CO-OPERATION IN BRITISH COMMONWEALTH DEFENCE

I have carefully considered your letter of 17th August on Co-
operation in British Commonwealth Defence and the future of the
Joint Chiefs of Staff in Australia, and have had a discussion with
the Secretary of State for Commonwealth Relations during his
visit.

2. In paragraph 2 you refer to the relationship of New Zealand to
commitments accepted by the Australian Government of a British
Commonwealth nature, which Australia has laid it down as
fundamental must be undertaken by the Australian Government
Machinery, provision being made for liaison with other Governments
concerned, as outlined in the Australian Memorandum. I cannot do
better than forward you a copy of the following correspondence
with the Prime Minister of New Zealand:-

(i) Mr.Fraser's reply of l4th July to my letter of 28th May which
was similar to the one addressed to you.

(ii) My answer of 13th August which was written after
consultations with Field Marshal Montgomery on his return from New
Zealand.

(iii) A further letter of 2nd September to Mr. Fraser in
confirmation of a discussion with him in Canberra on 1 September.

3. It will be noted from the letter of 14th July that the Prime
Minister of New Zealand was concerned about safeguarding the
position of the New Zealand Government in participating in the
Australian machinery 'on the basis of equality' and with 'an
effective voice and vote'.

4. In paragraphs 4 and 5 of my letter of 13th August, it was
pointed out that cooperation 'on the basis of equality' was
specifically provided for in the conclusions of the Prime
Ministers' Conference and in the Australian Memorandum.

5. In paragraph 9 of my letter, it was made clear that the
Australian Government's proposal for liaison between the countries
on the Government and official levels by mutual representation on
each other's machinery retained to each Government sovereign
control of its own policy and administrative machinery on a basis
of equality.

6. In paragraphs 10 and 11 it was pointed out that, in the light
of experience of the working of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
Committee in Australia and the assignment to the Australian
Government Machinery of the responsibility of carrying out the
extensive commitments which it accepted during the war in respect
of the United States Forces and the British Pacific Fleet, it was
fundamental that commitments accepted by Australia of a British
Commonwealth nature must be undertaken by the Australian
Government Machinery. It was also pointed out that, to give effect
to my statement that Australia would make a greater contribution
to British Commonwealth Defence in the Pacific, provision has been
made in the Government's Five Years' Defence Programme of an
amount of 33,500,000 for Research and Development and 2,129,000
for a Joint Intelligence Organisation. These projects are an
integral part of Australian Defence Policy, for which the
Government is responsible to Parliament. I might also have added
the establishment of a Naval Aviation Branch in the Royal
Australian Navy, towards the ultimate total cost of which
23,408,490 has been provided in the Programme, and which the
United Kingdom Government, in cablegram No. 181 of 16th August,
welcomed as a valuable contribution to the naval resources of the
British Commonwealth in the Pacific Area.

7. Finally, as mentioned in paragraph 9 of my letter of 13th
August, New Zealand, as well as Australia, is designated a Main
Support Area and the heart of a strategic zone. It was agreed at
the London Conference that 'the system for co-ordination should be
based upon the national defence organisation to be maintained in
the United Kingdom and in each Dominion'. It was assumed,
therefore, that the New Zealand Government would similarly want to
exercise control through its own machinery of responsibilities
accepted by it.

8. In paragraph 2 of your letter, reference is also made to the
extent of the responsibilities which Australia may feel able to
undertake. It will be recalled from paragraph 6 of my letter of
28th May that, after mentioning the specific commitments of a
British Commonwealth nature referred to in paragraph 6 above, it
was stated that the Government is prepared to examine other
measures relating to the development and defence of Australia as a
main support area and the associated area of regional defence, but
these measures would be considered in relation to the priority and
importance of other Defence proposals and commitments, and to the
amount that can be provided for Defence. You will be aware from my
cablegram No. 111 of 6th May that the Australian Government felt
that we might further the policy of the strategic development and
distribution of the resources of the British Commonwealth as
discussed at the Conference of Prime Ministers, by helping more in
research and development for which, as stated earlier, 33,500,000
has been provided in our programme. in accordance with your reply
No. 102 of 24th May, and my further No.242 of 6th September, the
Commonwealth Advisory Committee on Defence Science in London next
November is to consider various fields in which Australia might
render additional assistance. Also, the Inter-Governmental
Agreement between the United Kingdom - Australian Governments on
the Guided Weapons Project, including the apportionment of costs,
has still to be determined.

9. I would thank you for the agreement expressed in paragraph 3 to
accept an Accredited Representative of the Australian Defence
Department, the Defence Committee, and the Chiefs of Staff
Committee, to their corresponding bodies in the United Kingdom,
and to provide this representative with all facilities.

10. It is noted from paragraph 4 that you entirely agree in
principle with the comments in paragraph 12 of our memorandum on
Co-operation in British Commonwealth Defence about the procedure
for the use of the Australian Defence Machinery in matters of
British Commonwealth Co-operation.

