATIVE TO AUSTRALIA'S STRATEGIC POSITION

70. Australia is an isolated small Power with limited manpower and
resources. She is not able to defend herself unaided against a
major Power. While the United Nations remains in being, there is
no threat from a minor Power to Australia's security, but whilst
the power of the Veto exists, it would appear that the United
Nations does not offer security against aggression by a major
Power.

71. Australia is unlikely to become a primary objective of any
major Power, determined on aggression, until after the defeat of
the major Powers with whom Australia may be allied. She may,
however, become involved in war, as a member of the British
Commonwealth, in order to protect her ultimate position, or as a
member of the United Nations, in enforcing the decisions of the
United Nations Security Council.

72. The security of the British Commonwealth, and therefore of
Australia, requires the safeguarding of the Main Support Areas
from which war potential can be developed, and the maintenance of
sea and air communications between them. These areas, of which the
United Kingdom is the most important, are the United Kingdom,
Canada, Australia, New Zealand and South Africa.

73. The U.S.S.R. is the only major Power with which the British
Commonwealth might become involved in a war. The possibility of
the U.S.S.R. precipitating a war before 1951 appears remote,
although her war potential will increase as time elapses. By 1960
her economic development could be sufficiently advanced to support
an aggressive foreign policy, backed by military force, including
scientific weapons. She Would, however, probably still lack sea
power.

74. War against the U.S.S.R. would not be confined to any one
area, but whatever course it might take, there would always be a
major threat to British Commonwealth interests in Europe, the
Middle East, India and South East Asia. If Russia develops sea
power, there may also be a threat in the Pacific.

In relation to the protection of her ultimate position, Australia
is concerned with events in Europe, the Middle East, India and the
Far East. She is directly concerned with events in South East Asia
and with the security of sea and air communications in the Indian
and Pacific Oceans and through South East Asia.

75. It is unthinkable that the British Commonwealth would embark
upon a war of aggression. Her action, therefore, in the first
phase of a future major war, would be largely defensive in
character, followed by an offensive phase to achieve victory. The
action to be taken in the defensive phase by each nation of the
British Commonwealth will depend on its geographical position and
vulnerability to attack.

76. Because of her geographical position, the United Kingdom is
very vulnerable to attack from the mainland of Europe. Scientific
development, particularly of long range weapons, will make it
possible for an attack on the United Kingdom to be so effective as
to necessitate the United Kingdom devoting all her resources to
her own self-preservation. It is, therefore, possible that, in the
first phase of a future war, she would be unable to provide
assistance to the Dominions, increase her overseas garrisons, or
send expeditionary forces abroad. The other members of the British
Commonwealth may, in this case have to rely entirely upon their
own resources for the provision of the forces and war material
necessary for British Commonwealth security. The central co-
ordination and direction of British Commonwealth defence in these
circumstances may be located in one of the Dominions.

77. Australia's geographic and strategic position is very
different from that of the United Kingdom. Australia is remote
from Asia, hence, no major hostile Power could launch a sustained
and effective air attack against her, even with the use of new
long range weapons, until that Power has first established bases
within range of vital objectives in Australia. At present, no
potentially hostile Power possesses such bases. Australia could
not be successfully invaded except by a strong naval Power which
had established command of the sea and air, but the possibility of
sporadic raids on communications and vital areas exists.

78. For her own security, and to fulfil the functions of a main
support area, it is necessary that Australia should further
develop her industrial capacity and resources. Continued access to
essential raw materials or stock piling of items in which she is
deficient, is necessary to maintain or expand her capacity.

PART IV

MEASURES TO ACHIEVE SECURITY

79. An examination of Australia's strategic position indicates
that the following measures are necessary to ensure Australia's
security. These will involve closely coordinated political and
military action:-

Collective Security:

80. Australia, unaided, cannot ensure her own security, nor can
she rely upon the United Nations for security until such time as
international confidence is achieved and the United Nations
Organisation becomes fully effective. In the meantime, it is
necessary to rely upon a system of British Commonwealth co-
operation and upon such security arrangements as are practicable
with foreign nations. Individual security of each of its
components will depend on concerted action by the British
Commonwealth as a whole.