11. As you state in paragraph 5, a single Head of the British
Military Liaison Staff, with a small Joint Service Staff, is in
harmony with our proposals for accrediting a United Kingdom
Representative and staff to the Australian Defence Department and
its machinery, and we will be glad to give this officer and his
staff all facilities. It will be recalled from paragraph 12 of our
memorandum that, though the Head of the Liaison Staff will attend
and speak at the various Committees, he may be accompanied by
members of his staff, according to the nature of the subject to be
discussed. It is presumed this arrangement will meet your
reference to the Head of the Liaison Staff being normally the
United Kingdom Representative. It is observed from paragraph 6
that you would like to review this organisation in a year's time.

12.It is also noted from paragraph 5 that, for reasons of economy,
the Head of the Military Liaison Staff and his two lower ranked
colleagues and advisers from the other two Services will be the
representatives of the British Chiefs of Staff Committee
accredited to the Australian Defence Department, and the British
Service Representatives to the Australian Service Departments.

This is, of course, quite acceptable, but it is important that
they should be clearly designated as individual Service
Representatives to the Service Departments in respect of such
functions, as distinct from those for which they are accredited to
the Defence Department. In regard to their further responsibility
as the British Military Advisers to the United Kingdom High
Commissioner in Australia, a position which you understand to be
similar to the Australian Defence Department Representative in
London, I would mention that, in our case, sub-paragraph 16(b) of
the Australian memorandum provides that the Australian Defence
Representative in London is responsible for advice to the
Australian High Commissioner in London on questions of Defence
Policy and of general Joint Service interest, after such
consultation as is necessary with the Australian Service
Representatives in London. Similarly, sub-paragraph 12(ii)provides
that the Head of the United Kingdom Liaison staff would accompany
his High Commissioner to the Australian Council of Defence as
adviser.

13. In regard to the future of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Committee
in Australia, it is noted from paragraph 7 that you are agreeable
to it being dissolved as soon as practicable, and the control of
the British Commonwealth Occupation Force being assigned to the
Australian Government as proposed. A letter similar to the one
addressed to you was forwarded at the same time to the Governments
of the other parts of the British Commonwealth participating in
the British Commonwealth Occupation Force, but no replies have so
far been received. You will be further advised of the arrangements
for the change-over, when the concurrence of all Governments has
been received.

14. With reference to the approach to the problems mentioned in
your final paragraph, I would make the following comments:-

(a) The extent of the responsibilities that the Australian
Government is willing to undertake in matters relating to regional
security in the Pacific: This has been referred to in paragraph 8
above.

(b) Measures for the protection and furtherance of Commonwealth
interests in South East Asia: As stated in paragraph 7 of the
Australian memorandum on Co-operation in British Commonwealth
Defence, the methods and procedure on political policy must
conform to the broad principles that were referred to therein. The
machinery now agreed to will provide a means by which military
policy and measures can be examined and considered.

(c) An implementation of the principle of joint responsibility of
Commonwealth members for the protection of lines of communication
between main support areas: As stated by me at the Prime
Ministers' Conference, and as mentioned in paragraph 6 of the
Australian memorandum on Co-operation in British Commonwealth
Defence, this is a matter for examination in the light of other
commitments, and particularly those of a British Commonwealth
nature which have already been or may be accepted. The machinery
now agreed to will provide a means of doing this.

15. In connection with sub-paragraph 14(b) above, the question has
been raised informally of liaison between the South East Asia
Defence Committee and the Australian Defence Machinery. It has
been pointed out by us that this Committee is essentially part of
and responsible to the United Kingdom Defence Machinery, but,
subject to the scope of such liaison being defined, the Australian
Government would have no objection to direct liaison on an
official level, if the United Kingdom Government should desire it.

16. In conclusion, I would like to repeat some views on the use of
the machinery of the various parts of the British Commonwealth for
co-operation in Defence, which were expressed to Field Marshal
Montgomery during his visit, and which met with his complete
agreement. Each Government must retain the right of deciding its
own Policy and the commitments which it is prepared to accept. The
constitutional history of the British Commonwealth has shown that
the correct process in all these matters is an evolution. The
machinery should be allowed to develop in an evolutionary manner
as problems are tackled. This process could be retarded or even
frustrated by an anxiety to hasten too quickly. The approach has
to be gradual and realistic. It would be quite misleading to
accept responsibilities and make promises which could not be
carried out. As stated in sub-paragraph 9(a) of the Australian
memorandum on Co-operation in British Commonwealth Defence, it is
also fundamental to provide for an effective voice by Governments
in the higher control of planning on the official level. There can
be no question of Governments being embarrassed on the political
level by the plans of joint Planning Staffs on the official level,
which are inconsistent with political reality and the resources
that can be provided. As you are aware, there may also be
legislative enactments which relate to such matters.

17. Finally, I would state that the Australian Defence Machinery
is at present heavily burdened with local matters relating to
Post-War Policy, with questions concerning the United Nations,
Disarmament, Peace Treaties, and with the commitments of a British
Commonwealth nature already accepted. In addition, there is a
shortage of suitable officers, both in the Services and the Public
Service, for the tasks in hand. It will therefore be essential to
consider carefully the addition of new problems to the load that
is at present being carried by the Australian machinery.