Co-Operation with Foreign Powers:

81. It is essential to Australia's security that a situation
favourable to Australia should be assured in the Pacific and
Indian Oceans and in South East Asia. For this purpose, friendly
relations are desirable with foreign Powers, particularly with the
undermentioned:-

(a) United States of America-In the event of U.S.S.R. becoming the
aggressor, not only would a concerted effort be required by the
nations of the British Commonwealth to ensure their security, but
the early assistance of the United States of America would be
essential. The United States of America is unquestionably the
predominant Power in the Pacific and accordingly, the security of
Australia will depend upon close co-operation with the United
States of America. It is, therefore, in Australia's strategic
interest to support any measures designed to perpetuate the United
States of America's influence in the Western Pacific.

(b) China-The possibility of China entering the U.S.S.R. sphere of
influence is very real, and this fact should be borne in mind in
guiding our relations with China.

(c) France-Relations with France should be designed to ensure that
her possessions in French Indo-China, New Caledonia, New Hebrides
or the Indian Ocean are not available to a potential aggressor as
bases from which to menace British Commonwealth lines of
communication or the Australian mainland.

(d) Siam-It is desirable that a stable government should be
established in Siam, with which Australia could maintain friendly
relations, with the object of ensuring that Siamese territory is
not used by a potential enemy as a means of threatening
Australia's security.

(e) Philippines Republic-The promotion of friendly relations with
the Republic is important in view of the position the Philippine
Islands occupy in relation to the Northern approaches to
Australia. The continued right of the United States of America to
bases in the Philippines is of great importance to Australia's
security.

(f) Indonesia-This region, which includes the territories formerly
known as the Netherland East Indies, is of great strategic
importance. It is most desirable that this region should be
administered by strong and stable governments with whom Australia
could establish friendly relations, since the only route by which
an aggressor weak in sea power could approach Australia is through
this region.

Indonesia is astride the line of communications between Australia
and Singapore and must be denied to potential enemies who, once
established there, could threaten Australia's supplies of raw
materials, her lines of communication, and ultimately, the
mainland.

(g) Portugal-It is strategically important that Australia should
foster friendly relations with Portugal, to ensure the denial of
facilities in Portuguese Timor to other Powers whose motives might
conflict with Australian interests.

The Necessity for an intelligence Organisation:

82. An effective intelligence organisation is a basic requirement
in war, and is also essential in peace to provide the information
necessary for strategic planning. The Australian intelligence
organisation should, therefore, be an integral part of the world-
wide British system, and permit of affiliation with those of the
United States of America and other likely Allies. The organisation
should be firmly established and functioning in peace if it is to
be of real value in war.

The Necessity for Co-Ordinated Planning:

83. An aggressor could deliver a crippling blow against one or
more of the nations of the British Commonwealth, if they were
unprepared. Scientific development accentuates this possibility.

Should aggressive action eventuate, it will occur with great
rapidity, and the success of the defence will depend upon the
extent and speed with which counter measures are taken. To ensure
that each member of the British Commonwealth can, without delay,
take that action which will be most effective in meeting a threat,
it is essential that the joint strategic plans for the defence of
the British Commonwealth should be formulated and coordinated in
time of peace. In such plans, provision should also be made for
probable participation by the United States of America, in
particular, and by any other prospective Allies. An overall
strategic plan cannot be developed, however, until political
arrangements between the nations concerned have been made and
effective machinery for the co-ordination of British Commonwealth
defence measures has been introduced.

A Basis for Overall Plans:

84. Prior to the preparation of overall strategic plans, it is
necessary to forecast the broad situations with which the plans
would probably have to deal in the event of war with U.S.S.R.

Based on this forecast, it would be possible to consider the part
which Australia might play, in such plans, to protect her ultimate
position.

85. U.S.S.R. would probably first seek to overrun Western Europe,
before embarking on large scale operations in the Middle East or
Far East. Australia is unlikely to be directly threatened, except
as the result of successful action by the U.S.S.R. in one or both
of these two areas. In such a situation, Australia's interests
might best be served by making a contribution either in the Far
East or Middle East. If the United States of America were involved
in the war prior to, or at the same time as the British
Commonwealth, her forces would probably be employed in both Europe
and the Far East. Since it might be difficult for the United
Kingdom to reinforce the Middle East, Australia's most effective
contribution in this case might best be made in that region. If,
as in the past, a period elapses after the commencement of
hostilities, before the United States of America becomes involved,
then it might be preferable for Australia's contribution to be
made in the Far East, to stabilise the situation until aid is
forthcoming from the United States of America.

86. A plan will be required to deal with each of the varying
situations which might occur on the outbreak of war. This should
provide both for action by the British Commonwealth alone, and for
action in conjunction with United States Forces. Essential pre-
requisites to the formulation of any plans are the knowledge of
the forces which each nation might be prepared to provide, and the
alternative tasks each nation might be prepared to undertake. It
is evident, however, that in the event of war with U.S.S.R.,
Australia should be prepared to make a contribution in either the
Far East or the Middle East. Her dependence on co-operation with
other nations for her security will compel her to accept the fact
that the strategic employment of her forces will be governed by
considerations wider than those of a purely regional nature. Her
strategic plan for defence should, therefore, envisage provision
of forces to operate in the Middle and/or Far East, in accordance
with an overall plan. However, should hostilities occur before
agreed overall plans have been formulated, then each nation of the
British Commonwealth would be primarily concerned with the defence
of its own zone of strategic responsibility and its vital
communications. Plans made for this purpose would have to form the
basis for the subsequent preparation of hastily improvised overall
plans with other nations of the British Commonwealth and the
United States of America.

Australia's Zone of Strategic Responsibility:

87. Economy of force, and the great distances between the
components of the British Commonwealth, require that the initial
responsibility for defence of its vital interests should be borne,
as far as practicable, by the nation nearest to, or most
immediately affected by, events in any particular area. This
factor, coupled with the knowledge that Australia must make a
greater contribution to the security of the British Commonwealth
than in the past, establishes the need for defining the zone in
which Australia should formulate and control strategic policy, an
accept t responsibilities involved in the formulation and control
of such policy. This strategic policy should conform, in general,
with overall British Commonwealth policy, but it will be difficult
to define Australian policy unless agreement is reached as to the
zone with which Australian planning should primarily be concerned.

88. From the defence aspect, the extent of the Australian Zone of
Strategic Responsibility should be based on the following
factors:-

(a) The likely aggressor;

(b) The important and vital areas to be protected;

(c) The protection of essential lines of communication;

(d) The need to exclude an enemy from areas from which he could
attack these important and vital areas and lines of communication;

(e) The availability of suitable existing or potential bases from
which forces could operate.

89. The view has been expressed in this paper that the U.S.S.R. is
at present the only major nation which is likely to resort to
armed force in order to achieve her ends. In the event of the
British Commonwealth becoming involved in war with Russia,
Australia is unlikely to be directly attacked until Russia has
attained her objectives in the Far East, and her attack in the Far
East may either be concurrent with, or follow the securing of her
position in Europe and the Middle East. The U.S.S.R. is at present
weak in sea power, and her line of approach towards Australia
would, therefore, be through South East Asia and Indonesia. Having
established herself in Indonesia, Russia could attack the mainland
of Australia under cover of land based aircraft. Hence, it follows
that Australia is vitally interested in this line of approach.

90. The greatest threat would occur if the enemy were able to
bring its long range weapons within range of the important or
vital areas of Australia. In the present stage of development the
weapon with the longest range is the heavy bomber powered with
reciprocating engines, which, armed with an atomic bomb, has an
operational radius of action of 5,000 miles. However, from the
present information available, it is unlikely that the U.S.S.R.

possesses a heavy bomber which, armed with an atomic bomb or
equivalent bomb load, could exceed an operational radius of action
of about 3,500 miles.

91. The most profitable and likely targets for long range attack
are important centres of population, industry and communications.

The majority of such centres in Australia are located in the vital
area to the South East of a line drawn from immediately North of
Brisbane to Spencer Gulf in South Australia. From bases in Malaya
and the Philippines, an attack could be made on vital targets in
any portion of the Australian mainland. Should an enemy attacking
from South East Asia succeed in establishing himself within 3,500
miles of the Australian mainland, the Perth-Fremantle Area and
Darwin would be vulnerable to sustained air attack, and a grave
threat to Australia's security would exist. The enemy would then
be in a position from which to make an invasion of the North West
coast of Australia. Such an invasion could be a prelude to a
further Southward advance, or have as its object the establishment
of a base from which sustained air attacks could be launched on
the vital South East area of Australia.

92. Singapore is the key to the approaches to Indonesia from South
East Asia.

Forces based on Singapore and British North Borneo would command
the North Western approaches to Australia through Indonesia, and
those based on Manus would dominate the sea approaches from the
North. Adequate forces operating in these areas should be able to
deny to an enemy positions from which he could launch sustained
air attacks with long range weapons against vital targets in
Australia. Consequently, it is essential that the areas containing
Singapore, North Borneo and Manus should be included in
Australia's zone of strategic responsibility. Since attacks could
be launched on the vital area of South East Australia from bases
in the Malay Peninsula and the Philippines, hostile penetration
South of a line including these areas would be dangerous. The
Australian zone of strategic responsibility should, therefore,
extend at least, as far as this line.

93. The chart attached as Appendix 'A' indicates-
(a) The danger line for hostile penetration and suggested minimum
Northern limit of the Australian zone of strategic responsibility.

(b) A line drawn 1500 miles from the coast of the Australian
mainland.

(c) The line of bases described in para. 92above.

(d) The area containing the majority of important and vital
targets.

Regional Security with New Zealand:

94. The Australian - New Zealand Agreement of1944 would require
review in the light of the proposals made in paragraphs 92 and 93
relating to the Australian strategic zone. The Northern limit of
the Australian zone has been suggested in paragraph 92 above.

Before an Eastern limit can be established, it will be necessary
to consult with the New Zealand Government, in order to decide
whether there will be a separate New Zealand zone abutting on the
Eastern limit of the Australian zone, or whether the two zones
will be a joint Australian - New Zealand responsibility. In the
former case, a dividing line between the two zones must be
determined, and in the latter, it will be necessary to seek
agreement with the New Zealand Government concerning the Northern
limit of the joint zone. Until these matters have been resolved,
the military plan for the defence of the Australian area of
strategic responsibility cannot be formulated.

Local Defence:

95. Provided an enemy can be prevented from establishing himself
in the Australian zone of strategic responsibility-and this can be
prevented only by the successful implementation of an agreed
overall plan-there is no danger to Australian territory except
from raids. Such raids are likely to be directed mainly at vital
areas and at focal or terminal points of lines of communication.

To counter such threats, it will be necessary to provide
operational bases and local air and seaward defences, so disposed
as to provide the necessary degree of protection commensurate with
the scale and type of attack. It must be accepted that even in
minor attacks, some missiles will reach their target, and in this
age of long range weapons, such missiles will be directed against
important centres of industry, population and communication.

Although their accuracy may not be great, it would be manifestly
unwise to risk the loss of a vital establishment through too great
a concentration of industry. To minimise the effect of raids, a
civil defence organisation, dispersion of resources, and
duplication of vital industries to the economic limit, are
necessary.

96. It is important, however, to maintain a proper balance between
the effort devoted to local defence against raids, and that
devoted to the security of distant strategic areas. Undue emphasis
on the former, at the expense of the latter, might permit the
enemy to reach positions from which he could launch major attacks
on the mainland.

97. In planning defence measures, it must be assumed that the main
overseas sources of supply may be interrupted, and therefore, to
maintain Australia's war effort, essential industries should be
rendered as self-sufficient as possible and stock piles
accumulated.

Development of Australia as a Main Support Area:

98. If Australia is to become an effective Main Support Area for
the forces of the British Commonwealth engaged in hostilities in
the Indian and Pacific Oceans and in South East Asia, it will be
essential to-
(a) establish potential for the production of equipment, supplies,
etc., essential to the prosecution of a war. This potential
includes shipbuilding, ship repair and aircraft production;

(b) make concerted arrangements for adequate supplies of raw
materials;

(c) provide the manpower essential to give effect to (a) and (b)
above;

(d) establish capacity for scientific research and development;

(e) establish an organisation responsible for the survey of
national resources, and for the planning, in peace, of the
allocation and development of the industrial, economic and
manpower resources of the country, to meet the requirements of war
conditions;

(f) make provision for training and maintenance facilities
required both by Australian Forces and any other British
Commonwealth Forces which may be based on this country.

Scientific Development:

99. Australia is relatively weak in conventional war potential,
and it is therefore important that she should seek to gain every
advantage which the possession of scientific weapons would bestow.

Just as co-ordination of British Commonwealth strategic effort
will be necessary in future wars, it is equally important that the
British Commonwealth's scientific effort in the research and
development necessary for the production of such weapons, should
be coordinated in peace and war.

[matter omitted]

PART V

A SUMMARY OF THE MEASURES TO ACHIEVE SECURITY

(1) Until the United Nations becomes fully effective, Australia
should rely for her security on a system of British Commonwealth
co-operation, and upon such security arrangements as are
practicable with foreign nations, particularly with the United
States of America.

(2) Friendly relations should be maintained with all countries
having territories in the Pacific and Indian Oceans, in South East
Asia, and above all, with the United States of America, which is
the predominant Power in the Pacific.

(3) It is essential that overall strategic plans for the defence
of the British Commonwealth should be formulated and coordinated
in time of peace. in such plans, provision should also be made for
probable participation by the United States of America in
particular, and by any other prospective allies. Strategic plans
cannot be developed, however, until political arrangements between
the nations concerned, have been made, and effective machinery for
the co-ordination of British Commonwealth defence measures has
been introduced.

(4) Should hostilities occur before agreed overall plans have been
formulated, then each nation of the British Commonwealth would be
primarily concerned with the defence of its own zone of strategic
responsibility and its vital communications. Plans made for this
purpose would have to form the basis for the subsequent
preparation of hastily improvised overall plans with other nations
of the British Commonwealth and the United States of America.

(5) Australia should accept responsibility for a strategic zone,
the suggested minimum limits of which, are shown in Appendix 'A'.

(6) The Australian - New Zealand Agreement of 1944 requires
review, in order to establish whether there is to be a joint
Australia - New Zealand Strategic Zone, or whether there should be
two separate zones.

(7) To guard against raids on the Australian mainland, it is
necessary to provide operational bases, and local air and seaward
defences. To minimise the effect of raids, a Civil Defence
Organisation, dispersal of resources and duplication of vital
industries to the economic limit, are necessary. It is important,
however, to maintain a proper balance between the effort devoted
to local defence against raids, and that devoted to the security
of distant strategic areas. Undue emphasis on the former, at the
expense of the latter, might permit the enemy to reach positions
from which he could launch major attacks on the mainland.

(8) Australia should develop the essentials of a Main Support
Area.

(9) Every possible advantage should be sought from the application
of scientific development to the defence of Australia.

(10) Australia's armed forces should be organised and trained so
that they would be available without delay for mobile operations
at home or abroad, as required. Their Organisation should permit
of rapid expansion in war, and for this purpose, reserves of
equipment and trained personnel are essential.

(11) Australian forces should be standardised in their
organisation, equipment and training with those of other nations
of the British Commonwealth, and, as far as possible, with those
of allies with whom a permanent association is likely to be
achieved.

(12) An intelligence organisation is essential to provide the
information necessary for strategic planning, and for the security
of the nation both in peace and war.